We began this series by identifying a key problem for Bengaluru’s governance: that the Master Plan 2031 process lacks legitimacy and, in its current format, cannot deliver on the city’s core concerns. This problem presents an opportunity for meaningful reform, as for the first time, we have reasonable alignment between civil society demands and the bureaucratic recommendations for Bengaluru’s future.
In the last four weeks, we’ve not attempted to fashion a comprehensive solution: instead, we’ve advanced politically feasible strategies to create new institutional arrangements and processes that have the capacity for iterative adaptive learning. A multi-scalar, decentralised system that enables civic participation in negotiated demand-led planning will galvanise the various stakeholders in the planning process in everyday decisions on the city’s future.
Corollary conditions
In our view, this reform proposal is a necessary but not sufficient condition for resolving the current planning crisis. In this piece, we explore three corollary conditions that need consideration to avoid derailing successful local planning: inter-sectoral institutional accountability and coordination; the disruptive potential of mega-regional projects, and the problem of enforcement. To enhance the probability of success, we recommend possible strategies to control the negative effects of these conditions.
An essential complement to effective planning is the means to secure implementation. Currently, local government has neither the financial clout nor the legal institutional capacity to deliver services on the ground. Both finance and capacity is vested in various State statutory authorities and corporations who either dominate or have a legal monopoly in sectors such as transport, water and sanitation. Even institutions exclusively dedicated to providing Bengaluru with transport services such as Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation and Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation are unwilling to adopt an integrated service or a common payment platform.
Further, monopoly service providers such as Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB) have no legal obligation to provide services projected by the planning process. Incidentally, this legal obligation is cast on the municipal authority, which has no control over the BWSSB!
Despite these institutional rigidities, it is unlikely that the State government is likely to transfer political control to make these authorities accountable to local government. So it is crucial to do away with the legal monopoly that such service providers enjoy and to empower various levels of local government to negotiate and contract with any service provider to deliver their local plans. To be sure, local government units must exert their collective bargaining power to ensure that service providers deliver equitably and satisfy the mandatory provisioning obligations currently imposed on the BBMP.
Second, Bengaluru is now located at the centre of two proposed industrial corridor regions: the Bengaluru-Mumbai Economic Corridor Region and the Chennai-Bengaluru-Chitradurga Industrial Corridor Region being developed jointly by the Union and the State governments. These regions cut across the south Indian peninsula piercing through the political boundaries of villages, cities and States. Industrial townships and zones planned within these regions are to be governed by Special Purpose Vehicles, distinct from the constitutionally mandated local government authorities. Territorial re-scaling of urban and regional development has multiplied sites of decision making and empowered government departments and statutory authorities at the State and Union levels. Unless constitutional local government bodies are integrated into the decision making and execution of these mega-regional projects, these territories will be washed away by the impact of these projects.
Third, even the best laid out plans are of limited utility if they are not enforceable. The current institutional approach to enforcement of planning law relies on local BBMP or BDA officials to take regulatory or legal action against deviations. Occasionally, the State government has created and empowered institutions such as Bangalore Metropolitan Task Force or the Lake Development Authority with allied powers.
All put together, these institutions have been unable to secure compliance. Currently, those most affected by the non-compliance either lack access to the relevant plan documents or do not have the legal right or standing to enforce the plan. While Bengaluru has witnessed some high-profile litigation by well-organised citizens or neighbourhood groups, this is insufficient to tackle everyday non-compliance.
Radical transparency
Earlier in this series, we proposed a regime of radical transparency for parcel-level building plans through a negotiated planning process. If those affected by plan violations are granted the legal right to vindicate their claims by social negotiation, arbitration or in civil court, this will ignite a citizen-led plan enforcement movement. The inefficiency and delay in the court system will incentivise parties to arrive at negotiated settlements to mitigate costs and time overruns. So long as the law makes it clear that the court must grant injunctive relief to bar any plan deviation without regard to its own views on where equity may lie or what a superior plan may be, the court process will reinforce the negotiated planning approach.
Ultimately, a new approach to planning for Bengaluru must respond to the political economy of the city and its governance institutions and culture. The approach proposed in this series imagines Bengaluru as a conglomerate of inter-dependent units of government delivering nested multi-scalar plans to be implemented and enforced at the local level. It makes the politics of the planning process visible, galvanises civic engagement and enhances democratic accountability. These vectors of change give us shared hope for a vibrant, equitable and livable 21st century Bengaluru.
(Sudhir Krishnaswamy is professor of law and director of the School of Policy and Governance, Azim Premji University, and founder-trustee of the Centre for Law and Policy Research, Bengaluru; Champaka Rajagopal is visiting professor, Azim Premji University; she has worked on the Revised Master Plan 2015 for Bengaluru; Mathew Idiculla is research associate, Centre for Law and Policy Research)
