Thomas Joseph, Member Secretary, Kerala State Higher Education Council, writes:
This is a response to the rejoinder of Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon (Feb. 22, 2010) to my article on National Commission for Higher Education and Research (NCHER) Bill (Feb. 6, 2010).
I stand by my argument that the pious intensions to promote autonomy of higher educational institutions set forth in the preamble of the bill are undermined by various provisions of the bill. Let me cite a few provisions from the bill. It is mandatory for all universities, including state universities, to appoint Vice-Chancellors only from a panel of five names forwarded by the Commission from within the national registry of scholars prepared by it (clause 26). A university constituted by an act of Parliament or State Legislature shall commence its academic operations only after being authorised by the Commission (clause 32). For such authorisation, the university has to produce satisfactory assessment report from an accreditation agency registered with the Commission (Clause 33). Authorisation once granted can be revoked by the Commission, without reference to the Parliament/State Legislature, as the case may be (clause 36). No university shall award degrees unless it is authorised by the Commission in this regard (Clause 41). The Commission shall frame national curriculum and enforce it in the universities through regulations (Clause 54). All these new arrangements further undermine the limited administrative and academic autonomy the universities enjoy today.
A single window regulatory system at the Central level might be a convenient device for enforcing national policies across the country. But the bill provides no structural safety-net to insulate the system against authoritarianism and corruption, which have been the bane of apex regulatory bodies like the UGC, the AICTE and the NCTE, which are being subsumed by the NCHER. The apprehension is all the more serious as extensive regulatory, administrative and financial powers, which the UGC or other apex regulatory agencies never enjoyed, are sought to be bestowed upon the Commission. Such concentration of powers in a small body of seven experts is potentially dangerous.
It is not clear as to how the new system could ensure “true autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning.” Autonomy implies not only “delivery of educational services” as “a decentralised activity at the institutional level,” as Dr. Madhava Menon would have us believe, but also taking policy decisions on what to teach, whom to teach and how to teach and setting up and administering institutions that are engaged in such activities. Since autonomy also implies accountability to national and local societal values and goals, the implementation of autonomy inevitably also involves setting up a two-tier regulatory mechanism, one at the national and the other at the State level. Hence the issue of federalism in education is not one of “legislative competence” alone. It is one of the defining features of autonomy, more so in a country of continental dimensions as ours. Autonomy thrives through decentralisation, through celebration of diversity.
In a federal set-up, State governments cannot be treated as a part of the amorphous crowd of “stakeholders.” They are as much policymakers as the Central government. The appropriate forum for consulting the states on the collaborative enterprise of education is not hurriedly convened meetings of “stakeholders,” but the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE), which was revived from limbo after a gap of 10 years only in 2004. Constitutionality apart, a democratic, consensual process of decision making should get precedence over arguments over legislative competence, administrative convenience and pious intentions. Education is so much an integral part of the project of inclusive nation building that it cannot be merrily abandoned to the care of seven experts, even if they all happen to be Nobel Laureates.
