The availability of serious, well-researched literature on intelligence is in inverse proportion to the insatiable public interest the subject attracts. It is this deficit that the Harvard University historian and scholar, Calder Walton, seeks to bridge through his magisterial work Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West.
From the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Russia — or the U.S.S.R. till 1991 — and its satellites on one hand and the U.K., the U.S. and their allies on the other have been mutually locked in shadowy wars that largely play out beyond the glare of public attention. This is because the existential conflicts between communism and capitalism for much of the 20th century and between authoritarianism and liberal democracy in the 21st century have remained intractable. Intelligence agencies, being at the “sharp end” of these ideological and geopolitical contests, can never take a pause from their exertions.
Cold War to 21st century
From the twists and turns of last century’s Cold War to the gathering momentum of the “New Cold War” between the U.S. and China, Walton expertly navigates the “stream of time,” doing full justice to the “action parts” of intelligence — espionage, sabotage, subversion and information warfare, as he puts it — as also to the “fourth theme,” or analysis which involves “understanding an opponent’s aims and capabilities.” The critical cryptanalysis breakthroughs of the U.K. which enabled the Allied powers to read Nazi Germany’s military and diplomatic codes during World War II, the thorough penetration of the “Manhattan Project” by the Soviets, the betrayal of the West by the ideologically-driven “Cambridge Five” and the priceless human intelligence delivered by the Soviet agent, Oleg Penkovsky, which gave President Kennedy room for diplomatic manoeuvre at the height of the Cuban missile crisis are among the storied instances from the past that Walton recounts to bring home to readers both the nobler and darker arts that characterise the world of intelligence.
Walton reminds readers that the underlying strategies of intelligence — to spy on, disrupt and degrade enemy states — remain unchanged notwithstanding the fact that we live in a world transformed by digital technology. At the same time, the new globalised information environment has inverted the nature of intelligence, with open-source information, the bulk of which is generated by the private sector, assuming greater importance than the secrets that governments traditionally collect. He posits that the eventual outcome of this century’s East-West intelligence wars, in which the intelligence services of China seek to follow the Soviet playbook even while taking it to new levels, will be determined by which side is better at “harnessing imagination” to exploit complex data and convert it into meaningful insights through technologies such as machine learning, artificial intelligence (AI) and supercomputing.
The India angle
Indian readers will find the chapter on the intelligence wars fought by the Cold War adversaries in the countries of the Third World — now known as the Global South — particularly interesting. The devastation left in the wake of covert Western interventions in places such as Vietnam, British Guiana (Guyana), Congo, Ghana, Chile and Afghanistan is described in riveting detail. The section on superpower influence operations in India has a moral: the political foundations laid by the leaders of the then-newly-independent country were too strong to be shaken by the meddling of external actors. Walton’s assertions about the late A.C.N. Nambiar, confidant of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, having been recruited by Soviet intelligence or, more lately, India having “aligned itself” with Russia over the Ukraine war may, however, be contested by Indian historians and diplomats.
Other lessons stand out. First, timely, relevant and accurate intelligence will deliver margins for decision makers who are willing to listen and encourage the speaking of truth to power. Second, aggressive intelligence wars are primarily waged by weaker states to equalise the balance of power they feel is otherwise weighted against them. Third, covert action can be successful only if it is in alignment with broader policy goals: seductive as it is, covert action cannot be a quick fix for failed diplomacy. Four, strategic doctrines bereft of strategic empathy — the ability to understand how a state’s actions are perceived by its adversaries — are likely to lead to miscalculations. Above all, the greatest contribution spies can make is to help prevent the outbreak of war.
Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West; Calder Walton, Abacus, ₹707 (Kindle price).
The reviewer was Special Secretary in R&AW. The views expressed are personal.
Published - October 27, 2023 09:02 am IST