While there is no evidence that Barack Obama consulted New Delhi about the impending shift in U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, India must now begin a ‘dialogue' with the Taliban along with a policy to instil confidence in the Pakistani mind about our intentions.
The United States President, Barack Obama's announcement regarding the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan was not India-specific, as compared to Washington's initiative in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to bar the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to New Delhi. But it is more lethal, casting a shadow on India's regional strategies.
Why Mr. Obama took such a decision doesn't actually need much explaining. Put simply, his sharp political instincts prevailed. He had a pledge to redeem; he sensed the public mood; he heard “bipartisan” opinion in Capitol Hill that the soldiers be brought home; he faces an adverse budgetary environment and he understood that his priority should be to mend the U.S. economy rather than wage wars in foreign lands. The “surge” may have made gains, arguably, but gains are reversible; so, what is the point? Meanwhile, Afghan opinion is turning against foreign occupation and the killing of Osama bin Laden offers a defining moment.
On the diplomatic front, regional allies proved exasperatingly difficult, while European allies got impatient to quit. The regional opinion militates against a long-term U.S. military presence, while the contradictions in intra-regional relationships do not lend easily to reconciliation. The foreign policy priorities need vastly more attention: exports and investment, upheaval in West Asia, China's rise, etc.
There is no evidence that Mr. Obama consulted New Delhi about the impending shift in the U.S. strategy in India's immediate neighbourhood. We need to calmly ponder over what the U.S. means when Mr. Obama calls India its “indispensable partner in the 21st century.” In the period ahead, keeping the dialogue process with Pakistan on course; pursuing normalisation of ties with China; consolidating the gains of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's path-breaking visit to Kabul — all these templates of our regional policy assume great importance. Indeed, the raison d'être of a “new thinking” in policymaking cannot but be stressed.
The implications of Mr. Obama's drawdown decision are far-reaching. The U.S. has accepted the Taliban as being a part of the Afghan nation and concluded that it does not threaten America's “homeland security.” No segment of the Taliban movement that is willing for reconciliation will be excluded. Mr. Obama expressed optimism about the peace process. He estimated that al-Qaeda is a spent force and any residual “war on terror” will be by way of exercising vigilance that it doesn't rear its head again. The timeline for the drawdown — 10,000 troops by end-2011, 33,000 by mid-2012 and the bulk of the remaining 70,000 troops at a “steady pace” through 2013-14 — plus the change of command necessitated by David Petraeus's departure in September as the new head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) hardly leaves scope for keeping a high tempo of security operations. Obviously, the Taliban has borne the brunt of the U.S. firepower and has survived.
The stunning geopolitical reality is that the U.S. is barely staving off defeat and is making its way out of the Hindu Kush in an orderly retreat. The Taliban responded to Mr. Obama's announcement saying, “The solution for the Afghan crisis lies in the full withdrawal of all foreign troops immediately. Until this happens, our armed struggle will increase from day to day.” Again, Mr. Obama appears to be optimistic about the Kabul government's ability to assume the responsibility of security by 2014.
Mr. Obama completely avoided mentioning an almost-forgotten pledge that the former U.S. President George W. Bush made in the halcyon days of the war, that the U.S. would someday consider a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan. He, instead, pleaded that this is “a time of rising debt and hard economic times at home” and he needs to concentrate on rebuilding America. The Afghans fear that western aid and projects would dry up. If that happens, Afghanistan will revert to the late 1990s when the Taliban regime first accepted the financial help offered by bin Laden. All hope now hinges on the international conference that Mr. Obama will be hosting in May next year in Chicago.
However, there is no need to press the panic button. A repetition of the civil war scenario of the 1990s appears a remote possibility. The Taliban's ascendancy in the 1990s was more an outright Pakistani conquest of Afghanistan in which the Pakistani air force, artillery, armoured corps, regular officers and intelligence agencies directly participated. The Taliban was a cohesive movement. Besides, there were regional powers determined to provide assistance to the non-Pashtun groups. In all these respects, the situation is radically different today. Pakistan hadn't yet known at that time the blowback of terrorism. The very fact that Pakistan learnt about the secret talks between the Taliban and U.S. representatives from news reports speaks volumes of its command and control of the Quetta Shura.
Pakistan cannot be so naïve as not to factor in the fact that a revitalised, triumphalist Taliban just across the Durand Line (which, by the way, has all but disappeared) could ultimately prove a headache for its own security. Pakistani commentators candidly admit that the Afghans deeply resent Pakistan's interference. There has been an overall political awakening among the Afghan people and a replay of the old Pakistani policies will be challenged. The gravitas of Afghan domestic politics has shifted. Thus, all things taken into consideration, Pakistan will see the wisdom of allowing a kind of intra-Afghan “equilibrium” to develop rather than try to prescribe what is good for that country.
Mr. Karzai has proved to be a remarkably shrewd politician gifted with a high acumen to network and forge alliances. He has emerged as a pan-Afghan leader who maintains working relationships with influential figures cutting across ethnicity and regions — Mohammed Fahim, Karim Khalili, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Rasul Sayyaf, etc. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, which is a Pashtun-dominated group antithetical to the Taliban, already forms a part of Mr. Karzai's government. Mr. Karzai has his own bridges leading toward the Taliban camp to which he once belonged, after all. There will always be disgruntled elements, but then there are the traditional Afghan methods of patronage and accommodation. Mr. Karzai takes an active interest in regional affairs. His bonding with Pakistan and Iran shows that his political antennae are already probing for openings in anticipation of the U.S. withdrawal.
In this complex setting, India's own policy orientations are realistic and near-optimal. The primacy on building warm and cordial ties with the government in Kabul; nurturing people-to-people ties; contributing significantly to reconstruction; non-interference in internal affairs; an aversion to Indian military deployment; a non-prescriptive approach to an Afghan settlement and the insistence on an “Afghan-led” reconciliation process; and, most important, the trust that Mr. Karzai knows the “red lines” — these parameters of policy are eminently sustainable.
However, a couple of points need to be made. India should establish communication lines with the Taliban — assuming, of course, it wants to talk with us. After all, we talked with Mr. Sayyaf, leader of the Ittehad, which Jalaluddin Haqqani served as commander. It is inconceivable that any Afghan could harbour ill will towards India and the Indian people. The rest is all the disposable stuff of how the Afghan has been manipulated by outsiders through the 30 years of civil war — including when he vandalised the Bamiyan statues. But in the kind of Afghanistan Mr. Karzai wants his country to return, it becomes possible for us also to rediscover the Afghan we knew before foreigners came and occupied his country. (Incidentally, this is also the basis of Mr. Karzai's optimism when he reacted on hearing about Mr. Obama's drawdown plan: “This soil can only be protected by the sons of Afghanistan. I congratulate the Afghan people for taking the responsibility for their country into their own hands … Today is a very happy day.”)
And, our “dialogue” with the Taliban must go hand in hand with a policy to do all we can by word and deed to instil confidence in the Pakistani mind about our intentions that for the foreseeable future, Afghanistan's stabilisation can become a shared concern for the two countries. Much has changed already in the most recent months in the prevailing air. No one talks seriously that the drawback of Mr. Obama's drawdown plan could be India-Pakistan “rivalry” in Afghanistan. There is actually no scope for zero-sum games, since Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan are legitimate — and are reconcilable with India's concerns.
Second, Indian diplomacy should utilise the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) process to evolve a new strategic culture of collective security for the region, which it lacks. Mr. Obama's words should be properly understood, when he said that the U.S. can no more “over-extend … confronting every evil that can be found abroad.” As India and Pakistan move to a new trajectory of growth, a favourable regional environment becomes the imperative need. India can learn a lot from the Chinese “technique” of creating synergy between the SCO track and Beijing's bilateral track with the Central Asian capitals — and with Moscow — which till a generation ago were weaned on unalloyed anti-China dogmas of the Soviet era. Indian diplomacy can do one better. It can adapt this “technique” to normalisation with Pakistan — and with China.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
Keywords: U.S., President Barack Obama, U.S. troop withdrawal, Afghanistan, India, Afghanistan, Taliban, Pakistan, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
With less troops to engage, Taliban with the help of ISI and the Pakistani Military apparatus will turn its attention on softer assets like Kashmir. It will be in their interest to have a win to show-off to the hardliners in the Islamic world. India will be prudent to beef up the presence in the border with Pakistan and engage the Pakistani Government in destroying the terrorist outfits in Pakistan.
Better still take a leaf from the US engagement and destroy the terrorist outfits without engaging Pakistan.
Does Mr.Bhadrakumar really believe that Karzai can stand up to the Taliban in Afghanistan when the US withdraws? He seems to support the view of the Manmohan Singh government that Karzai, backed by India, is Afghanistan's bulwork against a second round of Talibanisation of that country. There will be few takers for this view. Our government will be well-advised to keep off from the most dangerous part of the world. Let us first tackle our homegrown Naxal and other such problem before we venture out to foreign lands on political rescue missions.
I am not an expert on foreign policy of India. But I have a suggestion which our expert readers can discuss about. Here is the deal to Pakistan. What if we offer no resistance to Pakistan's Afgan interests in exchange for settling Kashmir dispute to our favor once and for all?
If Mr Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat, then the entire diplomatic services needs to be over hauled. He comes accross as someone who would accept the enimity of Taleban, LeT and even serve Pak army agenda over friendship of USA.
Why indian government is dependent on others.We should not depend on other for our security.We should provide protection to our people in Afganistan if we care for our interest in Afgan.
The author is right that, India should talk to to Taliban. However, it is better to not be taken in by unjustified concerns from Pakistan about Indian's intentions. Taliban's leaders may not be in Afghanistan, but there is enough Taliban in Afghanistan,for India to being contacts, and to understand , who they are, what they want etc.. The only way for India to succeed is to NOT share with Pakistan, India's contacts with Taliban. The consulates should be fully utilized for this, since that is the purpose of consulates, to discuss and build bridges with Afghan people. Reminding Afghans of Indian history in Afghanistan should also be essential. Discussions with Pakistan can be at a later stage, when India builds leverage with ground level Taliban, and it needs to directly talk to the Taliban leaders ,who are at the mercy of ISI in Pakistan.It might be a good idea to request US to let India join talks with Taliban. Let Pakistan say NO. It only proves their ill-intentions against India.
I am a little puzzled by the author's leap of faith. Pakistan has been known to not keep up, oral /written agreements in the past even on issues, where Pakistan deals directly with India. That country has repeatedly shown that it is untrustworthy. How on earth can India collaborate with Pakistan on Afghanistan ? Just because Pakistan keeps repeating to the world that it does not like Indian consulates in Afghanistan, doesn't make India culpable. The trouble maker (Pakistan) should first explain, why it keeps interfering in Afghanistan, and what it means by strategic depth, which contravenese UN charter on neighbor relations. Let Pakistan, being the trouble maker, do the explanation first,and build trust. Regarding Pakistan's supposed future position on Afghanistan, as speculated by the author, I wish it was true. However, knowing Pakistan, it is better to, not be taken in by words, but look at its concrete actions, to understand Pakistan's intentions towards Afghanistan.
Mr Bhadrakumar tries to put a positive spin for India on the withdrawal of American troops. Bottom line is the Losers: USA, NATO, India. Winners: Taliban, Pakistan, Iran (to some extent).Both Karzai and Mullah Omar want to rule Afghanistan. After USA leaves Karzai's Army does not stand a chance against Omar. The civil war will be short and swift in favour of Omar. Unless of course Omar is killed before that.
Why all this worry about how Afghanistan is going to turn out after the US leave? India never had a proper policy towards Afghanistan anyway. India has always dithered and stumbled, trying not to upset anyone. India just needs to shut its borders and protect its own people. India has nothing to gain from its western borders. Build strong alliances with Nepal, Burma, Sri Lanka and the eastern tigers, best way to go for its economy. Pak and Afghanistan offer only trouble and strife.
Completely agree that we are doing all we can possibly do to curry favour with the regional powers vis-a-vis the Afghan scenario. Some aggressive diplomacy will, however, need to be exercised to ensure that those regional stakeholders recognise India's right to inclusion in influencing the future of the Af-Pak region, whether it be via the SCO or via bilateral dealings with all concerned. We cannot leave things to chance and 'hope for the best'.
The author should note, at least, one positive outcome for India,- US freebies of billions of dollars of aid to Pakistan will stop this aid gets diverted to military expenditure that can used against India.
I think India's foreign policy can be modelled on china's foreign policy. The present government needs to realize the importance of maintaing a healthy relationship with its neighbors which is important for a sustainable development of the country.
I think India should give more edge to Afghanistan as its interests can easily be aligned with India unlike in the case of pakistan.The recent visit by our PM underscored that 'We are not the US' - which means India has its own interests in Afghanistan - point. Knowing Pakistan for 6 decades and its pendulum kind of policy, india would do wise to strenghten its relations with afghanistan which would act as a fillip to the ongoing talks between india and pakistan giving india more edge over Pakistan.
I can completely agree with Mr.Obama. He recognized that spending money on war is mere waste. Building his country economy which is major challenge for him. War is not a solution, with that we can destroy enemy but enhance the bitterness between the countries. Now it's time for India to start the dialogue with Pakistan.
Why we, Indians, are really concerned about withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. President of America is obliged to fulfill his promise that he had given to his people at the time of their presidential election.
Even though the author was a former diplomat, I think he forgot about the India's strategy, reluctance of sending Indian troops to Afghanistan.
Both NDA and UPA regime recriminated each other, when the opposition governments showed their interest to send our troops to Afghanistan. Our central government failed to convince people of India that sending troops was to make ensure the security of India, rather than gaining contract for Indian corporate companies. We are misusing the opportunities, to eliminate terrorism from India. For that we need a strong and a healthy government,which we are lacking for decades.
History is made up of losers who dint learn from History. Sadness about this compromise, the lesson remains in living memory. It is better to have a wise enemy than a stupid leader. Even in diplomatic parlayance, when they were blue eyed Soviet kickers, Mullah Omar has parlayed India as 'those hindus'. Such an association should not have been considered in civilised society.
Further to Rajiv's comment, both India and Pakistan have a tacit understanding to uphold Niccolo Machiavelli's infamous axiom that it is much more profitable for a politician to keep a problem alive than solve it. Kashmir has remained the 'deliberate' bete noire between the two. This apart, Nehru crafted a Pakistan policy wherein that nation must be favoured by India and successive governments in New Delhi have maintained this positing. While the average citizen of both countries might want peace, the respective political - and in Pakistan's case, military - leaders do not.
It is hard to believe that an experienced diplomat could write this. He tells us that "It is inconceivable that any Afghan could harbour ill will towards India and the Indian people". If that were the case, why did the Taliban express hostility towards India when they were in power? Why did they allow numerous Kashmir focused terrorist organizations to setup training camps? Why did they provide safe passage to hijackers and leaders of terrorist groups?
The Taliban, like most hard headed political organizations operate on the basis of what is best for them. Being anti-Indian gets them the decisive support from Pakistani army in their struggle for control over Afghanistan, so they have no trouble being militantly against India. Why is this so hard for a former diplomat to understand?
Mr Bhardrakumar's breathtaking animosity towards America appears to drive him towards completely undesirable and unrealistic solutions. Pakistan wants an Afghan colony so that it can provide 'strategic depth' from where terrorists can be dispatched to neighboring countries as a way to project power. This is speculation - this is what we have already seen and experienced. In particular, against India, Pakistan was openly conducting a war that they called one of a '1000 cuts'. Mr Bhadrakumar would rather see terrorism return to India than see Americans help build a democratic Afghanistan.
Mr Bhadrakumar, I am tired of your repeated statements that India needs to instill confidence in Pakistani mind. That in a nutshell tells me you understand nothing about the Pakistani mind as reflected by its army and ISI that control policy. Anti-Indiaism is a stand alone, cold blooded , well thought out policy of the Pak establishment mind and they do deliberate, dishonest propoganda for it.
The future Afghanistan, inevitably Islamist, will not forget and forgive that India had always stood by the foreign invasion and subsequent occupation, and has always pleaded for an extension. No amount of dancing and bollywood will change that, since it will have little appreciation from the rural masses who see it as unIslamic. It is sad commentary on India that the only way it could advance its interests in Afghanistan is on the back of foreign invaders.
It is an opportunity for India and Pakistan to normalise their relations for the sake of the well being of South Asia as a region. India has greater responsibilities being a big brother.
1. Let me understand. The Taliban has close ties with Al Qaeda. Last time I checked, Al Qaeda is an international terror network. Hasn't Al Qaeda declared some kind of war against Indian targets ? So, how is a neutral or non-prescriptive attitude possible on the part of India about intra-Afghan politics?
2. How has the US concluded that the Taliban does not pose a threat to America's homeland security ? Doesn't Taliban have close ties with Al Qaeda ?
It is a pity that Bhadrakumar cannot get over with his bias against USA. India must take into consideration the worst case scenario and not rely on Pakistan to provide it with a space proportionate to its legitimate intrests.
Our 'sustainable' approach to Afghan politics will have to re-assert itself by declaring unambiguously, that the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan is the prime cause for tensions in the region. As despicable as the Talibs world-views are, we do not have a choice but to reconcile with them just as we are with Pakistan's military rulers. Pragmatism and Idealism are contrary notions in the geo-politics of South Asia.
But what if Taliban takeover Pakistan... through a civil war. We will be in a much more dangerous situation.
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