Is a “world without nuclear weapons” a less-than-utopian goal which the global politicians of a misty future era could seek to attain? Taking a positive view, Japan and Australia have now begun to outline “ideas” about “practical steps” towards such a global order. Their move was timed for the end-February announcement that United States President Barack Obama would convene a Nuclear Security Summit in April.
It is not as if “practical steps” or even the dream of a nuclear-weapons-free world are strikingly original thoughts. It is simply a matter, though, of such public discourse finding some resonance now in the inner recesses of a power bloc. This marks a shift of such discourse from India, an original home of these thoughts, to the citadels of today's superpower in distress, namely the U.S. And, the evolving context is that Mr. Obama surprised many last year by affirming a U.S. desire to strive for a world without nuclear weapons.
Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and his Australian counterpart Stephen Smith issued a Statement after their talks in Perth on February 21. Their ideas flowed from the recent report of the non-governmental International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). It was co-chaired by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi. The panel, which included India's Brajesh Mishra among others, was the result of a political initiative by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. And, Japan, for long a nuclear pacifist, joined forces with Rudd's Australia in this domain.
Japan and Australia have a strategic trilateral link with the U.S. To this extent, any new nuances in Washington's policies or visions produce a cascading effect on the world-views of both Tokyo and Canberra. Unlike Japan, Australia is a relative late-convert to the “cause” of total nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Yet, this makes no difference to their basking in Mr. Obama's vision which, in Mr. Okada's view, “dramatically changed” the mood for nuclear disarmament.
An important factor in such companionship is the Japan-Australia declaration of March 2007 on their bilateral security cooperation. So, they are unsurprisingly “eager [now] to take a lead ... to make a [positive] difference” to the efforts for creating a world without nuclear weapons. Indeed, Japan and Australia “are both very responsible and capable non-nuclear [-armed] states,” said a top Japanese official Kazuo Kodama on February 25. Another relevant commonality between these two countries is that they also rely on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” or “extended deterrence.” Mr. Kodama told this journalist that “we do not have any concerns” that the U.S. might downgrade its nuclear umbrella for Japan in this new ambience. At the same time, Tokyo would “not call” for a U.S. policy that might “contradict the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”
Beyond such official nuances, it is clear that the limitations of Mr. Obama's initiative are reflected in the follow-up moves of his associates in ally-states. He is still unprepared for the political equivalent of a space odyssey for exploring the uncharted universe of a peaceful nuclear order for humanity. His dilemma is germane to the current status of the U.S. as the premier nuclear superpower.
In this complexity, Japan and Australia have pledged to help countries with atomic energy programmes to stay clear of the nuclear-weapons path. The idea is to accept the “global trend” of many states choosing the atomic-energy route to produce electricity in a planet-friendly way. Mr. Okada and Mr. Smith decided to assist such countries in the realm of what is known as “3S”. As shorthand, “3S” stands, collectively, for safeguards, safety and security under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mr. Okada and Mr. Smith also delved into other “ideas” to “realise a world of decreased nuclear risk on the way to a world without nuclear weapons”.
A possible “world of decreased nuclear risk” is, in this perspective, a half-way house towards a totally peaceful global atomic order. Just two “ideas,” taken from the report of the ICNND, were emphasised by Japan and Australia for reducing the existing “nuclear risks” in the world.
One such “idea” is “enhancing the effectiveness of [the] security assurances” which one or more nuclear-armed states can give the world at large. Typically, such “assurances” would be designed to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against countries without such devices.
Another key “idea” is to reinforce the effectiveness of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence in a selective fashion. In focus is the assurance that a state might give to “retain [atomic] weapons solely for the purpose of deterring others from using such weapons”.
Japan and Australia have now selectively conceded deterrence as some kind of a right that could be invoked by a nuclear-armed state. However, Tokyo and Canberra have not conceded the right of deterrence for the acquisition of atomic weapons by the states in a grey zone of “proliferation.” Unsurprisingly, therefore, North Korea and Iran were singled out by Mr. Okada and Mr. Smith for various forms of condemnation and concern. Significantly, the latest Japan-Australia Statement is silent on Pakistan as a state that causes concern to the collective global fraternity of experts and leaders.
In a recent article, Graham Allison of Harvard University has cited Pakistan as a country that poses a “challenge” to the current “fragile ... global nuclear order.” Pakistan figures alongside Iran and North Korea in this thesis. The relevant reasoning is related to Pakistan's “increasing instability.” The crux of the argument is: “If Pakistan were to lose control of even one nuclear weapon that was ultimately used by terrorists, that [event] would change the world ... and alter conceptions of a viable nuclear order”.
It is understood on good authority that Japan and Australia have at this stage chosen not to focus on Pakistan because it is a de-facto nuclear-armed state. This surely is fine procedural logic. Pakistan, unlike North Korea, has not acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for any period of time. However, “practical steps” towards a peaceful global nuclear order, via the half-way house of “decreased nuclear risk”, cannot leave out Pakistan.
Mr. Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had, last November, issued a Statement with a larger sweep of a more universal kind. However, lofty principles rather than practical measures defined the tenor of that document. Of interest to India, the U.S. and Japan had spelt out their intent to “explore ways to enhance a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation”. The bottom-line should be that the peaceful use of atomic energy cannot be denied to those not recognised as nuclear-armed states under the NPT.
