Saturday’s unprecedented mass protest inside the highly fortified Green Zone in Baghdad is a harsh reminder of the deepening political crisis that has virtually paralysed the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. The protesters had also ransacked Parliament and assaulted some lawmakers. Mr. Abadi seems caught between two dominant blocs. The protesters, directed by the firebrand Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, are demanding political reforms, including the formation of a non-sectarian technocratic Cabinet. The established political parties are resisting any such reform, fearing that their clout will be diminished. Earlier attempts by Mr. Abadi to put non-partisan experts in charge of finance, utilities and the oil ministry have been blocked by those who support his rivals, including his predecessor Nouri al-Maliki. Meanwhile, Mr. Sadr has issued an ultimatum to implement reforms immediately or dissolve the government and face fresh elections.
The political crisis couldn’t have come at a worse time for Iraq. Low oil prices have weakened the economy, eroding even further the government’s capacity to deliver public services. Endemic corruption has resulted in great public anger against the government. Parliament has been dysfunctional over the last few months. The government has completely failed in providing even basic security to Iraqis as extremist violence continues to target civilians. Above all, almost one-fourth of Iraqi territory is controlled by the Islamic State. And the crisis has unfolded at a time when Iraqi forces are preparing a major offensive to take back Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, with enhanced support from the U.S. Yes, Mr. Abadi’s job was never easy. He inherited a divided Iraq torn by wars and sectarian and ethnic tensions when he was made Prime Minister in 2014. His predecessor’s divisive policies had turned a large chunk of the Sunni population hostile towards his government, which the IS exploited to strengthen its network in the Sunni-dominated regions. At that time, Mr. Abadi sounded more conciliatory than Mr. Maliki. He had the backing of both Iran and the U.S. and the general expectation was that he could build a national consensus among the country’s warring sects while leading a more aggressive and efficient campaign against the IS. Iraqi forces under his leadership did achieve some results on the battlefield, including the recapture of Ramadi in December 2015. But his failures, at least on two fronts, are glaring. First, he did not succeed in forging national unity, unable to win the trust of the Sunnis and finding the Kurds, emboldened by a weak government, upping their demand from autonomy to an independent state. Second, he delayed confronting the IS in Mosul, allowing the group to tighten its grip over the city. Mr. Abadi’s big challenge now is to find a way to set his house in order and win over his rivals. This is a tall ask, but without a stable government in Baghdad, a successful operation in Mosul against the IS is well-nigh impossible.
