The Japan-India talks on civil nuclear cooperation, which began in Tokyo on Monday, are a pointer to a new trend in the politics of East Asia. Not yet a political process that cannot be reversed, this new trend is the gradual recognition of India's growing relevance to a future geopolitical order in East Asia.
For several decades now, Japan has enjoyed a “unique” position across the world as a proactive non-proliferation guru. Surely, therefore, its latest decision to “negotiate” a civil nuclear cooperation pact with India is of unprecedented importance to the changing regional realities. In September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India an “exceptional status.” With “pacifist” Japan being privy to the NSG's unusual consensus at that time, India gained exemption from the cartel's guidelines. Japan was fully cognisant of why New Delhi was so treated at the behest of the United States. Yet, Tokyo rose above its status as an American ally and chose to stay clear of the nuclear rush towards India that followed the NSG's September 2008 decision.
Attitude of scepticism
Even as Russia, France, and the U.S. lost no time thereafter to look at the new prospects of doing business with India in the peaceful atomic energy sector, Japan remained unimpressed by such a nuclear rush. In a sense, Tokyo's hesitation, until now, symbolised the general East Asian attitude of scepticism about India's real intentions. While Japan is a globally recognised player from East Asia in the civil nuclear energy sector, China's capabilities in this domain are also well known. South Korea, too, is a keen player in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. And Australia, with its vast uranium deposits, is a nuclear supplier of considerable importance in the geopolitical space of East Asia.
Of these East Asian countries, China is in a privileged position with reference to India. At one political level, China's relentless rise as potential global superpower gives it a perspective different from the U.S. worldview. At another echelon, New Delhi is aware of China's geo-strategic interests in Pakistan. So, China's assent to the NSG's U.S.-brokered consensus in September 2008 amounted to a gesture of being mindful of the interests of the U.S. and India, as articulated by their governments, at two different levels.
South Korea and Australia are of course allies of the U.S., although not in the same category as Japan. The U.S.-led consensus in favour of New Delhi in the NSG is something that these three East Asian countries have had to reckon with, notwithstanding their individual views on the regional implications of the upward trajectory of India's civil nuclear energy programmes. As a matter of additional diplomatic nuance, Japan and Australia, active partners in the global non-proliferation debate, are in a sub-category that does not include South Korea as a proactive player. Moreover, these three countries have acknowledged, over time and not necessarily in unison, that India has maintained impeccable non-proliferation credentials. India's track record of this order, even while continuing stay outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has invariably come in for particular notice in this context. This does not, of course, imply that these countries share India's scepticism of the NPT as a discriminatory piece of international law.
Seoul's move
Unsurprisingly in these circumstances, South Korea moved ahead of Japan and Australia last January in seeking to establish new civil nuclear links with India. Seoul clearly sought to capitalise on its success in bagging a civil nuclear contract with the United Arab Emirates in a competitive process of international bidding. The civil nuclear energy market in India, given New Delhi's non-proliferation credentials, was, in Seoul's calculations, an attractive destination worth exploring.
This issue was first placed on the Seoul-New Delhi agenda during South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's visit to India as its Republic Day guest this year. And, on June 18, External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna announced in Seoul that India and South Korea would soon commence negotiations for a civil nuclear energy pact. A day earlier, he told Mr. Lee that there was much scope for a new trajectory of bilateral cooperation in the domain of space. South Korea promptly agreed to explore the possibilities of launching its satellites aboard India's space launch vehicles. It is not immediately clear, though, whether there can be some kind of a diplomatic trade-off between New Delhi and Seoul on these unrelated science-and-technology issues.
Australia's stand
By contrast, Australia's Labour government, which sailed with the U.S. without demur in the NSG in September 2008, has not evinced interest in selling uranium to India. Canberra's reasoning, in this context, is that India remains outside the NPT framework. So, with Julia Gillard having now assumed office as Australia's Prime Minister and promised to seek a mandate of her own in “the coming months,” it will come as a surprise if the closed issue of uranium sales to India is reopened in the present context.
A relevant poser, therefore, is why has the new Japanese Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, decided to break ranks with Australia in choosing to negotiate a civil nuclear agreement with India. Tokyo's latest move followed “consultations” with New Delhi. Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said on June 25 that Tokyo took this new initiative only “after confirming that India has been steadily carrying out its commitments and actions” as stipulated in the terms of New Delhi's exemption from the NSG guidelines as approved in September 2008. Also cited by Mr. Okada as factors relevant to this new initiative were “India's importance for Japan,” the urgent necessity of combating global warming, and Tokyo's own updated energy and industrial policies.
The proverbial intricacies of rocket science are not required to discern Japan's strategic compulsions that go beyond the political reasons it cited now. Mr. Kan has already committed himself to accommodating U.S. military interests in Okinawa, an issue over which his predecessor, Yukio Hatoyama, quit as prime minister. This emotive issue is intricately linked to the dynamics of Japan's domestic politics. However, Mr. Kan's foreign policy message is that he is mindful of Washington's heightened interests in East Asia at this time of new geo-strategic cross currents in the region.
Mr. Kan's decision to negotiate with India for “cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy” is reflective of a desire to enlarge the base of Tokyo's geopolitical reach. This makes sense in a context dominated by the continuing rise of China. Surely, both China and Japan have been pursuing a qualitatively improved bilateral engagement in recent months. At the same time, the regional scene is becoming more complex, with the Association of South East Asian Nations seeking to invite not only the U.S. but also Russia to a new ASEAN+8 dialogue forum. China and India, which is widely seen in the region as a U.S.-friend, besides the U.S. itself and Russia, will be among the proposed eight partners of the 10-member ASEAN.
Aside from such long-term perspectives, Japan's latest civil nuclear initiative towards India is reflective of a softening of stand by an ardent NPT protagonist. A relevant question, with no easy answer, is whether this may impinge, in some way, on the NSG's unsettled thinking on China's current move towards Pakistan in the civil nuclear domain.
