Multi-religious India’s founding ideals are fast being reshaped by a majoritarian formulation of the relationship between the state and religion. Rajeev Bhargava, political theorist and author of Reimagining Indian Secularism (2023), analyses the strengths and failings of India’s sui generis secularism. Edited excerpts from an interview to The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy.
V.S. Sambandan: In retrospect, was India’s constitutional idea of “principled distance” an aberration?
Rajeev Bhargava: Not at all. Contrast India’s constitutional secularism with other models. In the U.S. there is mutual exclusion; in France, a one-sided exclusion. In India, exclusion of religion is not possible. The state has to intervene to ensure that there is neither inter-religious nor intra-religious domination.
Therefore, it maintains principled distance: it intervenes or not depending on what helps to foster equality, freedom or fraternity. This is unique.
So, why did the constitutional ideal fall off the perch?
All orthodoxies in every religion abhor any interference. Then, there was Hindu nationalism; it’s as old as secular nationalism. Most Hindu nationalists wanted some preferential treatment for Hindus; a Hindu state. This partiality violates the principles of equality and impartiality. As Hindu nationalism grew, the idea of secularism morphed into something else.
Many Indian secularists also misunderstood secularism: that religion should be in the private space. This is not possible in India with its public expressions of religion like Muharram and Kumbh Mela. Insulating official public space from religion should have sufficed for secularists.
You had earlier argued that Europe has to learn from India. Should it?
Europe’s secularism was born in response to homogeneity and against diversity; but now it faces diversity. On the other hand, Indian secularism was born in response to India’s phenomenal diversity. Is it not clear which countries have to learn from whom?
How do you see tradition and modernity in the Indian context?
I’m not very happy with this [framework] which, in India at least, was invented by colonial anthropologists and administrators. That brings me to my latest book. Indian tradition has many religio-philosophical practices and experiences; multiple margas, pathways. But pluralism is new in the west. So, what is traditional and modern itself is open to question. Asoka said: “I am going to equally honour both Brahmanas and Sramanas”. Religiously impartial, he embodied the idea of what we consider modern.
Second, atheism is not new to India. A very large part of India’s religio-philosophical perspectives, until the second half of the first millennia of the Common Era, were free of God. Consider Buddhism which was grounded in individual human effort (Karma).
What about claims that [ancient] India perfected surgery, for instance?
There are many contributions from India that Indians and the world have to be proud of; plastic surgery is not one of them. We don’t have to invent things that are conceivable only in the 20th or 21st centuries. What kind of inferiority complex is this? Moreover, no culture can claim any idea entirely as its own. There’s always cross fertilisation of ideas.
Has the numerically influential Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) and its hinterland shaped the national narrative and response to secularism in a diverse India?
That is a hard question. All that I can say is one thing: Brahminical orthodoxy, the rigidity of the caste system is still very strong in U.P. and in other northern Indian States. The kind of movement that began in the south in the 20th century is happening in northern India almost a century later. And even that is not successful. Brahminical orthodoxy has more or less co-opted ‘lower’ castes. I would say that, yes, U.P. is a big, big problem. I wouldn’t, however, say that it’s only a U.P.-plus issue.
Let’s take two points of inflection. One was, as you say, Mrs. [Indira] Gandhi playing the Hindu card in the 1980s. Then, there wereShah Bano and Babri Masjid, which became national narratives. These are U.P.-plus-specific, but remember, Mrs. Gandhi played the Hindu card in Punjab and Jammu. It was followed up in U.P. and its hinterland but it started elsewhere. Reversing the Shah Bano judgment, unlocking Babri Masjid/Ram Janmabhoomi, banning Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, were all politically troublesome.
Borrowing from the title of your latest book, how would you ‘reimagine Indian secularism’?
It is important to not disconnect the inter-religious from the intra-religious. If you make defending minority rights (preventing inter-religious domination) as the main issue, secularism is seen as a project only for minorities and not for the Hindus.
[Combatting] intra-religious domination is as important. European secularism was for defending individuals from oppressive social communities and the state from a meddlesome church.
Caste is the Indian equivalent of the [western] church. The caste system thwarting individual autonomy, one caste dominating another within the Hindu order has to end. Those fighting against inter-and intra-religious domination should come together.
By reducing secularism solely to the defence of minority rights, specifically of Muslims and Christians, a lot of Hindus feel “secularism is not for us” and/or “it has worked against us”, [emphasises] which is not the case. Secularism is as much to protect Hindus from their own fanatics, extremists, caste groups and orthodoxies. It needs reimagination. Inclusive secularism should also address caste and gender domination.
This requires popular redefinition.
Yes! There’s another thought in the new book: modern religion itself is an alien category to us.
When the 16th-17th century European [social] invention of ‘religion’ journeyed to India, it upset the sub-continent’s cultural equilibrium and caused havoc. It created exclusivism, made the religious ‘other’ an enemy. We should reverse this religionisation.
Going forward, do you see further points of inflection?
I am hopeful that the downward trajectory will stop, albeit over time. The broader, historical pluralism will not be easy to dislodge. I believe Indian pluralism’s crisis is, in the long run, a blip.
V.S. Sambandan is CAO, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, Chennai. The longer version of this interview can be accessed here.