Britain’s apparent tone of accommodation over its current complex exit negotiations with the European Union (EU) would have seemed inconceivable only a couple of months ago. Prime Minister Theresa May’s candid remarks in January that a “no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal” did not amuse European diplomats. Again, her veiled threat of a possible low-tax and tariff regime for third countries in the event of failure to secure a trade agreement with the EU seemed intended to appease hard-liners in her own party. But recent developments suggest that there might be prospects to maintain continuity with the status quo beyond 2019 in Britain’s EU membership. The ‘remain’ camp in last year’s referendum may sense a small window of opportunity in this evolving scenario.
The Conservative government, long held hostage by eurosceptic backbenchers, was a hapless witness to the leave camp’s rallying cry ahead of the June 2016 plebiscite to “take back control” from Brussels. But so much for sloganeering. A demand for legislative approval of the historic verdict was resisted by the government in charge of delivering Brexit. Eventually, ‘remain’ supporters won the argument in a lower court. On appeal, the judges ruled that Britain’s withdrawal from a four-decade EU membership, with profound implications for citizens, required Parliament’s assent. Closure of the country’s borders to immigrants from the continent, quitting the bloc’s single market, and calling time on the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice constitute the core of the eurosceptic stance. They were equally the central pillars of the ‘leave’ campaign. But ever since London triggered the Article 50 exit clause of the Lisbon Treaty on March 29, the hard realities of a two-year deadline have begun to bite.
Some strings attached
In response to Article 50, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly to insist on compliance with the bloc’s budgetary obligations, the common trade policy, and the court’s jurisdiction. The implication is that Britain will continue to be governed by EU policy on these and possibly on immigration, even after Britain’s formal withdrawal.
The European Parliament’s resolution also offers the possibility of an association agreement, paving the path for closer cooperation between the U.K. and the remaining 27 states. But none of this detracts from the bloc’s core concerns that London’s exit does not set a precedent for countries with eurosceptic and populist forces eager to replicate the U.K. referendum. A related aim is that while the final deal may not be punitive, it should be inferior to full membership.
Ms. May’s recent statements echoing this emerging scenario have so far not elicited adverse criticism from her Conservative colleagues. But Britain’s hefty financial bill, still a bone of contention in Brussels and London, will determine whether the bloc is headed for a hard Brexit. The real meaning of “Brexit means Brexit” will soon become apparent.
