The most remarkable accomplishment of Narendra Modi as Prime Minister has been that he did not let Opposition parties close ranks completely against him, though he entered the national political stage as the most polarising political figure in modern Indian history. This reflects more on the ideological nature of Opposition leaders and their concern for secular India than on Mr. Modi’s ability.
Coalition failures
Since 2014, attempts were made to put together a coalition against him. For instance, in 2017, there was a n Opposition gathering in Chennai on June 3 , then-DMK chief M. Karunanidhi’s birthday; on August 17, former Janata Dal (United) president Sharad Yadav launched the ‘Sanjhi Virasat Bachao’ (save composite culture) in New Delhi, where many Opposition leaders were invited; at Rashtriya Janata Dal leader Lalu Prasad’s ‘BJP Hatao, Desh Bachao’ rally on August 27, 15 parties took part .
And this January, Trinamool Congress Mamata Banerjee’s congregation in Kolkata was attended by 22 parties. On February 13, Arvind Kejriwal of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) too held a gathering. A direct relationship, it is often argued, exists between the authoritarian conduct of a Prime Minister and the holder of the most powerful political office, and formation of a pan-Indian coalition against him or her. Examples of Indira Gandhi in 1975-77 or even Rajiv Gandhi in 1989 are often cited to corroborate this hypothesis. Though the coalition against Mr. Modi is far more organised today than it was in 2014, it’s not anywhere close to that of 1977 or 1989.
Looking beyond
The endeavour by the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) leader, K. Chandrasekhar Rao (KCR), to float a Federal Front may be a non-starter, but in Uttar Pradesh, the Samajwadi Party-Bahujan Samaj Party alliance without the Congress raises a valid question: Is there a space beyond the BJP and the Congress in the Indian polity today? Indeed, a vast political space does exist outside their social bases. This is partly because the best days of the Congress, India’s grand old party, are over.
It does not imply that the Congress won’t win more seats or even lead a coalition government, but its revival seemingly will be driven more by forces of anti-incumbency. The Congress is unlikely to form a national government on its own in the coming decades. On the other hand, a general disapproval of the BJP’s toxic politics does exist, led by a dominant social coalition particularly in regions where a credible alternative is presented, as was the case with the AAP’s victory in Delhi and later by the Lalu-Nitish Kumar coalition in Bihar in 2015, both at the height of the Modi wave.
The TRS is a dynastic party. Therefore, Mr. Rao’s attempt to weave a coalition of other regional dynastic parties would barely pass as a serious alternative ideologically to what the Congress or the BJP have offered already. If Mr. Rao’s adventure worked out, it would be an extension of the dominant populism that prevails today. Parties that do not allow internal democracy cannot be sincere champions of democracy, and the political elites who use dynastic veto to throttle the legitimate aspirations of its new generation of leaders cannot be serious advocates of equality of opportunities. Both run against the spirit of the Constitution and tenets of liberal democracy. Therefore, what Mr. Rao appears to be offering is more a case of old wine in a new bottle.
Shift to the right
Since 2014, scholars have argued that India has moved right ideologically. Let us not blame Indian voters for this shift because they waited for decades for the non-Congress space to be occupied by a secular coalition. Sadly, none of the coalitions that emerged victorious in 1977, 1989 or 1996 lasted for long. If they had, the BJP might have remained a regional outfit. When V.P. Singh was confronted by the media during the post-Babri Masjid period for his hypocrisy in characterising the BJP as a fascist party — it had backed his government in 1989 — he explained that the decision by the National Front government of taking outside support of the BJP was based on the understanding that the BJP would emerge as a weakened force, as was the case with the Jan Sangh during the 1977 anti-Emergency coalition. As it turned out, it was the V.P. Singh-led political formation that imploded.
Scholars will endlessly debate if having the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Jan Sangh as part of an anti-Emergency coalition gave a new lease of life and legitimacy to the Hindu right. But the fact is the Hindu right emerged deeply demoralised in 1980 when the Janata Party coalition imploded and consequently Atal Bihari Vajpayee was opposed to the Jan Sangh’s revival in any shape or form. It was the determination and persistence of L.K. Advani that finally persuaded Vajpayee to come along and help set up the BJP in 1980.
The fact that the Jan Sangh was revived under a completely new name indicates that there was a realisation among its leaders that it had lost is brand value. Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), it is worth recalling, did make serious efforts to persuade the RSS to give up on the idea of a Hindu Rashtra and create space for Muslims, though the RSS remained unmoved, which devastated JP.
The vote share riddle
While the social capital of the Hindu right might have increased today, Indian voters are yet to embrace its extreme agenda to the extent to vote it to power in New Delhi. In 2014, Indian voters embraced the BJP only on the development plank and many have found themselves in a trap. Clearly, instead of a Third Front there is a need for a First Front to confront the challenge that the Hindu right poses to India’s secular polity.
Shaikh Mujibur Rehman teaches at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, and has edited the recent book, ‘Rise of Saffron Power’
