How courts saw Periyar’s 1953 act of breaking a clay Ganesha ‘idol’

Though the case was dismissed in several courts, including the Madras High Court, with judges saying that the ‘idol’ cannot be considered as something held ‘sacred by any class of persons’, the Supreme Court held that an offence had been committed, but did not prosecute the accused and dismissed the case as it had become stale

Updated - December 20, 2023 05:09 pm IST

 The Additional First Class Magistrate, Tiruchi, the first court to hear the case, held that the speech made by Periyar E.V. Ramasamy was an offence, but did not proceed further as this required sanction from the government.

 The Additional First Class Magistrate, Tiruchi, the first court to hear the case, held that the speech made by Periyar E.V. Ramasamy was an offence, but did not proceed further as this required sanction from the government. | Photo Credit: The Hindu Archives

On the evening of May 27, 1953, Periyar E.V. Ramasamy, founder of the Dravidar Kazhagam (DK), broke a clay ‘idol’ of Lord Pillaiyar or Ganesha, at a public meeting in Town Hall Grounds in Tiruchi.

Offended by this S. Veerabadran Chettiyar, a Saivite, filed a complaint against Ramasamy and two others before the Additional First Class Magistrate, Tiruchi. He alleged that before breaking the idol, the DK leader made a speech, and expressly stated he intended to insult the feelings of the Hindu community with his actions. The other two accused abetted and aided him. This caused “terror-commotion in the mind of the Saivite Section” of the Hindu Community. Chettiyar said this act attracted offences under Sections 295 and 295A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

However, the magistrate, on receipt of a police report, dismissed the petition holding that the image broken by Periyar cannot be held as “sacred”. The magistrate observed, “The mud figure of Ganesha alleged to have been broken by the accused is not an object held sacred or worshipped by any class of persons. Simply because it resembled the God Ganesha, held in veneration by a section, it cannot become an object held sacred.”

Interestingly, the magistrate pointed out, “Even a Ganesha idol abandoned by the people as unworthy of worship loses its sanctity, and it is no longer an object held sacred by anybody, since such given up idols are found in several places of defilement. It is not an offence if a person treads on any such abandoned idol. Therefore, the breaking of mud figure of Ganesha does not amount to an offence under Section 295 of the IPC.”

The magistrate said the speeches delivered by the accused “with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging religious feelings of a community” no doubt amounted to an offence under Section 295 A of the IPC. However, for an offence under this section, it warranted the sanction of the government. In the absence of such, there was no ground to proceed against the accused.

Chettiyar then moved the Sessions Court seeking to prosecute Periyar for the offence under Section 295 alone. In January 1954, the judge concurred with the order of the magistrate and dismissed the petition. “The particular image (idol) broken was the private property of the accused and was not in itself an object held sacred by any class of persons; nor do I think that idol breaking by a non-believer can reasonably be regarded by a believer as an insult to his religion,” the judge said. He held the ingredients of Section 295 IPC “are therefore not made out”.

Thereafter, Chettiyar filed an appeal before a single judge in the Madras High Court. He too agreed with the lower courts and refused to order further inquiry. In the course of his judgment, he discussed the question whether a mud image of God Ganesha, came within the scope of the words “any object held sacred by any class of persons” in Section 295 of the IPC, and he answered the question in the negative.

Under active worship

The High Court took the view that the “object held sacred” would only apply to idols inside the temple, and when they are taken out in processions on festive occasions. “In such circumstances, as in the present case, the breaking (of Ganesha) is nothing more than a doll taken from the shop,” the judge said.

The dolls in the shop, though they may resemble several of the deities in the temple, cannot be considered objects held “sacred by any class of persons”. In modern society, there are several images of the deities in drawing rooms of several houses. It cannot for a moment be suggested that these images are objects held sacred. These have to be distinguished from the objects held sacred, which can only be when they are duly installed in a temple and from which they are subsequently taken out in procession on festive occasions, the court felt.

Eventually, Chettiyar moved the Supreme Court where an ex-parte order, overturning the interpretation of the other courts, was passed as the accused did not represent their case in person or through a lawyer.

In their order dated, August 25, 1958, a bench of Justices B.P. Sinha and P. Bhuvaneshwar held that it was a well-known fact that the image of Lord Ganesha, or any objective representation of a similar kind, was held sacred by certain classes of Hindus, even though the image might not have been consecrated. “The learned Judge in the Court below, has given much too restricted a meaning to the words ‘any object held sacred by any class of persons’ by holding that only idols in temples or idols carried in processions on festive occasions, are meant to be included within those words,” the Bench said.

The Supreme Court pointed out that there were no such express words of limitation in Section 295 of the IPC “and in our opinion, the learned Judge had clearly misdirected himself in importing those words of limitation.” The Supreme Court argued that if idols are only “illustrative” then the same could apply to the Bible, Koran, or the Granth Saheb. “If the courts below were right in their interpretation of the crucial words in Section 295 of the IPC, the burning or otherwise destroying or defiling such sacred books will not come within the purview of the penal statute,” said Justice Sinha, who authored the verdict. Despite holding the lower courts had erred, the Supreme Court did not direct prosecution of Periyar and the two others. It merely observed that the action of the accused persons, “if true, was foolish, to put it mildly, but as the case has become stale, we do not direct further inquiry into this complaint.”

The judges said if there was a recurrence of such “foolish behaviour on the part of any section of the community, we have no doubt that those charged with the duty of maintaining law and order, will apply the law in the sense in which we have interpreted.” It then dismissed Chettiyar’s appeal.

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