I would like to respond to some of the points raised by M.K. Narayanan, former National Security Adviser, while reviewing my book, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove (“ >Khurshid Kasuri’s flight of fancy ”, The Hindu , November 5). It may be pertinent to point out that Mr. Narayanan was regarded as a hawk. Even at a time when the peace process between India and Pakistan seemed to be doing very well, he issued a hard-hitting statement to which I refer in my book as ‘A Case of Good Cop/Bad Cop?’ (p. 238).
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri When I raised this matter with Shiv Shankar Menon — later India’s National Security Adviser and then India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan — who I always found very positive about the peace process, he told me, “the Indian establishment believed that they could do business with President Pervez Musharraf. The general thinking of India’s establishment was that the President was guiding Pakistan towards a liberal and progressive future. Therefore, engaging with Musharraf would help promote enduring peace in the region” (p. 241). Interestingly, I had a good working relationship with all of India’s National Security Advisers, including Brajesh Mishra, J.N. Dixit and Mr. Menon. I am at a loss to understand why I did not have an opportunity of interacting with Mr. Narayanan. Only former Prime Minister Dr. Singh would know the reason. I met Mr. Narayanan after I left office when he was Governor of West Bengal and we had a very cordial conversation while going down memory lane and recollecting the progress of the peace process during the tenure in which both of us held office. I now come to some of specific points raised by Mr. Narayanan.
On Kashmir Mr. Narayanan has said that “Kashmir takes up significant large amount of space in my book.” I have listed nine war and near-war situations that Pakistan and India have had to face, all directly or indirectly connected to Kashmir. We have had to endure almost persistent tension along the LoC (Line of Control). Surely, an attempt to resolve the matter in a manner that satisfies a large majority of Kashmiris, Pakistanis, and Indians should be welcomed and should not be considered unreasonable or obsessive? If it were only a Pakistani obsession, what would explain the phenomena easily discernible to anyone who follows the Indian media (not just Pakistani) and watches its television coverage of Kashmir and the state of affairs there? There is no doubt that a large part of the Kashmiri population in Jammu and Kashmir is unhappy with the current situation. Even leaders like Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and Mehbooba Mufti of the PDP (Peoples Democratic Party) and Omar Abdullah of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference — parties which regularly take part in elections, have emphasised on many occasions that their participation in elections in Jammu and Kashmir did not mean that they had accepted the current status, but emphasised that the status of Jammu and Kashmir needed to be resolved by Pakistan, India, and the Kashmiris. The position of various factions of the Hurriyat, the JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front), and others is self-evident.
“ I have listed nine war and near-war situations that Pakistan and India have had to face, all directly or indirectly connected to Kashmir. ”
No “new ideas” on Kashmir? The book describes the international situation; the situation in Kashmir; my interaction with Kashmiri leaders; the implications and importance of Article 370, as Kashmiris explained and which had an impact on the outcome in the framework regarding self-governance on both sides. I have highlighted 11 or 12 important features on which this framework rested, including joint mechanism, visa-free travel for Kashmiris, free and fair elections, demilitarisation, the challenge of non-state actors: centres to wean militants away through DDR (de-radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation), cooperation in hydroelectricity and the water sector, monitoring and review process, conversion of the LoC into a mere ‘Line on the Map’, and all of this and more, to be climaxed by the signing of a Treaty of Peace, Security and Friendship like the Élysée Treaty between Germany and France. Also, it was agreed that neither party would claim victory. What other new ideas does Mr. Narayanan wish me to come forward with, particularly when both former Prime Minister Dr. Singh and former President Musharraf have gone on record to say that they had come very near reaching a solution along the lines detailed in my book and referred to above? No perfect solution to Kashmir, which would satisfy 100 per cent of Kashmiris, Pakistanis, and Indians, is feasible. Both the governments at that time felt that this was the sort of framework that a large majority of Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris could accept. Why should I go fishing on a frolic of my own, searching for newer ideas?
Atmosphere was not warm? Mr. Narayanan could well be right because there were some (luckily not a majority) hardliners not just in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, but also in the Pakistan Foreign Office, who were not happy with the on-going peace process. I admit that in my book. The atmosphere at a public level had, however, changed dramatically as a result of the increased interaction through a more liberal visa regime. The mood of the people could be gauged by anecdotal stories which were common at that time among Pakistanis and Indians who had visited each others’ countries and spoken and written about the warm welcome they had received on the other side. Cricket matches between Pakistan and India are considered by some to be almost a substitute for a battlefield, but my book refers to ‘a public celebration of peace’ when India beat Pakistan at a cricket match in Lahore, and Pakistani youngsters cheered the Indian side and ran across the cricket field carrying flags of both the countries in their hands. This would have been unimaginable earlier. The Pakistani cricket team was also very warmly received at Mohali.
Terrorism
I have repeatedly emphasised in the book in different chapters that there was a rising recognition that Kashmir and other issues with India could not be resolved if non-state actors continued to resort to violence. There are numerous references to the negative role of non-state actors as well as on efforts by Pakistan through DDR to wean militants away from Kashmir. Former Union Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar points out in his review that “before the Mumbai outrage (which took place after Kasuri demitted office), Kasuri had accepted Indian High Commissioner Shiv Shankar Menon’s suggestion of an ‘Anti-Terror Mechanism to ease tensions and restore mutual trust’. At the Havana NAM summit later in 2006, ‘the two countries agreed on Anti-Terror Mechanism to identify and implement counter terror measures and investigation’ as also ‘not to freeze the peace process’ despite terror incidents (such as the Samjhauta Express explosions — the investigation and prosecution of which is proceeding in India at an even slower pace than the investigation and prosecution in Pakistan of the 26/11 attacks). Had the Lambah-Aziz back channel continued into 2008 and beyond, the joint Anti-Terror Mechanism could have been fleshed out. Perhaps it is now time to reactivate the Havana agreement on that issue.” I agree with Mr. Aiyar’s suggestion.
“ I am at a loss to understand why I did not have an opportunity of interacting with Mr. Narayanan. ”
Siachen
It was also around this time that Dr. Singh, while visiting the troops in the area, suggested that Siachen be turned into a ‘mountain of peace’. Obviously, he could not be talking in a vacuum and was aware of the progress being made on the issue in the talks between the two countries. If there is doubt in Mr. Narayanan’s mind, I suggest he read the account by Sanjaya Baru, who was Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Chief Media Advisor in United Progressive Alliance-1. He goes on to say that the Prime Minister made this proposal, regarding turning Siachen into a ‘mountain of peace’, after consulting every retired Army General who actually commanded the troops at Siachen. He even attacks the then Army Chief General J.J. Singh, about whom he says, “In closed-door briefings, the General would say the deal with Pakistan was doable, but in public he would back Antony when the Defence minister chose not to back the Prime Minister.” Interestingly, he even questions former Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s motives in opposing the Prime Minister’s Siachen initiative, which he links to wrangling within the Congress Party.
“Foreign Offices and Foreign Ministers on both sides were kept out of the loop”? How could Mr. Narayanan know what was happening on the Pakistani side? I have named the people to whom the ‘Back Channel’ was reporting. No one has questioned my account. Incidentally, Dr. Singh, former Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, and Gen. Musharraf have all attended my book launches. Does this not send a message to any of the Doubting Thomases? I give all the details and the background of the Kashmir framework agreed to by the two governments on the ‘backchannel’ and approved by those at the highest level in Pakistan, including the President, the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Secretary, Vice Chief of Army Staff (representing the institutional view of the Pakistan Army) and the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence. I do not know who the ‘backchannel’ was reporting to in India, but it is fair to assume that it must have been an equally powerful group of people.
McCain episode — “a bizarre matter”? Only Senators McCain and Lindsey Graham can challenge my account. Richard Holbrooke has died since. I never said that Dr. Singh had approved the suggestion that came from the two Senators. For those interested, the details are there in my book.
(Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri was Foreign Minister of Pakistan from 2002 to 2007. A shorter version of this article appeared in print.)
