Syrian ceasefire is unlikely to hold: expert

The best way forward I can see is some superficial leadership figurehead transition that leaves the Ba’athist core in place, says Prof. Paul Kingston

Toronto University political scientist Paul Kingston says Turkey and Saudi Arabia can’t shift the balance of power in Syria on their own.

After almost five years of conflict, the warring parties in Syria have come to a loose agreement to cease violence from February 27. The U.S. and Russia, which are supporting rival factions in the civil war that has killed over 4,00,000 people and displaced almost half of the country’s population, are finally pushing for the ceasefire.

Paul Kingston , Associate Professor of political science at the University of Toronto and a West Asia expert, tells The Hindu that the ceasefire is unlikely to hold in the long term.

Edited excerpts follow :

After years of fighting, there are now some efforts at the international level to push for a ceasefire in Syria. Both the U.S. and Russia have announced a plan to cease hostilities in the country. How do you look at the prospects of a ceasefire?

I don’t see the ceasefire holding or being significant. The Syrian government and their allies are ascendant; the opposition and their allies [including the U.S.] are in disarray and losing. Why stop when the prize of Aleppo is staring one in the face? [A major government offensive to capture Aleppo, the largest Syrian city, is under way].

Moreover, it is only a potential victory — there are still some serious battles to be fraught if true hegemony is to be gained in the northern city. It is only when the Syrian government has decisive advantage that a potential ceasefire could mean something — or if the rebel forces somehow can regain their footing and reproduce the previously existing ‘stalemate’, which seems unlikely at the moment.

The Russians will nuance this ceasefire, arguing that any continued fighting is against Islamist rebels, but that has always been a smokescreen clear for all to see that is also complicated by the fact that the lines and alliances between these rebel groups have always been blurred.

There are several regional actors involved in the Syrian conflict. What role Turkey and Saudi Arabia are playing in the civil war? Both are Western allies. And these nations were criticised for playing a double game — supporting Islamist groups while at the same time being part of the anti-Islamic State campaign led by the U.S.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s core interests are similar — both would like to see Mr. Assad go. But, that may be about it in terms of common goals. Saudi Arabia is particularly concerned about the growing transnational political dynamism of Shia populations in the Arab world, which it sees as being brought about by growing Iranian influence. I don’t see Turkey’s concerns in Syria being motivated by this same concern.

The nuclear agreement and the sense that the Obama administration is weakening its commitment to Saudi Arabia, combined with new younger Saudi leadership, is producing a more aggressive approach in Riyadh to regional politics — epitomised by its intervention in Yemen. But it does not have the kind of armed forces that can put troops on the ground in any significant numbers that could shift the dynamics of the Syrian conflict.

Can Turkey shift the balance of power in the Syria war?

Turkey would also like to facilitate the overthrow of the Assad regime and has been supporting the Islamist militias as has the Saudi regime. But its increasing concern is the growing autonomy and political dynamics of the region’s Kurdish populations, especially those within Syria that have benefited from U.S. support that has allowed it to establish itself as a significant militia presence that controls key parts of the border region between Syria and Turkey. Its main priority is now to prevent them from consolidating territorial power. Hence, Saudi Arabia and Turkey both support Islamist opposition to Mr. Assad but have different primary reasons for doing so. Both also do not have the capacity to shift the balance of power in the Syrian conflict by themselves — or together — but are dependent on what the U.S. wants to do.

The Americans and their allies want Mr. Assad to go. Within that, Saudi Arabia and Turkey may prefer a Sunni regime to replace the Assad government. On the other side, the Russians want the regime to survive, with or without Mr. Assad at its helm. And then we have the ISIS in Syria. What in your view is the way forward for this war-torn country?

I don’t see the continuation of the Assad regime as a sustainable solution in the long term. Too much blood spilled; too much consolidation of resistance power, however weakened they may be at the moment; too much institutionalisation of external penetration and resistance.

But, in the short term, it seems as though it will be difficult for the regime to be pushed aside, even if the Russians and Iranians wanted it so. At best, some superficial leadership figurehead transition that leaves the Ba’athist core in place.

That’s at best what I could see happening.

Finally, do you any dramatic shift in the U.S. policy towards West Asia in general, and Israel-Palestine in particular is possible? Has the Arab Spring prompted Washington to rethink its approached? The relations between the Obama administration and the Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are certainly not at their best.

I don’t really think so. These are tensions between personalities and politics. I don’t think there will be any dramatic shift in policies. Egypt is an example. Look what’s happening there. One of my colleagues was basically murdered by the Egyptian secret service. But the Americans and the Europeans are all maintaining their ties with Egypt. The American foreign aid to Egypt continues. So I don’t think that there’s any real change happening in the Western approaches towards the region.