After former Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalithaa’s conviction by a trial court in September 2014 in the disproportionate assets case, the State Bharatiya Janata Party leaders were visibly upbeat. Her absence from the political scene was an opportunity for them to boost their campaign of turning into a strong alternative to the two principal Dravidian parties in the State.
The National Democratic Alliance’s experiment in Tamil Nadu in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections may have fetched it only two seats, but it was seen as a unique moment in the State’s political history, where a formation sans the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam was able to taste electoral success.
In some constituencies, the NDA even managed to relegate the DMK to third position, creating huge expectations that it would seal its place on the State’s political map ahead of the Assembly elections in April 2016. It is also in this hope after Ms. Jayalalithaa’s conviction last year that the BJP was all set to send 42 Union Ministers to Tamil Nadu to propagate the achievements of the Narendra Modi-led government, a decision that it has scrambled to withdraw temporarily, following the Karnataka High Court’s verdict on May 11.
It was not just the large lacuna that was created electorally by Ms. Jayalalithaa’s absence that evoked such positive responses from BJP leaders. The sanguine verve had much to do with the cultural and social implications of her absence as well, which the BJP hoped to build on closer to the elections.
At the ground level, the AIADMK and the BJP fight for identical vote banks. This is also why they are identified as natural allies. The AIADMK’s stunning victories in recent elections have generally been attributed to the support that Ms. Jayalalithaa gets from powerful intermediate castes, in particular, but not restricted to, the Gounders and Thevars. Ideologically, political scientists and cultural historians place these communities to the Right of the political spectrum. These communities formed the crux of the movement of religious revivalism in the State in the 1980s, when the iconic M.G. Ramachandran, as historian M.S.S. Pandian put it, did little to propagate the rationalist movement in which he had his roots.
Religiosity is even more open in Ms. Jayalalithaa’s politics, noted commentator Stalin Rajangam says, for she neither had any problems identifying herself as a believer nor has shied away from participating in religious events.
In consequence, the BJP witnessed the complete appropriation in Tamil Nadu of a politics that it boasted to be the sole representative of in the rest of the country, so much so that the “national wave” in favour of its Hindutva poster boy, Mr. Modi, was not enough to stop the AIADMK juggernaut, which swept 37 of the 39 seats.
“Communities which have deeply religious and substantially rightwing voters have the icon of Ms. Jayalalithaa to identify with. In her presence, the BJP has little chance of attracting this vote bank,” Mr. Rajangam says.
After the trial court’s conviction of Ms. Jayalalithaa, the State BJP leadership mounted a scathing criticism on the AIADMK government. Statements hitting out at the administration were made almost everyday. But the moment the High Court acquitted her of all charges, paving way for her to return to the helm, the loud voices suddenly fell silent. In fact, State BJP president Tamilisai Soundararajan, perhaps the staunchest critique of them all, even went to the extent of addressing Ms. Jayalalithaa as the “people’s Chief Minister”.
Added to this are internal contradictions within the BJP that affect its policies towards the AIADMK. Even as the party’s State leadership attacks the AIADMK on policy issues, the Central leadership wishes to keep it in good spirits, as Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley’s visit to Poes Garden in January showed. Also, Ms. Jayalalithaa’s support will be essential for the Central government when it tries to force the controversial Land Acquisition Bill through the Rajya Sabha.
It is not only the verdict that has forced the BJP to rethink its strategy. The disintegration of the NDA in 2014 after the exit of S. Ramadoss’ Paattali Makkal Katchi and the Vaiko-led Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam also left the BJP staring at isolation, a dire situation it found itself in for a decade after the 2004 Lok Sabha polls.
What the national party now requires, as a National Executive member says, is a clear-cut direction from the high command, keeping in mind the long-term prospects of the party. In the case of handling the AIADMK, this has always been a tricky spot and there seems to be no strategy in sight.
