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Addressing an all-party meeting on Jammu & Kashmir recently, the Indian Prime Minister had said that “the fundamental reason for disturbances in Kashmir is cross-border terrorism promoted by our neighbouring country”.
While it’s true that Pakistan has overtly and covertly managed a terror infrastructure to destabilise J&K, it is incorrect to say that the fundamental reason for the current situation in Kashmir is cross-border terrorism.
>Data on South Asia Terrorism Portal clearly shows that terrorism-related casualties in the State have come down drastically over the past decade. During the peak of terror activity in the period 1990~2006, the average number of fatalities per year on account of terrorist incidents was as high as 2,402. In the period 2006-2016, this figure stood at 378. In fact, since 2011, the fatalities per year have dropped to an average of 164. While this proves the success of the Indian security apparatus in curbing terrorism, there seems to be no end in sight to the so-called ‘disturbances’ in the Kashmir Valley.
What then is the key problem in Kashmir today?
After the >Handwara firing in April this year, many Kashmir observers had warned that the situation in Kashmir was rapidly deteriorating. And the reason for this worsening situation wasn’t cross-border terrorism. This new wave of violence erupting in the Valley was in fact a result of the failure to build a genuine democratic culture in a post-conflict society like Kashmir.
The problem in Kashmir today is a political problem between the Indian government and the State of Kashmir, with Pakistan only at the opportunistic fringe. Placing Pakistan at the centre of the Kashmir issue is to find a convenient punching-bag while skirting the main issue of political divergences between India and Kashmir.
This article proposes no solutions to the Kashmir issue. Rather, its humble aim is to ask the right questions. We propose to do that by classifying this complex issue into smaller parts and creating a framework that highlights the political divergences between India and Kashmir.
The political divergences are essentially at three conceptual levels: nation, country and State. And at each level, the divergences between India and Kashmir can be framed as a set of key questions that are yet to be resolved.
nation
A nation gets constituted by an imagined shared identity. A nation is a body of people united by common culture, language, religion, descent or shared historical experience. Nations are, in >Benedict Anderson’s words , ”imagined political communities" — if a people imagine that their similarities override their differences, they belong to one nation. Else, they don’t. For example, as long as a Kashmiri, a Tamilian and a Kannadiga identify themselves more as Indians than as Kashmiris, Tamilians or Kannadigas respectively, they are a part of the Indian nation.
Taking this concept of a nation to the Kashmir story results in two key questions that both the Indian and Kashmiri sides are grappling with.
Question for India
>> Does the idea of the Indian nation include people from the Valley?
>>Will the idea of a liberal Indian nation be stronger if the Kashmiri sub-nation is a part of the Indian nation?
While some radical sections on the Indian side may answer these questions with a “no”, the prevailing political opinion has not drifted as far, just yet. The PM, in the all-party meeting, clarified that "Jammu & Kashmir is not only a matter of our territorial integrity but also defines our nationhood”.
So, if Kashmiris are indeed a part of the Indian nation, what justifies the Indian government keeping its own nationals under the shadow of a gun for decades, in the fear of an external enemy? Why the repeated and sometimes brutal use of force on one’s own compatriots?
Question for Kashmir
>>Is Kashmiri nationalism truly incompatible with Indian nationalism?
>>Whom does the Kashmiri nation include?
Sub-nations are not uncommon to India. In fact, there is an argument to be made that the Republic of India is not a nation-state but a multinational state. Thus, if various other nationalities have thrived and survived under the Indian state, is it not prudent for the Kashmiri nation to do the same?
The second question that the Kashmiri nationalists are themselves grappling with is that the idea of a syncretic Kashmiriyat is hardly the force behind the separatist movement. The driving principle instead is constructed on the edifice of ever-shrinking, illiberal religious boundaries.
country
The word ‘country’ only emphasises the physical dimensions of a geographical area. Derived from the medieval Latin word conterra , meaning ‘land that lies on the opposite side’, country merely refers to a geographical extent. The divergence over geographic extent is an integral part of the the Kashmir story.
There are three key questions related to geographical extent:
>>Is the “territorial integrity of the Indian country" more important than the welfare of Indian nationals?
>>Is Kashmir, the country, more important than Kashmiris, the people?
>>Of what relevance are the areas of Jammu & Kashmir that are now in Pakistan’s (and Chinese) control?
The long-standing rhetoric in India has been that territorial integrity is uncompromisable. But from a liberal viewpoint, territorial integrity is important only to the extent that it enhances the well-being and development of its people. Whenever territoriality gets in the way of citizens’ welfare, it can be compromised. In fact, the current government adopted this principle when it agreed to exchange enclaves between India and Bangladesh because the citizens in these enclaves were unable to fulfil their aspirations of leading a normal life.
Obsession over the Indian country’s area is a key determinant that is affecting the public opinion on Kashmir and it needs to be tackled head on.
state
The third divergence is over the State: “a nation or territory considered as an organised political community under one government”. A state is essentially a political institution that comes into being when individuals trade some of their freedoms off, like giving up the freedom to conduct violence in return for the security offered by the state.
In Leviathan , Hobbes argues that individuals cede all their rights in return for protection to a sovereign who is himself above the law. John Locke, writing after Hobbes, is more moderate: in his view, individuals surrender only some of their rights (liberty) to a government that rules by the consent of the governed. Thus, the primary role of the state then is to prevent the strong from eating the weak.
Question for India
>>Is the Indian state better off if it has different social contracts, tailored for each of its various constituents?
For instance, Article 370 allows for J&K residents to have a different contract with the Indian state. Does this make the Indian state weaker or stronger?
While we don’t claim to have an answer to this question, it will be prudent to clear a few facts. As Sitaram Yechury pointed out in his speech in the Rajya Sabha, such an arrangement of varying contracts with the Indian union is not unique to J&K. For example, Article 371(A) explicitly states that no act of Parliament on ownership and transfer of land and resources of Nagaland shall apply unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland so decides. Article 371(G) does the same with respect to Mizoram. Many other States such as Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka also have special provisions under Article 371.
Thus, is this diversity, which evolved through various political processes, acceptable today? Or are these differences so detrimental to the Indian state that they should be completely done away with, not only for J&K, but for many other States as well?
Question for Kashmir
>>Is sovereignty a necessary condition for meeting the aspirations of the Kashmiri people?
>>Is self-determinism the only way that Kashmiris can be assured of their well-being?
The recent experiments with self-determination in West Asia have led to outcomes that have become global menaces, let alone self-advancement. Hence, what is different about the demand for Kashmiri self-determination that will buck this trend?
We have merely raised some of the key political divergences that are lost under the din of anti-Pakistan rhetoric. Unless some of these key questions are answered, the Kashmir conundrum will remain unresolved.
(In >this earlier article , the authors tried to delve into the meaning of ‘Nationalism’)
