“Failure is a great teacher” is a truism. Subsequent discussion on this quote leads one through the ‘enlightenment’ that accrues to those who engage in an honest, open and no-holds-barred conversation on what went wrong; they learn from the misadventure and come out stronger.
Events that have brought joy or an accomplishment that has enriched an individual or a group are readily remembered, celebrated and commemorated publicly. But a synonym for commemoration is ‘observe’. Hence, we as a nation commemorated the golden jubilee of the 1965 India-Pakistan war, while the celebration of the golden jubilee of the 1971 war, that saw the birth of Bangladesh, was commemorated with pan-India seminars, symposia, discussions, television debates and exhibitions. Yet, with just a day before the 60th observance of a dark moment in the history of our young nation, the 1962 India-China war (it began on October 20), there is no indication of its observance in which India lost so many of its brave men — (as in one report) 1,383 soldiers killed, 1,047 wounded, 1,696 missing and over 400 prisoners of war with the Chinese.
The main issues
Let us pause for a moment in tribute to those brave sons; but, thereafter, let us discuss what went so terribly wrong. Did those Indians die in vain? Were there any bright sparks in those 30 days (October 20 – November 20, 1962) which can give us solace? So, let the discourse be about five issues that I can distill from various accounts about the war.
First, is the international standing of the national leadership in world fora any index to the ‘power’ of a nation? Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the builder of modern India, was a champion too in the eyes of the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa and was feted by the West. But misguided optimism in the ephemeral ‘moral’ superiority and peaceful intentions of the Chinese leadership resulted in an enfeebled Indian Army that was ill-prepared and ill-equipped to face the realities of hard power.
Second, an underestimation of the strength of the Indian Air Force (IAF) resulted in its offensive fleet not being used; all writings indicate that the use of fighter aircraft would have been a game changer especially since the Chinese air force was severely operationally handicapped due the high altitude of the airfields from which its aircraft would have had to operate.
A lop-sided equation
Third, the lop-sided power equation between the political, bureaucratic and military top brass was responsible for many ills as there was micro-management of events from the top — why was it that the Army top brass was not strong enough to stand up to the political interference in affairs that were purely military?
Fourth, what lessons can be drawn from the stellar performance of the Indian jawan on the front? The stories of Major Shaitan Singh and many others are legendary. But what is not talked about is the unheralded, unsung and back-breaking work put in by the transport and helicopter aircrew of the IAF. They flew troops and equipment round the clock, into primitive advanced landing grounds and helipads and brought back casualties with aircraft such as the Mi-4 helicopters and Otter light transporters overloaded beyond one’s wildest imagination. To give the hard-worked pilots some rest, young fighter aircrew flew as co-pilots; they were handed over controls after take-off while the captains got some sleep till just before landing.
And last, while the frontline war fighter lived up to his credo, why did senior military leadership in the field wilt when asked to deliver what was expected of their rank and position?
Begin the review
This article has been written in hindsight. This advantage needs to be channelised into knowledge and wisdom that should be imparted to young field grade and mid-level officers, both civil and military. But there is an appeal. Can the politicians join in too, for it is their leadership that modulates events that follow years and decades later? So, it can start with the Government opening up documents that are still classified, which includes the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report. The war colleges of the three services, the Defence Services Staff College (Wellington, Tamil Nadu) and the National Defence College (Delhi), need to delve into what transpired during that fateful period. The media too should debate this. This is the least we can do to honour those brave Indians and to observe the 60th year of an event that is a black spot on our collective conscience.
And, even as the nation rejoices in India’s victories that came after that dark period, the young in this great nation must know the truth about the 1962 war. It is a part of our history. Let us talk about 1962.
Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur VM (retired) is Honorary Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal
