The Kargil conflict of 1999 was an opportunity to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff but India failed to do so for political reasons, says Lt. Gen. Mohinder Puri (retd.), who played a critical role in the battlefield as the commander of 8 Mountain Division.
Lt. Gen. Puri’s observations find resonance even today given India’s dilemma in dealing with continued cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, and the uncertainties that nuclear weapons have introduced into the South Asian security scenario. In fact, the nuclear discourse in the subcontinent has been further convoluted in recent times with Pakistan introducing tactical nuclear weapons or low yield nuclear warheads into the equation.
“It could have perhaps been escalated into a wider war. Perhaps the politician did not want to enlarge the scope. The Pakistanis overplayed the nuclear thing and we succumbed to it. It was time to call the bluff but we didn’t. Nobody is going to go for nuclear war in this age,” Lt. Gen. Puri said in a conversation with The Hindu.
He was General Officer Commanding (GOC), 8 Mountain Division, which conducted operations in the crucial Drass-Mushkoh sector during ‘Operation Vijay.’ His personal recollection of the battle, titled Kargil: Turning the Tide, was released recently.
He noted that the government’s redlines were very clear: do not cross the Line of Control (LoC) at any cost.
“Within the combat zone there were possibilities of crossing the LoC if we were allowed. You need not have a classical sort of offensive of crossing into the other’s territory, there was the option of just going across hitting the target and coming back. Second was just crossing the LoC and then carry the rearward operation where possible,” he said.
In this context he stated that hard borders cannot be changed in today’s world but only trouble spots or soft borders can be manoeuvred with.
In the summer of 1999, India was caught off guard as Pakistani soldiers occupied the icy heights in Kargil and adjoining areas. After initial losses, India eventually drove away the adversary but as a strategy refused to cross the LoC or open new fronts.
Lt. Gen. Puri defended the strategy of relying on heavy troop numbers to offset the enemy’s advantage of height which cost hundreds of lives. “If one is familiar with the terrain, there is not even a blade of grass. It gives no camouflage or concealment. You are out in the open.”
He observed that the terrain itself does not lend to an offensive operation as the adversary was sitting right on top. It had to be done with heavy attacks with concentrated artillery fire which took our forces close to the objective and then enabled them to carry out a normal infantry operation. “So I am convinced that what we did was the best way. There is no other way in the hills…”
Battle of Tololing
Terming the battle of Tololing as the turning point of the conflict, he said there was “initially a sense of despondency as not much positive was coming out of the war” but the victory changed the mood of the nation.
Tololing in the Drass sector was taken over by 2 Rajputana Rifles on June 21, 1999 and it was essential as it overlooked the crucial Srinagar-Kargil-Leh highway.
On his personal memories during the conflict Lt. Gen. Puri said he could not pick one as there were several with many people. “You shake the hand of a soldier in the morning and in the evening he is not there. It is a very touchy moment, but emotions had to be kept aside,” he added.
Commenting on the book, General V.P. Malik, who was the Chief of Army Staff during Operation Vijay, said he pushed Lt. Gen. Puri to write the book. “I wrote about the macro perspective of the conflict, I wanted someone to present a ground view,” he said.
