The promise of peace at the end of a protracted conflict in Colombia may evoke a degree of scepticism if not undue pessimism. Peace is still contingent upon approval in a popular plebiscite. Pitted against President Juan Manuel Santos, who seeks to sell the agreement with the rebel militia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), is his predecessor Álvaro Uribe, credited with forcing the guerrillas to the negotiating table. The former President now opposes a proposed amnesty to FARC leaders and the prospect of running for political office as a compromise in the extreme. Official pardons and reduced sentences for confessions to crimes were part of a transitional arrangement. Mr. Uribe’s political pitch could well resonate with a populace disillusioned with decades of mass disappearances and massacre of civilians that resulted in the loss of over 200,000 lives, besides the millions who went missing. Conversely, the chances of genuine and lasting reconciliation between the government and the rebels will depend on the establishment of effective mechanisms to bring the latter back to mainstream society. A particularly formidable challenge would be the demobilisation of guerrillas, thousands of whom were kidnapped as children and pushed into drug trafficking and fighting. Many of them have been victims of sexual abuse. Their rehabilitation is vital.
About a quarter million Colombian children were displaced in the last three years of peace negotiations, the United Nations said in March, an estimate corroborated by Unicef. That is some indication of how formidable the situation on the ground has become since the beginnings of the conflict half a century ago. Bogota’s final agreement with the insurgents comes as the culmination of four years of hard negotiations mediated by Havana since 2012. Sustaining the momentum for peace and channelling it into a credible and lasting settlement would call for huge investment by way of political capital and constructive economic incentives. Given that the State Department continues to regard FARC as a terrorist organisation, the rapprochement between Washington and Havana could serve as a crucial force to contain the rhetoric between Colombia and the U.S. Washington, in fact, could do much to facilitate the consolidation of democratic institutions in its long-troubled neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the readiness to engage the government in a dialogue by a smaller extremist organisation, the National Liberation Army, will boost the credibility of President Santos’s efforts. Latin America’s last significant armed insurgency seems well within sight of abating, at long last. The latest agreement may be just the beginning on that difficult road, but it is an important one nonetheless.
