Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's visit to India last week became a celebration of the “Putin Decade” in bilateral relations. It was Mr. Putin's fifth visit to India since 2000, when he became the Russian President, and the first since he stepped down and shifted to the post of Prime Minister two years ago. Notwithstanding the change in Mr. Putin's official status both sides were at pains to make it a president-level visit. This served to emphasise Mr. Putin's role in rebuilding close ties with India after a period of drift in the 1990s.
Speaking at a video conference in New Delhi Mr. Putin stressed that India had been Russia's strategic partner “for decades” by virtue of “near complete concurrence of our geopolitical interests.”
Convergence of interests has indeed defined relations between India and Russia for the past 60-odd years. There are simply no other two big nations in the world that have enjoyed so close and invariably friendly relations for such a long time as India and Russia. After the end of the Cold War, when interstate relations were stripped of ideological coats, it took India and Russia time to realise that their shared interests did not depend on the changing global scenarios or on the vagaries of their interaction with other countries.
Harsh realisation
In the first post-Soviet decade when Russia courted the U.S. in a naive hope of winning a place in the sun in the western world, then President Boris Yeltsin had all but written off Soviet-era special relationship with India as a vestige of the Cold War confrontation. The harsh realisation that geopolitical rivalries with the West did not end with the Cold War dawned on Russian elites towards the end of the 1990s.
Within months of assuming presidency in May 2000 Mr. Putin paid his first visit to India to sign the historic Declaration on Strategic Partnership reconstituting relations between the two nations as geopolitical allies.
As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted in his statement for the press after talks with Mr. Putin:
“Prime Minister Putin has been the architect of the strategic partnership between India and Russia, and we owe a deep sense of gratitude to him for bringing our two countries so close to each other.”
Ever since Mr. Putin's first visit to India Moscow has never swerved from the path of building close strategic ties with India. India today is Russia's most trusted defence partner in the world, including the former Soviet space. Russia is the only country that is prepared to share with India cutting-edge strategic technologies in the construction of military aircraft, ships and missiles.
Much has been said about the acrimony between Delhi and Moscow over the Russian demand for an upward price revision for the Gorshkov overhaul. But the blame for the dispute, which was finally settled during Mr. Putin's visit, should not be placed at the Russian door only. Indian officials must also bear responsibility for signing the original contract on the basis of only a superficial technical inspection of the warship that failed to correctly assess the full volume of the work required.
The U.S. of course has loomed largest on the radar screens of both India and Russia in the 2000s but Moscow has not allowed its ups and downs with Washington to impact ties with New Delhi. During George W. Bush' presidency, when Russian-American relations sank to a post-Cold War low, Russia streamlined and expanded its defence ties with India, shared expertise in building nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, and secured for India observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Today, when Russia's ties with the U.S. are on the rise thanks to President Barack Obama's policy of “reset”, Moscow is imparting new dynamism to all-round cooperation with New Delhi. And, as Mr. Putin pointedly reminded to his hosts in New Delhi, Russia has never sold any weapons to Pakistan (despite repeated requests) out of respect for India's concerns.
India's record has not been so consistent. When the Bush administration warmed up to India and signed the landmark nuclear deal, Delhi shifted its goalposts. It signed up with the U.S., Japan and Australia to set up a quadripartite grouping prompting Moscow's concerns about “counter-productive” attempts to set up closed defence alliances. India noticeably lost interest in the SCO, confining its participation to economic issues only, and broke ranks with Russia and China on Iran's nuclear programme. Finally, Delhi shocked Moscow by backing away at the last moment from signing an agreement for the supply of four additional reactors for the Kudankulam plant, presumably out of fears to provoke U.S. displeasure. The 2007 Indo-Russian summit in Moscow where the accord was to be sealed became the frostiest bilateral interaction in years.
Raft of defence deals
Mr. Putin's visit put these problems in the past. Coming barely three months after the annual Indo-Russian summit in Moscow, the visit underscored Russia's desire to take bilateral ties to new highs. The two sides signed of a raft of defence deals to the tune of $4 billion. Russia agreed to provide exclusive access for India to military uses of the GLONASS global positioning system, indispensable for precision targeting of guided missiles. India will partner Russia in the development and manufacture of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the most ambitious joint project yet that will enhance India's aircraft-building capabilities and guarantee air superiority for its Air Force for decades to come. In two months India will take delivery of a Russian-built nuclear attack submarine that will give the Indian Navy invaluable experience in operating in future indigenously built nuclear submarines of similar design.
By 2013 Russia will hand over to India the retrofitted Admiral Gorshkov/INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier complete with MiG-29K deck fighters. Another batch of the same planes will provide air power to India's indigenous aircraft carrier that is under construction. In the next few months India and Russia are to sign a contract for the purchase of additional 40 Su-30MKI long-range multi-role fighters, bringing the total number of these aircraft with the Indian Air Force to 230. Also in the pipeline is a joint venture to build a medium-haul military transport aircraft (MTA).
Impressive as the defence deals are they pale in comparison with a breakthrough in the field of nuclear energy. The agreements reached during Mr. Putin's visit pave the way to the supply of up to 16 Russian nuclear reactors to India. More importantly, they provide for technology transfers and progressive indigenisation of supplies for the reactors. Unlike the U.S. Russia did not demand that India pass special legislation to limit the liabilities resulting from possible nuclear accidents. The nuclear accords with Russia should help India resolve remaining problems with operationalising the nuclear pact with the U.S. and fend off possible pressure at the Washington Summit on Nuclear Security next month and the NPT Review Conference soon thereafter.
One big difference
There is no doubt that India needs both Moscow and Washington to advance its strategic interests. And both Russia and the U.S. are eager to expand cooperation with India to advance their own interests. There is one big difference: U.S. interests in the region, for example, vis-à-vis China or Afghanistan, may not coincide with India's, whereas Russian interests do, as Mr. Putin emphasised last week in New Delhi. Russia is not trying to build up India as a bulwark against China and is just as concerned as India about the U.S.-Pakistan plan for re-Talibanisation of Afghanistan.
It is to be hoped that India's renewed focus on Russia is not motivated by New Delhi's current problems with the U.S. or any other country. The Putin Decade should provide conclusive proof that Indo-Russian partnership has enduring value and is not to be neglected in chasing other friendships. Mr. Singh's description of relations with Russia as a “key pillar of our foreign policy” inspires optimism.
