The Madras High Court on Thursday dismissed a petition filed by Leader of the Opposition Vijayakant, challenging a resolution of the Assembly adopted on February 2, suspending him for 10 days.
Justice V. Ramasubramanian said that none of the petitioner's contentions was acceptable. The parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in the Raja Ram Pal case for the exercise of power of judicial review were not satisfied. Therefore, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed.
The petitioner contended that the power of judicial review had been recognised to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution. There was a gross violation of the principles of natural justice and hence scope for court's intervention.
The Additional Advocate General submitted that the scope of judicial review in such cases was limited only to gross or substantive illegality or unconstitutionality, which was not satisfied in this case. No mala fide could be attributed to an august body such as the legislature.
Mr. Justice Ramasubramanian said that the petitioner had not denied in his reply to the notice that he made the gestures. The claim that he did not talk or behave in a manner amounting to breach of privilege was only a general denial. Mr. Vijayakant had not complained that he was not furnished with a copy of the report. His complaint was that the report copies were not furnished to other members of the House. The only person who could have effectively defended the petitioner was the Deputy Leader of his own party. A copy had been furnished to him. The petitioner had not established the prejudice caused to him on account of non-supply of the copies of the report to other members.
The Judge said the limitation that a member could not be suspended for a period longer than the duration of the remainder of the session may be a limitation on the power of the Speaker but not on the power of the House.
Once it was accepted that the House had the power to even expel a member, it followed as a corollary that suspension spilling over two sessions was permissible.
The Judge said it was clear that the validity of suspension could not be judged merely by the consequences that flowed out of the same. An elected member debarred by virtue of an order of suspension from discharging his duties and function may have to suffer all consequences that went with the office.
Therefore, the petitioner's contention that suspension for a period spilling over to two sessions would be tantamount to exercise of power beyond the four walls of the legislature and, therefore, impermissible could not be accepted.
