Africa figures prominently in China’s worldview and in the conduct of its foreign policy in the 21st century. During the past 24 years, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has emerged as an all-encompassing and effective platform for dialogue, interaction and planning between the two sides. African countries, despite their reservations and grievances, have found it useful to enhance their proximity to China. Unlike the previous decade, African governments and institutions of multiple hues now find it increasingly more comfortable to deal with their Chinese counterparts. In this light, the outcomes of the Ninth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, which just concluded in Beijing, merit a dispassionate scrutiny.
As scholar George Yu noted in 1968, ‘studying China in Africa is much like pursuing a dragon in the bush. The dragon is imposing, but the bush is dense’. In the latter half of the 20th century, especially in its last decade, China laid the foundations of a strong partnership with Africa. This has blossomed during the FOCAC era which began with the first summit held in Beijing in 2000. Since then, a total of five conferences took place in Beijing and one each in Ethiopia, Egypt, South Africa, and Senegal. The Beijing summit last week confirms China’s consistency and steadfastness in pursuing its goals relating to Africa. They are economic, political and strategic in nature, reflecting Beijing’s long-held view that Africa is vital to the world’s future — therefore, it should be motivated to stand alongside China.
The main elements
A careful look at the 30-paragraph-long Beijing Declaration of the latest summit reveals its key elements.
First, the jointly negotiated document which bears predominantly the stamp of Chinese draftsmanship, has six sections, namely outlining the high-level ‘China Africa Community with a Shared Future’; fostering ‘synergy’ between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), AU’s Agenda 2063 and the 2030 UN Agenda for sustainable development; the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI); and spelling out the review and outlook for FOCAC.
Second, both sides have committed themselves to expanding exchanges on governance, modernisation and poverty reduction so that modernisation based on ‘the characteristics of their own civilisations’ is promoted. Further, they favour ‘mutually beneficial and inclusive economic globalization’ that focuses on the concerns of African countries. China supports Africa in increasing Africa’s influence and role in global governance. The declaration states: ‘Africa appreciates it that China is the first country to support the AU in joining the G20.’ Besides, the parties stand for an equal and orderly multipolar world, and for necessary reform and strengthening of the United Nations (UN), including its Security Council.
Third, there is little new in the goal to promote synergy involving Chinese, African and UN plans for development as this has been often articulated in the past. However, China has now hailed progress in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and expressed readiness to sign a framework agreement for economic partnership with Africa. On the issue of financing projects and businesses in Africa, the Chinese side astutely shifted responsibility by calling on international financial institutions and commercial creditors to participate in debt treatment for African countries.
Fourth, China’s three flagship plans — GDI, GSI, and GCI — have been firmly embedded into the purportedly joint strategy to create a common path to all-round security and development paradigm. The declaration, for example, voices China’s support for increased UN funding for Africa’s independent peace operations, counterterrorism activities and maritime security challenges. Further, the document waxes eloquent in highlighting the need for joint action for deepening dialogue among cultures and civilisations.
Fifth, the concluding section points to the transfer of responsibility of Africa’s FOCAC co-chair from Senegal to the Republic of the Congo and confirmation that the tenth conference will be held in 2027 in Congo.
Beneath the surface, a familiar template
The international media produced numerous headlines while covering Chinese President Xi Jinping’s keynote address at the inauguration of the Beijing Summit, unaware that it sticks to a familiar template used on such occasions in the past. He presented the offer of new financing amounting to nearly $51 billion in soft loans, grants and investment promotion to African nations. He identified 10 partnership actions relating to trade connectivity, green development, industrial chain cooperation, and health, as he did in the past. On the surface, his big announcements such as provision of 60,000 training opportunities for women and youth, invitation to 1,000 members of African political parties to visit China, and training for 7,000 military and police personnel from Africa sound impressive, but opacity will prevail about the degree of their implementation in the future as it did in the past. What, however, is noteworthy on this occasion is China’s decision to give all 33 African least developed countries zero tariff treatment for 100% tariff lines. When implemented, it could boost African exports to China.
Concerning the growing multi-dimensional cooperation between China and Africa, three principal perspectives should be factored in. First, the Chinese view is that a natural partnership exists between China, the largest developing country in the world, and Africa, the continent with the largest number of developing countries. With its own economic success, China has shown an alternative path to modernisation which is different from westernisation. The Chinese path is highly relevant to Africa, according to this school.
Second, a sober African view recognises the benefits and risks of close partnership with China, but as pointed out by Paul Nantulya of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the FOCAC-centered process is still largely shaped by “a donor-recipient dynamic where African countries mostly take a back seat while China initiates most of the agenda”.
Third, the prevalent American perception has been presented by Michael Schuman of the Atlantic Council who argues that China’s interest in the developing world is shaped by Xi Jinping’s anti-Americanism. He is of the opinion that the aim of Mr. Xi’s strategy is to build a coalition of states within the Global South to act as ‘a counter weight’ to the U.S. global alliance. A more sophisticated viewpoint was articulated by a European foreign minister visiting India in 2019. He cautioned against interpreting the Chinese role in Africa ‘in black and white terms’. It was doing some good as in the health and education fields and it was also expanding its power and influence on the continent, he noted.
The import for India
Finally, what are the takeaways for India from the latest FOCAC summit? At least three seem fairly obvious.
First, consistency in cultivation of Africa at the highest political levels is a must. After holding three India-Africa Forum Summits, India paused its Africa-centered conference diplomacy in 2015. Almost a decade has elapsed since then. Second, strong historical bonds, ideational contributions and stirring rhetoric are useful, but they must be backed by financial generosity. This demands substantial additional resources for fuelling India-Africa cooperation. Without them, our diplomatic and business initiatives would become handicapped. Third, Africa’s place in the list of India’s diplomatic priorities must be reviewed. If the continent enjoys a high priority, the Indian polity must be enabled and encouraged to act accordingly.
India’s Africanists have presented a range of practical policy choices to the government. What is now needed is stronger political will.
Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House, a former Indian High Commissioner to South Africa, Kenya and Lesotho, and the author of India-Africa Relations: Changing Horizons (2022)
Published - September 11, 2024 12:16 am IST
