A U.S. cable disclosed by WikiLeaks said due to the weakness of the Indian forensic system, “terrorism investigations and court cases tend to rely upon confessions, many of which are obtained under duress if not beatings, threats, or, in some cases, torture. These factors, along with a creaky and corrupt judiciary, contribute to cases lingering in the courts for years.''
The disclosure about the Regional Security Officer (RSO) in the American embassy in New Delhi making an end run around the system is contained in an April 2006 cable sent by Robert Blake, then the second-in-command. It is part of a “scene-setter” for the U.S.-India Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group.
“RSO sends the majority of threat information investigative requests to the New Delhi Police Department's Special Cell, which is the primary law enforcement entity in New Delhi tasked with the investigation of terrorist activity and major case investigations,'' the cable said. “As with all investigative efforts in India the office is only as good as its local contacts; the RSO often has greater success by discreetly contacting a local officer in the Special Cell in lieu of sending in an official request, many of which are not acted upon.”
“RSO receives very little follow-up information from Delhi police after a terrorist attack, such as the status of the police investigations or efforts to apprehend suspects. The information RSO does receive is usually already available in the media,'' it said.
It said while the RSO's liaison with the Indian police is adequate, there is room for improvement. “The Indian bureaucracy stalls many investigative requests with demands for written letters to various offices, additional approvals …RSO and other Embassy law enforcement elements must often pass investigative requests between Indian law enforcement agencies, acting as the middle man, although the use of personal “unofficial” contacts can sometimes expedite an investigation,'' the cable said.
“A lot of emphasis has been placed on getting Indian officials trained in various aspects of anti-terrorism activity, and cyber security. It would be incorrect and improper to say that FBI officials or RSOs can freely meet officials in the local police or State police organisations,'' a former CBI Director said. Another retired senior police official said that since 2005 cooperation between the two countries on counter-terrorism front has been “good'' so there was no need to forge “personal or unofficial'' contacts with the local police.
