Reading Kim Jong-un’s mind

At least the U.S. administration must do this in order to defuse the current crisis

August 17, 2017 12:02 am | Updated December 04, 2021 10:45 pm IST

Korean Peninsula crisis made ​​of gear

Korean Peninsula crisis made ​​of gear

Is North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un a “crazy fat kid” and a “total nut job”, as U.S. President Donald Trump has described him, or is he a rational leader who makes his foreign policy choices to protect the interests of his regime? Every discussion around the North Korean nuclear crisis could eventually settle around this basic question. If he is an irrational, crazy and impulsive leader, it’s difficult to reach a diplomatic settlement with him. A military solution to the North Korean issue is even more difficult and risky as Mr. Kim could use the country’s nuclear arsenal in retaliation. That’s a cul-de-sac. On the other hand, if there’s a strategy behind Mr. Kim’s perceived madness, it at least opens avenues for further engagement.

Overcoming an asymmetry

Most accounts of the Korean crisis are written from the perspective of Pyongyang’s rivals where an erratic, despotic regime is portrayed as relentlessly pursuing dangerous weapons in defiance of international public opinion and sanctions. But if one looks at the whole issue from a North Korean security point of view, it is not hard to find a method behind the North’s actions. It’s a country that’s been technically at war with its neighbour for almost seven decades. There are also multiple U.S. bases in South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Guam Island and a naval presence in the East China Sea and the Pacific, in the vicinity of North Korea. In terms of conventional military might, the impoverished North knows that it’s no match for the U.S. This has forced it to make extreme choices to overcome the asymmetry in capabilities.

This strategic insecurity was reinforced in the 1990s when Russia became a directionless, timid, floating power after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and China gradually moved closer to the U.S. These were the only allies North Korea had. In 1992, China established formal relations with South Korea, which deepened Pyongyang’s concerns. Adopting a two-pronged strategy, it fast-tracked its missile and nuclear programmes — even announcing its intention to pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT — and expressed a willingness to negotiate. The purpose, as it seems now, was to prompt world powers, mainly the U.S., to sit down to talk and make assurances on security. This strategy met with success as the Clinton administration responded constructively. In 1994, Pyongyang agreed to freeze the operation and construction of nuclear reactors in line with the Agreed Framework signed with Washington. In return, the U.S. promised two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors.

Mr. Clinton sent special envoy and former Defence Secretary William J. Perry to build additional agreements into the Framework. Mr. Perry recently told The New York Times that both sides were on the verge of an agreement when Mr. Clinton’s term got over. The George W. Bush administration took a hawkish stance towards Pyongyang. In 2002, Mr. Bush lumped North Korea with Iraq and Iran in the “Axis of Evil”. Pyongyang withdrew not only from the Agreed Framework but also from the NPT, and accelerated efforts to gain nuclear weapons. With President Barack Obama following the tested and failed policy of sanctions and intimidation, the North steadily expanded its military capabilities. Weeks before his inauguration, Mr. Trump had said North Korea would never have inter-continental ballistic missile capability, betting on China to rein in Pyongyang. Though Beijing has considerable economic leverage over the North, it is a mistake to assume that it can dictate terms to Pyongyang. Also, China has its own apprehensions about the U.S.’s plans towards Asia. That it won’t give up on the North entirely is only due to American pressure. Seven months into his presidency, Mr. Trump is dealing with a North Korea equipped with nuclear bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach U.S. territory.

Both the diplomatic and military options are now a lot more difficult than those in the early 1990s. A limited attack by the U.S. could snowball into a full-fledged nuclear war, threatening millions in East Asia. The North’s nuclear facilities are spread across its mountainous regions making it difficult to destroy them. So are the country’s missile capabilities, which reportedly have mobile launchers that could survive an attack on defence bases. There are thousands of pieces of artillery along the Demilitarised Zone that could be used to attack Seoul which lies roughly 50 km from the border.

For a diplomatic solution, the North will have to make great compromises. In the 1990s, North Korea was an aspiring nuclear power and all it needed to surrender was its ambition in return for security. Now that it is a nuclear power, will it abandon its nuclear weapons in return for security assurances? It’s unlikely to happen as the examples of Iraq and Libya show. Both Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadhafi, respectively, had given up their nuclear ambitions, saw their regimes toppled by Western invasions and then were killed. Even the example of Iran would not be encouraging for North Korea. Tehran agreed to curb its nuclear activities and open its reactors for routine international inspections in return for the lifting of international sanctions during the Obama presidency. The Trump administration has taken an extremely hostile view, added more sanctions on Tehran, joined hands with its regional rivals, and even threatened to cancel the certification of Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal. Mr. Kim would be asking himself how he could trust American security assurances even if they come by.

China template

North Korea would rather prefer a Chinese model. China exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1964, which led to it being treated as a rogue nuclear power. But China was accepted into the mainstream international order in the 1970s. Even the U.S., its main rival, initiated a diplomatic process with Beijing. Mr. Kim may be betting on both his nuclear deterrence as well as his chances of being accommodated as a nuclear power in the international system, a game of chicken scenario. Conflict is inevitable if the U.S. and North Korea keep going down the path they are now on. If one swerves, the other will benefit. But will both swerve for a tie and relaunch a diplomatic process afresh?

stanly.johny@thehindu.co.in

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