From the South China Sea to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India, China has been more forcefully pushing its territorial claims with neighbours with the aim of dissuading their warming ties with the United States, a risky strategy that experts said could end up backfiring.
While the latest 19th round talks between China and India, held on August 13 and 14 at the Chushul-Moldo border meeting point, ended with a joint release from both sides unlike in the previous round and an agreement “to resolve the remaining issues in an expeditious manner”, the negotiations have been anything but expeditious, Indian officials say, because of a broader hardening Chinese stand in enforcing Beijing’s claims along the LAC. Dialling down tensions, officials and experts add, may likely only be tactical moves to create the right atmosphere for a high-level leaders’ meeting, even as Beijing continues beefing up its posture along the border.
This dynamic has in recent days also been mirrored in another theatre – in the contested South China Sea, where one among China’s fleet of increasingly large and sophisticated coast guard ships deployed water cannons to stop a Philippines vessel to deliver supplies to an already present garrison on the contested Second Thomas Shoal.
Warming ties with U.S.
In Manila, the moves have widely been seen as being aimed at its warming ties with Washington. “China has been upset with the Philippines, more so after the Marcos government renewed security cooperation with the United States, which now has access to more local military bases,” the Manila Times said in an editorial on the incident. “Clearly, the Philippines wants — more likely, needs — stable and peaceful relations with China. Not only is it poised to be the biggest economy in the world, but China is also one of this country’s closest neighbors. Moreover, peace in the region is also key to global stability and prosperity. Mr. Marcos has repeatedly said the Philippines wants to steer clear of any superpower rivalry. But no country will just keep silent when its security and other interests are threatened. To paraphrase the President, the Philippines wants to be friends to all, but not at the expense of its territory.”
Similarly, Indian officials say as the China-U.S. rivalry has heightened, Beijing has increasingly situated its relations with India only in the context of its ties with Washington, an approach they believe has been a prime driver in worsening India-China relations, which are at their lowest point since the normalisation of relations more than three decades ago.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has in several interviews and public remarks suggested Beijing was viewing ties with India through the prism of a third-party. He has also described current relations as being “abnormal” in the wake of Beijing’s moves to unilaterally enforce its claims and change the status quo on the LAC starting with multiple transgressions in April 2020.
Since Corps Commander-level talks started in 2020, both have disengaged from five friction points in Galwan Valley, north and south of Pangong Lake, and Patrolling Points 15 and 17A. However, the talks have dramatically slowed down in the past 12 months, when only three rounds of talks have been held and Beijing has made what Indian military officials see as “unreasonable and unacceptable” demands requiring India to give up patrolling rights in the remaining two friction areas in Depsang and Demchok.
Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, who recently visited Beijing for a high-level security form at Tsinghua University, told The Hindu in an interview that “as the level of concern or perception from threats from the U.S. increase, they appear to look at anything that happens between India and the U.S. as being directed at them. They are convinced that America has now decided to put a containment ring around them and that India is becoming a willing partner in that.”
If some observers have been puzzled by why Beijing appears to be actively driving its neighbours into closer ties with the U.S. with its actions, Mr. Saran explained that there appeared be “two views” about this approach within the strategic community in Beijing, with some voices indeed aware of the fact that this had risked backfiring and pushing countries into deeper security embraces with Washington.
“One view is that putting pressure on India will dissuade them from moving closer to the U.S.,” he said. “There is a train of thought that says that, ‘if we do something on the border, then don’t think anyone will help you and don’t provoke us, there will be a price to pay.’”
“The other suggests that China should look at this more closely because India has still followed more or less an independent foreign policy, and has been displaying that with respect to the war in Ukraine, and that the more you use coercive measures against India, the greater will be a risk of India getting closer to the Americans. Both trends of thinking,” he added, “are there in Beijing.”