Light at the end of Iraqi tunnel

What has emerged is that there is probably some degree of U.S.-Iranian convergence on the power-sharing deal in Baghdad.

November 20, 2010 12:31 am | Updated 01:16 am IST

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki reacts during a press conference in  Baghdad. File photo

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki reacts during a press conference in Baghdad. File photo

The first major foreign policy success of the Barack Obama presidency began surfacing last week. This, of course, is an optimistic way of looking at the power-sharing deal in Baghdad, which was sealed eight months after the inconclusive general election in March. But wasn't the deal brokered by Iran? How can it be counted as Mr. Obama's success story? It can be. The heart of the matter is that the United States has tacitly consorted with Iran, which only underscores political realism on the part of the Obama administration.

The Baghdad deal, which followed three days of high-pressure talks between the Iraqi political factions, envisages that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a Shi'ite will have another term in office. So also Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, will continue as President, while the post of Speaker of Parliament has gone to Osama al-Najafi, a Sunni Arab credited with an obscure past of links with Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. As part of the deal, a new statutory body, National Council for Strategic Policy (NCSP), is being established to oversee security, which will probably be chaired by the former Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, a “secular” Sh'ite from the mainly Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc, who many regard as a U.S. proxy. And, to complete the tapestry, if rumours gather substance in the coming days, the post of Foreign Minister may go to Saleh al-Mutlak, the “secular” Sunni politician who is commonly linked to the Baath Party.

It is almost impossible to be certain about who won and who lost in a pantomime. The Americans, prima facie , “lost” and yet, as the witches in Macbeth would say, they may have “won” as well. So has Iran. The U.S. initially backed Mr. Allawi for prime ministership, failing which it worked for a power-sharing deal between him and Mr. Maliki. At a later stage, it sought to have Mr. Allawi as President. But Mr. Maliki trumped Mr. Allawi and the Kurds (who have been sturdy American allies), rebuffed the U.S. and insisted on retaining the presidency. The U.S. has now been left to persuade Mr. Allawi to accept the post of head of NCSP, whose powers are yet to be defined. Again, the U.S. sought to exclude the fiercely anti-American Shi'ite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, from the power structure but the current deal is riveted on his group's undertaking to support a government with Mr. Maliki, and the Sadrists may hold as many as a quarter of Cabinet posts in the new government. Indeed, Mr. Maliki travelled to Iran to meet Mr. Sadr (residing in the holy city of Qom) and publicly acknowledged his appreciation of Tehran's role in persuading Mr. Sadr to set aside his visceral hatred of him (Mr. Maliki).

The noted Middle East analyst and historian, Juan Cole, wrote: “I don't think there is any way to interpret what has happened except as a victory for Iran … Iran has been working hard to put back together the fractured coalition of Shi'ite religious parties ... As the U.S. withdraws its troops over the next year, Iran's favourable position in Iraq will now likely be strengthened.” True, the current deal is not what the U.S. would have preferred. On the other hand, the deal also reflects the U.S. influence insofar as it provides for an inclusive government that does not disenfranchise Mr. Allawi's Sunni supporters. The Obama administration has all along argued that the new government must be broad-based and should include all major factions and accommodate all groups, including even the Baathists of the Saddam era.

What has emerged is that there is probably some degree of U.S.-Iranian convergence. The deal in Iraq leaves one guessing all over again about the backchannel contact between the two implacable adversaries that never quite stops working. We know for sure that the backchannel has been working steadily on Afghanistan in the recent period. All the same, it is hard to tell whether it was a mere coincidence that, in a dramatic turnaround on November 3, the U.S. State Department designated the Jundullah as a terrorist organisation. Tehran has been accusing Washington of secretly supporting the Jundullah to bring about a “regime change” in Iran. In March last year, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei publicly warned the U.S. that Iran had intercepted communication between the Jundullah terrorists and American operatives. He chastised Mr. Obama: “In a neighbouring country, bandits, terrorists and murderers are in touch with American officials. They say ‘Let's negotiate, let's start relations'. They have the slogan of ‘change'. But where is the ‘change'? ‘Change' has to be real. You change, and we shall change as well.” Is the Obama administration finally changing course and addressing the mother of all “injustices” that Tehran alleges successive U.S. administrations have perpetrated on Iran through the past three decades — the covert policy to seek a “regime change?”

Of course, Tehran will wield influence over the new government in Baghdad so as to ensure that Iranian interests are not jeopardised. But it knows well enough that Mr. Maliki is first and foremost an Iraqi nationalist — so is Mr. Sadr — who is a master-tactician in balancing competing interest groups and superb practitioner of the politics of expediency. Mr. Maliki all along kept lines open to Tehran and Washington, besides having his own regional connections, as is apparent from his success in winning over Syria (which, along with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, has been supportive of Mr. Allawi) to his side. In sum, Tehran is accepting a power structure in Baghdad that is dominated by Shi'ite groups but accommodates Sunni groups and possibly at some stage Baathist elements as well. Iran's main consideration is that Iraq should remain stable and friendly.

Mr. Obama's enthusiasm for the Iraqi formula is equally meaningful. He called it “another milestone in the history of modern Iraq.” He said Washington had been lobbying for precisely such a “broadbased government”. In recent days he (and Vice-President Joe Biden) spoke to several Iraqi leaders, coaxing them to compromise, during which, as Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes put it, the President “reiterated our strong desire to see an inclusive government in Iraq, and welcomed the steps that have been taken toward reaching that goal.” Mr. Obama called up Mr. Allawi to prevail upon him to agree to the current deal brokered by Iran and to hold positions in the partnership government. Of course, the U.S. would have to stay engaged in the coming period also. Mr. Allawi's followers seek the repeal of the “de-Baathification” laws so that Saddam Hussein's followers can hold office. This may not find favour with the Shi'ite and Kurdish groups. Again, it is unclear whether Mr. Mailki will allow his prime ministerial prerogatives to be circumscribed by the NCSP. The Shi'ite-Sunni power struggle has been institutionalised in Iraq.

To be sure, Mr. Obama's pragmatism in hailing a political dispensation in Iraq comprising stakeholders ranging from Arab nationalists, pro-Iranian Shi'ites and radical anti-American Islamists to U.S.-backed moderates (and possibly erstwhile Baathists) is noteworthy. How long can Mr. Obama shy away from showing statesmanship to the Hamas in Palestine and the Hezbollah in Lebanon — groups that have, like the Sadrists in Iraq, demonstrated their support via the ballot box? More important, is there scope for extending similar “pragmatism” to the Afghan conflict?

Although no two conflicts can be analogous, the contours of an Afghan settlement can be discerned from what has been happening in Iraq. By no means is Iraq's regional milieu less turbulent than are the raging storms in the region surrounding Afghanistan. Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran — they all have specific interests in Iraq. Iraqis and Afghans face similar problems of ethnicity and fragmentation of their political economies. Of course, Iraqi society is far more urbanised. But then, Afghanistan faces nothing like Kurdish separatism or Shi'ite-Sunni schism or the legacy of brutal authoritarianism. Yet, the big difference is that the Pakistani military leadership is yet to show the wisdom and cosmopolitanism of the Persian mind. It remains rooted in the tribal instincts of a zero-sum game. It continues to waffle on the core issue of Afghanistan's stability and takes recourse to detours — ‘The road to Kabul runs through Kashmir,' etc.

The crucial difference is that in Iraq, General David Petraeus was allowed to do his job and the insurgency was checked so that the political processes could gain traction. The Taliban has to be weakened first. That is the game-changer in Afghanistan. The Pentagon has seemed to grasp this lately and the Pakistani generals are mighty upset about it. The strength of the Afghan Army and police is scheduled to reach 3,50,000 by 2013. Therefore, Mr. Obama should push back the July 2011 deadline for the start of the American drawdown. Hamid Karzai suggested 2014 as the key date for handing over the defence of Afghanistan to the Afghans themselves. Concurring with Mr. Karzai will be Mr. Obama's “Afghan pragmatism”.

(The writer is a former diplomat.)

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