Before 9/11 forced a rethink, the United States considered terrorist threats from abroad more serious than home-based threats. The responsibility for co-ordinating preventive action was, therefore, vested in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which handles external intelligence.
The CIA had a Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) for tasks of co-ordination and follow-up action on the intelligence collected by various agencies. The CTC had officers taken on deputation from different agencies. They worked under a CIA officer.
In India, the Vajpayee government set up a Task Force in May 2000 — I was one of the members — for revamping the country's intelligence apparatus. Its report recommended, inter alia , the setting-up of a CTC on the U.S. model. Since in India, the IB had over-all responsibility for counter-terrorism and liaison with the State police, it suggested that the CTC should be part of the IB and should work under its Director (DIB).
The Vajpayee government set up the CTC, under an executive order, as part of the IB but for reasons not clear to me, it named it the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and not the CTC. It looked upon the MAC as a clandestine wing of the IB, itself a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. Therefore, no legal powers were recommended for the MAC.
The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the U.S. brought out serious gaps in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. The Bush administration, therefore, set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in 2004 as an independent institution not under the control of any existing agency. It was placed under the Director, National Intelligence, who is part of the President's personal staff.
While the U.S. gave up the CTC after 9/11, the Indian model of the MAC, patterned after the U.S. model, has continued functioning. Neither the Vajpayee government nor the Manmohan Singh government revisited the recommendations of the Saxena Task Force in the light of the 9/11 lessons.
Gaps in the system
The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai brought out gaps in the functioning of the MAC. Flow of preventive intelligence and follow-up action on even the limited available intelligence were unsatisfactory. In a statement to the Lok Sabha after taking over as Home Minister, P. Chidambaram admitted that the responsibility for follow-up-action on the available intelligence was diffused.
He, therefore, decided to set up the NCTC after a visit to the U.S. But his model of the Indian NCTC differs from the U.S. model in two respects. The U.S. NCTC is an independent institution not under the control of any of the existing agencies. In India, it is to be made a wing of the IB and will work under the DIB.
In the U.S., the NCTC is a legal institution set up under Congressional legislation after bipartisan consultations, but it does not have any legal powers to act on its own in matters such as arrest, detention, interrogation, searches etc.
Undesirable powers
The Indian NCTC has been set up by executive notification under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967. This has obviated the need for fresh legislation and fresh political consultation at the Centre and with the States.
More seriously, the Indian NCTC is to be given powers of arrest and searches as part of its preventive operations.
Granting these powers to the IB through the NCTC mechanism could have two undesirable consequences. First, there may be allegations of misuse of the IB for harassing political opponents.
Secondly, the IB's role as a clandestine intelligence collection organisation may get affected. The IB will be preoccupied with defending its arrests before the courts and against allegations of human rights violations.
Today, the IB enjoys protection from the Right to Information Act. If it has these powers and adds policing to its functions, it may no longer be able to enjoy this protection.
The Home Minister had two options. If he felt the NCTC must have the powers of search and arrest, he could have made it an independent agency. Or if he felt that it must work under the IB, he could have made it a division of the agency without giving it these powers.
His unwise action in arming the NCTC with these powers as part of the IB could prove counterproductive. There is no opposition in India to the NCTC concept, which is necessary. The opposition is to some of its features, and to the manner in which it has been set up, without adequate consultations.
Mr. Chidambaram should not stand on false prestige. He should re-visit the proposed NCTC architecture in consultation with political parties and the States.
(B. Raman is a former Additional Secretary with the Research & Analysis Wing.)
