Amidst the sharp East-West hostilities generated by the war in Ukraine, there is one country that is at the centre of regional diplomacy — Turkey. Following earlier rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has rebuilt bridges with Israel by meeting its Prime Minister Yair Lapid on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September this year, and pledging to cooperate on shared security and energy interests. And, in a dramatic overture, on August 19, Mr. Erdoğan indicated Turkey’s readiness to engage with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, saying “there is no resentment in politics”.
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But, despite this bonhomie, Turkey’s mailed fist has also been on display. It retains its tough posture on Sweden’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), insisting on the repatriation of Kurdish leaders, described as “terrorists”, who are enjoying sanctuary in the Nordic capital. And, it maintains its confrontation with fellow NATO member, Greece.
The Grecian churn
Turkey is concerned about expanding ties between Greece and the United States; Ankara recently summoned the Ambassadors of both countries to protest about the deployment of U.S. military supplies on islands in the Aegean that are close to Turkey, in violation of several agreements, including those of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947).
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Two other areas of dispute are Cyprus and the East Mediterranean. In early September, the U.S. removed restrictions on defence supplies to Cyprus in response to the island nation denying refuelling and repair facilities to Russian naval vessels. Turkey has belligerently announced that it will expand its military presence on the divided island, going beyond its present strength of 40,000 troops.
In a further provocation to Greece, in early October, Turkey concluded an energy agreement with the Tripoli-based Libyan government for joint exploration of hydrocarbon resources in the East Mediterranean. The agreement was signed in the presence of Mr. Erdoğan who was accompanied by his Foreign, Defence, Energy and Trade Ministers, signalling Turkey’s wide-ranging strategic interests in the region.
Turkey has affirmed that it is the only NATO member which can engage with Russia and mediate in the Ukraine war. Turkey successfully negotiated the grain agreement with the two warring parties — the first shipment of Ukrainian grain left Odessa on August 1, and, within the next month-and-a-half, three million tonnes had been shipped from Ukraine.
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Russian-Turkish ties, though marked by important differences on Armenia, Syria, Libya and the East Mediterranean, remain substantial and mutually advantageous. They are marked by significant Russian investments and financial transfers to Turkish banks, including a $15 billion transfer from Russia’s nuclear company, Rosatom, to its Turkish partner to purchase the required equipment for the Akkuyu nuclear power plant and avoid sanctions. Turkey’s exports to Russia have increased 75% over the last year, even as it has emerged as a major importer of Russian energy. Russian President Vladimir Putin has reciprocated by proposing that Turkey become a hub for supplies of Russian gas to Europe.
Turkey has also indicated its interest in membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): in response to criticisms that this is an anti-West grouping, Mr. Erdoğan has said that Turkey is positioning itself as a “global power”.
Global ambitions
Turkey’s diverse diplomatic forays are bewildering: mired in serious economic crises, with inflation well over 80%, and facing a tough general election in June next year, is Mr. Erdoğan being impelled by domestic political considerations or does he have a grand vision for his country?
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It is possible that like most populist leaders in a democratic system, Mr. Erdoğan sees no contradiction between the two interests. Anti-Kurdish hostility and confrontations with Greece please the nationalists at home. They are also enthused by Turkey’s central position in world affairs that is drawn from Turkey’s own Ottoman traditions rather than its links with the West.
Perhaps the best way to understand Mr. Erdoğan is to see him as seeking to maximise advantages from Turkey’s geopolitical place at the confluence of Europe and Asia, abutting the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Mediterranean and North Africa, and placing this geography in the frame of Ottoman authority and influence at its peak.
At the global level, Mr. Erdoğan has positioned Turkey at the centre of the East-West divide, reaping benefits from both sides, but fully committing to neither of them.
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Nearer home, he works closely with Russia and Iran, but parts company from them when Turkey’s crucial interests are involved. This explains Turkey’s military posture vis-à-vis the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, while maintaining links with the governments in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Arbil.
In Syria, Mr. Erdoğan has nurtured ties with Turkmen and Islamist groups, to the chagrin of Russia and Iran, but the recent outreach to Damascus will please both his regional partners. Similarly, in West Asia, he has got close to the Arab monarchies, but not at the expense of relations with Iran.
This pattern is being repeated in the Caucasus and the Balkans: in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, Turkey has backed the former, but then worked with Russia to maintain the ceasefire and also mend ties with Armenia. Again, in early September, Mr. Erdoğan undertook a three-day tour of the Balkans to patch up differences between Bosnia-Herzegovina and its breakaway Serb community, followed by visits to Belgrade and Zagreb to improve ties between the three successor states of the erstwhile Yugoslavia
Mr. Erdoğan foreign policy reflects the adroit usage of politics and geopolitics, mixed with strong elements of Ottoman glory.
Talmiz Ahmad is a former diplomat