Toofan Al-Aqsa jolts West Asian geostrategic architecture Premium

On balance, a long war between Hamas and Israel does not seem likely

Israelis inspect the rubble of a building a day after it was hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza Strip, in Tel Aviv | Photo Credit: AP

There are uncanny similarities between the Hamas operation Toofan Al-Aqsa (Al-Aqsa Flood) and the launch of the 19-day Yom Kippur War 50 years ago. Although the latter was inconclusive, it led to a regional tectonic shift with Israel accepting a ‘land for peace’ formula at the Camp David Accords six years later.

With this jerky roll of the regional geostrategic kaleidoscope, can a similar outcome follow? Even as the ground situation is evolving, some broad, but inherently tentative, surmises can be made.

Key takeaways

From a military perspective, despite the fighting on its territory, Israel is not under an existential threat. The outcome is also not in doubt: Israel is expected to prevail, and push back Hamas, which lacks resources to sustain the campaign. A massive ground incursion into Gaza could follow to exact vengeance, restore morale, re-impose the strategic asymmetry, and try to rescue captured soldiers and civilians. The unsavoury experiences from abject intelligence failure to the misplaced reliance on hi-tech missile defence and Artificial Intelligence would compel Israel to revise its strategic doctrines.

The ‘shock and awe’ of the Hamas blitzkrieg portrayed in war images have created new, but lasting social media icons. Depending on the endgame, this conflict could potentially revive the ‘military option’ and further boost the standing of non-state Arab militias, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, al-Houthis, Islamic State, various avatars of al-Qaeda, and Al-Shabaab.

Third, although the conflict could protract, it would remain geographically confined as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both Gaza-based Sunni outfits, have few all-weather friends. In the domestic arena, the Palestinian Authority is vertically split between the West Bank run by al-Fatah, in a modus vivendi with Israeli occupation authorities, and Gaza administered by Hamas, which refuses to recognise Israel. As the Fatah gerontocracy has failed to stop Israeli land grabs in the West Bank, it is losing credibility with the masses, particularly young Palestinians. Hamas and Islamic Jihad are taking advantage to establish their cells in the West Bank, leading to an iron-fisted Israeli response. Thus, while the Palestinian Authority would praise “the resistance” and express indignation at the Israeli “war crimes”, it would privately wish something else for its two political rivals.

Regionally, too, the granular picture is largely non-supportive of Hamas. The only Arab neighbour of Gaza is Egypt, whose pro-West military regime has little love lost for the Gazan rulers as they were allies of the Muslim Brotherhood that Egyptian generals overthrew in 2013. Cairo, nevertheless, is trying to de-escalate the current situation. All the Gulf monarchies, except Qatar, strongly disapprove of Hamas, calling it a political Islamic outfit. Although Qatar regularly provides generous dollops of humanitarian assistance to the Gazans, it does not wish to annoy Washington. Turkey, a big regional Sunni power, traditionally supports Hamas, but Ankara’s badly bruised economy has limited its outreach. Moreover, it is trying to reconnect with Israel and the Gulf monarchies. Hamas and Islamic Jihad burnt their bridges with Damascus a decade ago by supporting the anti-Assad Arab Spring intifada. While Damascus and Hamas had a facile reconciliation last year, the latter’s karma still rankles.

Shia Iran has long been a mentor of the two Sunni outfits, at one point creating a clandestine weapons and ammunition supply line through Sudan and Egypt to Gaza. Iran has tried to replicate its success in creating a Hezbollah-type proto-state in Gaza to threaten Israel on two fronts. Other pro-Iranian regional outfits like al-Houthis could support the Gazans.

On balance, thus, a long war between Hamas and Israel seems less likely, unless Hamas overplays its hand in negotiating the release of the Israeli hostages, an Achilles heel for Israel, putting all bets off.

A ‘double or quits’ option

This crisis effectively presents Israel’s current 10-month-old ultra-nationalist government with a ‘double or quits’ option. Even before Toofan Al-Aqsa, Jerusalem’s hard-line has led to a surge in violence with over 200 Palestinians and 30 Israelis dead this year. Given the Israeli traditional policy on such matters coupled with the current adrenaline-high ambience, the line is likely to get harder. The crisis is also likely to corral the national unity.

The profound consequences for regional geopolitics could include a delay in the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel as Tel Aviv would be unwilling to grant the concessions to the Palestinians sought by Riyadh. Other Abraham Accords signatories would hope that their wager on economic gains riding roughshod over the regional politics would stand. Iran could feel emboldened by the arch-enemy being in mortal combat.

While India is not directly affected by Toofan Al-Aqsa, it would, nevertheless feel some heat. Protracted regional turbulence could cause collateral damage through an oil price rise, impact our diaspora, and dim the prospects for India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and other I2U2 constructs. It can also highlight India as a safe, fast-growing economy for foreign investments, largely insulated from the turmoil.

Mahesh Sachdev is a retired Indian Ambassador and head of Eco-Diplomacy and Strategies, a Delhi-based consultancy