The Chinese hide behind diplomatic walls to deploy an array of tools not available to democracies, said former Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale on Wednesday, remarking that the flexibility displayed by Indian negotiators can accord them an edge over their Chinese counterparts reluctant to engage with informal diplomacy.
A veteran diplomat and a China expert, Mr. Gokhale, who served as Ambassador to Germany and China besides several high-level appointments, was speaking on his recent book The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India in a talk organised by the Pune International Centre and chaired by diplomat Gautam Bambawale, who was also a former Ambassador to China.
“The Chinese prepare for negotiations very carefully which includes the study of old records which are undeniably better than us as they have a history and tradition of record-keeping. They prepare with wide consultations not just with those within the government, but with ex-government officials and people in different professions. This allows the Chinese negotiators to take the advantage of ‘institutional memory’,” Mr. Gokhale said, stating that the objective behind writing the books was to present an account based on first-hand knowledge on how the Chinese approach negotiation with India, something that was missing in Western diplomatic narratives.
Through six incidents covering a period from 1950-2020, Mr. Gokhale has attempted to discern trends and traits about Chinese negotiating tactics and how they achieved their goals.
“The Chinese want global public opinion to be confused about us. They want public opinion along the Indo-Pacific region to think that because India is pursuing its objectives in the region, any alliance we make with other countries automatically means it is an anti-China alliance, though it is nothing of the sort…We need to be aware of the image that the Chinese want to have about us and must work towards dispelling that,” said the seasoned diplomat, who completed his tenure as India’s Foreign Secretary in January last year.
Setting agenda
Given that in a democracy, everything is open for discussion, Indian negotiators often deviate from the agenda to indulge in informal diplomacy in stark contrast to their Chinese counterparts, for whom agenda setting is extremely important, Mr. Gokhale said.
“The Chinese often attempt to circumscribe the scope of talks which is akin to a method of control during negotiations. It has taken a while for us to figure this out and become wise to the fact that agenda setting is important,” he said.
Mr. Gokhale further said that the Chinese process of negotiation is very “theatrical”, like acting in a play or drama.
“When a Chinese negotiator interacts with his Indian number, the objective is not to be friendly. While we try to build a personal rapport and create a positive atmosphere during the process, for the Chinese, every word or gesture conveys a message and not an emotion. Unlike diplomats who serve a democracy, every posture the Chinese adopt, ranging from flattery to playing the victim, are mere tactics to advance goals and put psychological pressure,” the former diplomat said.
According to Mr. Gokhale, Indians use language in negotiations which is ‘persuasive’ while the Chinese tone is meant to ‘dissuade’ to prevent one from moving forward to achieve one’s objectives.
“They [the Chinese] often resort to accusations of faithlessness and of deviating from the ‘consensus’, though the consensus is never defined…they deliberately leave an unspecified threat hanging in the air,” Mr. Gokhale said, adding that his book is not a factual rendition, but a post-facto reconstruction of how Sino-Indian negotiations proceeded.
He said that one of the most dangerous elements in the process occurs when an idea or proposal (from the Indian side) is met by silence on the Chinese.
“Silence is grand deception on the Chinese part which is intended to distract or divert one’s attention. Therefore, we have to be extremely careful when our proposal is met by silence and have to proceed on the assumption that silence is not assent but dissent,” the former Foreign Secretary said.
For all their guile, Mr. Gokhale said, it does not mean that Indian negotiators are at a disadvantage or the Chinese are far superior in this game.
“The Chinese face discomfiture with ad hoc or unplanned diplomatic sessions and are very regimented and rigid. They have a great reluctance to engage in any kind of informal diplomacy along the margins of a meeting because they don’t like to commit. In the 21st century, and particularly after COVID-19, when we are moving towards digital diplomacy, Indians are at a clear advantage because we are comfortable with informal diplomacy and more flexible,” Mr. Gokhale said.
Stating that the Indian negotiator is usually more empowered than his or her Chinese counterpart, he pointed to the 123 Agreement between India and the United States (U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement) as a benchmark in “flexible” Indian diplomacy.
“The Chinese continued to believe that we would be a nuclear pariah and they showed a lack of understanding about India in the 1990s. They assumed the rest of the world would not give us the legitimacy we craved for. The Chinese media continued to report on ‘negative’ aspects of the Indian socio-political scene in the 1990s without any consideration for the economic reforms already under way. They could not grasp that we had adjusted to the post-World War II order,” Mr. Gokhale said.
Speaking on the momentous 123 Agreement, Mr. Gokhale said that the Chinese assumed that differences with the U.S. and India were very great and had no idea that both former PMs Manmohan Singh and Atal Bihari Vajpayee had worked hard to overcome differences with the U.S..
“The 123 Agreement was a benchmark which proved that when it came to achieving national security objectives, India could do so despite the fact that we are not a permanent member in the UN Security Council. And we could achieve these by following a flexible policy of working with others, though this was not tantamount to an alliance,” he said.
