International student mobility is big business. Approximately, 2.8 million students study abroad, distributing an estimated $50 billion around the globe annually. Most international students come from developing or middle-income countries, the majority from East and South Asia; most are self-financed. They contribute major revenues to the institutions and countries where they study and represent a key part of the internationalisation of higher education.
The number of students pursuing opportunities abroad is expanding and no longer limited to individuals from elite backgrounds. This larger pool has less international exposure and fewer personal sources of information than earlier generations of mobile students. These students are looking for help and willing to pay for it. Universities now see these students as important sources of revenue as well as contributors to diversity. Competition for international students has increased greatly. As a result, new enterprises have appeared to address the demands of this growing market.
Recruitment agents are not new operators in higher education, but their participation in the university admission process has always been controversial. No data are available about how many agents operate worldwide, but their presence is growing and an increasing number of universities are using these services. For now all available information is anecdotal, since no research exists on this topic.
Recruitment agents: Recruitment agents act as local salespeople for one or more universities overseas. They are not university employees but their presence on the ground ensures that the institutions that hire them are more accessible to students interested in going abroad. Agents act as local promoters and a conduit of international applications for their university client(s). They are typically paid a commission that ranges from 10 to 15 per cent (but may go as high as 25 per cent) of the first year's tuition. The agents may but do not necessarily receive any professional training from their university clients, nor are formal mechanisms generally in place for keeping them current on programmes or policies.
Agents may also act as counsellors, helping students sort through the overwhelming amount of information available on the Internet. However, their motivation does not consist of providing impartial information but rather to steer students to specific institutions — something that may not be entirely clear to a student who consults them.
The primary client for agents is the institution that hires them. In order to be successful, they must deliver an acceptable number of students to their sponsoring institutions. It is not known how frequently agents accept payment from students as well as from universities and colleges, although anecdotal evidence indicates that this does happen. The key here is that the extent of their activities, source of their fees, and propriety of their services lack transparency, particularly to students.
It is not possible to confirm the extent of services provided, but they include activities required to match student clients with university clients. Many universities suspect that agents sometimes complete applications and write essays for their student clients. Although it is not possible to generalise, sufficient anecdotes have been reported to cause concern.
Other information sources: Another service available to internationally mobile students is offered by a growing number of private independent advisers. This service is hired by students to provide guidance in matching their goals, objectives, and academic profile to appropriate institutions overseas. Private consultants do not have contractual agreements with any university that would influence the advice they provide.
To be successful, these professionals must cultivate a local reputation for providing excellent service to students, not institutions; they must be well informed about a wide range of colleges and universities, academic programmes, and admissions requirements throughout the world. They welcome contact with institutions, meet with travelling representatives, contact alumni, and often visit campuses abroad. In fact many universities seek out these advisers and provide them with information to build a “triangle” of communication that works to everyone's advantage.
Advisers and extensive information are also offered to students in many countries at non-profit advising centres operated by the British Council, the U.S. State Department, and other governments that provide a basic orientation to higher education in their respective countries. Yet, staffing at these agencies is inadequate to serve the growing international student market.
Perverse incentives: The dynamic between an intermediary, an institution, and a student is inevitably influenced by the incentives and rewards that shape it. A recruitment agent's income depends on directing students to specific institutions. While this action may result in a good match for the student, the incentives are not set up to ensure the best match for the student or, for that matter, to work in the student's best interests.
Agents are entrepreneurs who earn their income from providing a service to two entities whose best interests may, or may not, be the same. The rewards arise from the relationship between the agent and the institution that hires him or her, not from the service provided to the student, presenting a potential conflict of interest that no professional standards or guidelines can eliminate. In fact, as long as the incentives favour the interests of the institution and agent over the interests of the student, professional standards will have limited effect.
False arguments and lost opportunities: Most of the arguments in defence of overseas agents are somewhat hollow — such as, students cannot be expected to sort through vast amounts of information on their own; small institutions do not have staff or resources to launch effective international marketing campaigns; since agents exist, standards should be set for their behaviour; and the market will weed out unscrupulous recruiters.
Given the investment and consequences of their choice, students should be required to participate actively in the research. It is too risky to allow someone else to make (or influence) decisions if the student lacks the knowledge needed to judge advice fairly. It is inappropriate that a recruitment agent, motivated by economic gain, should be the source of all information.
When institutions work through agents, they sacrifice the benefits (and necessary information) that result from the direct engagement of university administrators and faculty in recruitment, which ensures a necessary flow of information — about foreign cultures, foreign education systems, and international student needs. Similarly, direct communication with institutional representatives helps students receive accurate and up-to-date information.
Alternatively, college administrators can travel with a number of companies that organise international recruitment trips; they can participate in overseas education fairs. Institutions with limited budgets have found creative ways to increase their visibility overseas. Numerous examples of recruiting successfully exist including working with students on study-abroad programmes; faculty who travel; combining efforts (and budgets) of multiple offices such as admissions, alumni relations, and development to send a single administrator abroad to represent the institution; Webinars (live Web-based seminars) and other online events. Private consultants (professionals hired by students) welcome contact with international institutions.
Not knowing what agents actually tell their clients leaves students (and universities) very vulnerable. It is unrealistic to expect that “the market” will regulate quality or that unethical agents will be unsuccessful. The “market model” assumes that students (as consumers) have the knowledge and experience necessary to choose the best-quality service, and that is unrealistic. Adequate oversight is impossible, and professional certification will only provide “ethical cover” and a false sense of security to institutions and students alike.
Conclusion: New enterprises have responded to the opportunities from the growing numbers of mobile students. Still, not all businesses that have found markets for their services should be welcomed. The use of recruitment agents is clouded by many factors. Their activities cannot be adequately monitored to guarantee that student interests are protected. No international standards can guarantee local activity or that the relationship between an agent and a university will be entirely transparent to the student. Furthermore, the incentives and rewards do not depend on ethical behaviour.
Some universities are participating in a process to certify agents who adhere to ethical standards. Yet, ethical behaviour is interpreted differently in various cultures. Who will mediate cultures to ensure compliance with standards as they are intended?
By “outsourcing” recruitment, institutions trust their reputation and vital communication with students to a third party, and this is a serious mistake. Students heading overseas must take an active role in the research, ask good questions, and make informed decisions about where to study. Alumni of foreign universities can help. The Internet is a good tool; visits to education information centres or education fairs can help; and direct contact with staff at prospective universities is essential.
Agents are a strong presence in many countries. However, the issue of employing agents merits more public discussion, and it would be most unfortunate to forego the debate and proceed on the basis of “if you can't beat them, join them.”
( Liz Reisberg is research associate at the Center for International Higher Education, Boston College. She has 30 years of experience in international admissions. Philip G. Altbach is Monan professor of higher education and director of the Center for International Higher Education at Boston College .)
