One of the most relevant recent books on China, from India’s perspective, has been authored by Ketian Zhang, an Assistant Professor at the Schar School of Policy & Government at George Mason University in the U.S. China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion examines when, why and how China attempts to coerce other states over perceived threats to its national security.
A painting depicting a scene from the Long March at an exhibition at the military museum in Beijing. The exhibition commemorates the 80th anniversary of the Long March, a military retreat by the Red Army during the Chinese civil war. | Photo Credit: AP
The book’s merit lies in Zhang’s efforts at crafting a theory about China’s coercion decisions by using case studies relating to the South China Sea, Taiwan, Japan and Tibet. A glaring omission is the India-China case although Zhang recognises that China uses coercion against India. Notwithstanding this omission, Zhang’s book makes an important and valuable contribution to theorising as to why China is selective in its timing, target and tools for coercing other states. It is relevant for Indians who are grappling with the question of what made China undertake its misadventure in Galwan in 2020.
People in Shimla pay tribute to the Indian Army soldiers, who were martyred during the standoff at the India-China border along Galwan valley. | Photo Credit: PTI
Non-military coercion
Zhang’s basic argument is that China acts coercively not just when its national security is physically threatened, but also when it anticipates a threat and feels the need to establish its reputation for firm resolve. It acts in order to both deter the potential threat-maker as well as to message other states not to mess with it. Her core argument is that China is more likely to militarily coerce when the need to establish resolve is high and when the economic and geo-political costs are low. If the latter is also high, then China likely resorts to military coercion only on matters of the highest importance, Taiwan for instance. In other cases, it prefers non-military coercion. The author gives the example of the South China Sea where China has, thus far, preferred to use non-military means of coercion because of the high geo-political risk of American military involvement.
Zhang’s chapter on the South China Sea contains a wealth of information, and uses three different case-studies over a 20-year period to demonstrate how China engages in selective targeting. Although three of the claimant states are ASEAN members, namely, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, China has used military coercion only against the Philippines because of the low economic cost and the high need to establish resolve. In the case of the other two countries, it has used non-coercive means (including grey-zone coercion but not force or threat of use of force) because of the high economic cost and the low need to establish resolve. Zhang also places the use of force by China in the broader context, namely that it is not merely the actions of one player (the Philippines) but the surge in the activities of several players in the South China Sea at the same time, both in the mid-1990s and post-2010, that triggers the selective use of military coercion against the target. The target it selects is the one from which China perceives it will derive the greatest benefit.
A team from the Chinese army marching into the Lhasa Square in Tibet to hoist the Chinese flag. | Photo Credit: Getty Images/istock
The case of Taiwan
On the other hand, in the case of Taiwan, where the need to establish reputation for resolve is very high and the potential economic and geo-political costs are also high, China still uses military coercion because this is a ‘core’ interest for China. Three issues, per Zhang’s book, call for potential use of military coercion even if the other costs are high — Taiwan, Tibet and territorial disputes.
Members of the Taiwanese Marines stand guard on the assault craft at Zouying Navy Base in Kaohsiung, Southern Taiwan. Taiwan is holding spring military drills amid threats from China, which claims the island as its own territory, that it is determined to annex possibly by force. | Photo Credit: AP
This puts India in the list of states to which China is likely to apply military coercive measures. Although India’s case is not dealt with in greater detail, it is implicit that the geo-political costs of militarily coercing India are manageable because the U.S. is less likely to intervene. Zhang makes a distinction between ‘alliance’ and ‘partnership’, and postulates that where a state (Japan) is ‘allied’ to the U.S. the geo-political cost is higher, and therefore China needs to be more careful in application of force, than is the case when a state (India) is only a partner. This distinction does not provide for any nuance in the latter case on the size, abilities or intentions of the state involved or the extent of the ‘partnership’.
One debatable distinction Zhang makes is the definition of grey-zone coercion. From India’s perspective this constitutes any sort of quasi-military activity along the Line of Actual Control. Zhang tries to draw a line between grey-zone coercion which, according to her, is action by civilian authorities, and military coercion done by the PLA. Since Chinese civil-military fusion is well advanced, and China’s fishing fleets and border settlements are military or quasi-military means in civilian garb, such distinction is questionable. To be fair, the author calls for more studies on the concept of grey-zone coercion. If there is one book that the Indian strategic community needs to ponder over as we grapple with how to deal with China in 2024, I would say that it is this book.
China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion; Ketian Ziang, Cambridge University Press, ₹2,615 (Kindle price).
The reviewer is a former foreign secretary and Ambassador to China.
