The end of the Cold War ushered in transformational changes in the strategic and political/ideological context of world affairs. The bipolar world passed into history. The U.S. emerged as the lone superpower. Communism lost its credibility as a model of development across the world. Capitalism triumphed by default. Liberal capitalist globalisation led by the U.S. swept the world since the 1990s. India moved with the tide. Its rightward shift under the leadership of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao marks the beginning of significant political/ideological bonding with the U.S. Rao was the architect behind the historic reforms of 1991. He was also the father of the ‘Look East’ policy, which is applauded by one and all today. The twin initiatives put India on the historic journey of growing proximity with the U.S. The U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement signed under the watch of Manmohan Singh and George Bush was certainly a landmark in the history of their bilateral relations.
A perceptible drift and stagnation in bilateral relations from that high-watermark began early in the Obama Administration. The book under review, ‘India-US Partnership’, zeroes in on this phase of the equation between the two nations. The distinguished contributors to the volume (policy makers, former high officials, and expert analysts from both countries) address two questions in depth: (1) the drift and stagnation and what is to be done about it; (2) the dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and whether U.S. and India could work together more closely on this front, especially in the face of a rising China.
The book was the outcome of a ‘get-together’ sponsored jointly by the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) and the U.S. Heritage Foundation in Delhi in 2012. Even more interesting is the fact that much of the thrust and drift of the findings sound like a rationale behind Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy initiatives, particularly in dealing with China and Pakistan. It is also noteworthy that Ajit Doval, who contributed the chapter on Chinese Intelligence was the Director of VIF then, is currently Modi’s National Security Advisor. The latest development is that he is appointed as the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on border talks with China. Out of the 11 chapters in the book as many as six focus attention on China — its rise, policies, capabilities, and its economy and foreign policy goals.
The analysts in this book agree that since 2009 there has been a slow down in the U.S.-India equation, and that it is not desirable and needs urgent correction. From India’s perspective, China and Pakistan pose serious threats to the nation’s security. The Indian side rightly feels that the American side has not recognis0ed the gravity of the threat posed by Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. With respect to China, both nations have similar concerns. But, over the last few years the U.S. government has given inconsistent signals vis-à-vis China. Initially, Obama tried to woo China and welcomed it to play a larger role in South Asia, much to India’s annoyance. He even talked of the U.S. and China being the G-2 of world affairs. But, China was against playing second fiddle to the lone superpower and refused to fall into what it called “the American trap”. Moreover, America’s focus was only on the maritime issues in the Western Pacific. Such a narrow approach towards expansionist China missed India’s concerns completely. The “pivot to Asia” policy of rebalancing America’s strategy away from the Atlantic to the Pacific came much later.
On the American side, the key concerns were Iran’s role in Afghanistan and its bid to produce nuclear weapons. India had done much to respond to American concerns. But, that was not enough from the U.S. viewpoint. India could play a bridge role, if only the U.S. favoured such an approach. The second concern of the American side is its defence relationship with India. The Obama administration was deeply disappointed for not getting the contract for medium range combat aircraft (MRCA), which went to France. According to India, the selection process was fair and the French aircraft was superior and met India’s needs better. In any case, the U.S. is the largest military supplier to India today and more purchases would continue in the future.
Elsewhere in the book, the shift of centre of gravity from Japan to China in the 1990s, the spectacular rise of the flow of FDI into China, and China’s export led-economic boom are discussed in depth. Ambassador Shukla, its editor, rightly observes that Japan followed the same model of growth earlier — rapid growth initially, but not sustainable in the long run. China is in the same boat today.
The disconnect between U.S. economic and politico-military policies towards China continued from the Clinton era through the Bush years to Obama at present. That is why many Asian nations are lukewarm towards American strategy in the Asia-Pacific. In the emerging adversarial axis between the U.S. and China, India joined hands with the U.S., but with some reservations. This scenario is changing under Modi’s leadership, it must be noted.
Many contributors discuss China as a factor in India-U.S. relations over the decades. It is interesting to note that Lehman, Director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, described India’s policy shift from supporting the democratic movement in Myanmar to pragmatic government-to-government relations as moving from “Look East” to “Act East”. Modi used the same phraseology to describe his new policy initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region.
Lt. General Sawhney deals with the prospects of peace and stability in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of U.S. and Western forces from the scene. Since his assessment of 2012, the Security Agreement signed recently commits the U.S. forces to stay on for a year after December 2014. Many analysts point out that the FDI-fed and export-led Chinese economic growth has slowed down and the rate of growth is likely to decrease further. The chosen alternative strategy of expanding domestic consumption on a large scale comes with its own set of challenges. The inevitable growth of middle class demanding more freedoms against single party authoritarian rule puts the nation’s economics and politics at odds with each other, Nageswaran points out.
In conclusion, a careful reading of the book shows it contains the rationale behind Modi’s foreign policy stance in general and his decision to opt for enhanced partnership with the U.S. to achieve his twin goals of promoting rapid and sustained economic growth at home and enhancing nation’s security vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. This explains the bold and unprecedented invitation to President Obama to be the Chief Guest at the Republic Day celebrations on January 26, 2015. His prompt and positive response indicates that the other side is equally enthusiastic in this regard. How this will play out only future can unravel.
This is a very perceptive analysis of the bilateral equation and deserves the attention of research scholars and policy makers interested in international relations and foreign policy.
