The recent assassination of top Afghan peace negotiator, Arsala Rahmani, has further derailed the desperate U.S. effort at cultivating the so-called ‘moderate' Taliban forces. Yet, General John Allen, the Supreme Allied Commander in Afghanistan, is going ahead with President Obama's orders to withdraw 23,000 troops before the end of summer. Similarly in Iraq, from where the U.S. finally withdrew at the end of last year, terrorist violence remains unabated with its links being now investigated to the very top of sharply divided Iraqi leaders.
The positions of both Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Pushtun President Hamid Karzai remain very shaky and overdrawn. Most now count Pakistan in the same category making these three the worst cases of the botched-up ‘war on terror' especially in the initial years of the Bush presidency. This is what Dan Caldwell examines at such great depths in this book aptly titled Vortex of Conflict .
Dan presents a thorough analysis on how flawed assumptions and internal dissensions at the very top of the Bush presidency lay grounds for this mess which President Obama is now expected to clean in a hurry. Meanwhile, continued slow recovery of the economy makes the U.S. imperial outstretch clearly out of sync. The U.S. is now forced to explore greater burden-sharing with its allies and co-opt emerging economies.
Starting with the CIA raising Afghan mujahideen to fight Soviet forces, the U.S. had entered this ‘cockpit of Asia' via the conduit of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. But, having accomplished its mission, the U.S. drastically decreased its aid and involvement in Pakistan and Afghanistan leaving them vulnerable to these forces of radical Islam leading to Islamisation of Pakistan, Talibanisation of Afghanistan followed by the rise of al Qaeda and 9/11. Dan shows how the U.S. was not fully aware of the monster it had created. So in August 1998 when al Qaeda attacked U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the CIA responded by placing $3 million bounty on bin Laden who also announced a $3 million award but for the head of any CIA officer brought to him dead or alive. The CIA escalated it further and hired private security contractor Blackwater to locate and assassinate top leaders of al Qaeda but to no avail till Special Forces achieved it on May 2, 2011.
Even attacks on USS Sullivans and USS Cole did not wake up the Bush administration until 9/11 finally heralded this spectre of ‘new terrorism' that is global, networked, diversely motivated and far more lethal. It is in this context of panic reaction that Wendy Chamberlain (U.S. Ambassador to Islamabad) told President Musharraf that there was “absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban. The time for dialogue was finished as of September 11” making her host fall in line as the war on Afghanistan was launched within four weeks' time and was followed by the attack on Iraq from March 2003.
Test case
9/11 also came as a test case for the leadership of Bush Jr. who did not have any experience in military or foreign policy and was once known for his ‘drinking problem' or investments in Texas oil companies. This meant that his wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were run by vice president Dick Cheney and his handpicked seasoned secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, his deputy Wolfowitz and General Frank while National Security Advisor Condi Rice watched in reverence and equally experienced Secretary of State, Colin Powell and Generals like Shinseki, Zinni, and Shelton stood undermined.
Dan provides an impressive detail of how Rumsfeld was obsessed with ‘revolution in military affairs' and drunk on their quick surgical victory in removing Taliban in Kabul using only 431 Special Forces operatives. The Cheney-Rumsfeld duo was determined to ensure an equally quick getting in and getting out in Iraq. Rumsfeld was sure that Iraqis would welcome U.S. forces. His other fallacy was how after a short war Iraq would be self-financing its reconstruction.
Other mistakes of U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority, headed by Ambassador Bremer, included disbanding about 720,000 Iraqi men in uniform, not sealing Iraq's borders and persisting with low numbers of U.S. forces which made Iraq a haven for terrorists of all hues including al Qaeda. The final straw on the camel's back was Cheney's insistence on procuring post-war reconstruction for Department of Defence which was the first of its kind. The resultant mess was to boomerang in U.S. Congressional elections leading to Democrats gaining a majority in both houses for the first time since 1994.
The author highlights how the Bush team had worked on best, and not worst, case scenarios and planned for a clear military victory without worrying about the perils of post-conflict reconstruction. This post-Rumsfeld shift was marked by the arrival in Iraq of General Petraues and Ambassador Crocker. This marked the shift in U.S. military strategies from conventional war-fighting to counterinsurgency i.e. from defeating the enemy to winning the hearts and minds leading to stabilisation and withdrawal.
This Petraeus-Crocker duo is seen as having made all the difference. The author reveals a strong bias in favour of General Petraeus as being the best of his generation. The book sometimes becomes too exhaustive in details and citations though some of these are perhaps meant to strengthen the author's rather bold and blunt conclusions. Repetitions begin to creep into the last two chapters and too many pages are devoted to endnotes which are repeated in References which hardly have any local experts. In the end, this book makes very valuable addition to the body of literature especially on the internal workings of Bush Jr. administration that helps in the understanding of the drag and dismal outcomes of the U.S. historic military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
VORTEX OF CONFLICT — U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq: Dan Caldwell; Foundation Books, 4381/4, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002. Rs. 995.
