A series of private diplomatic cables of the United States' State Department, released this week by WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website, has cast light upon the complex relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.
They detail Pakistani efforts to block the U.S. from monitoring the use of civilian aid; a civilian leadership in Pakistan noticeably lacking in power relative to the military yet pleading for U.S. military assets such as drones; and fears that U.S. diplomats had for the safety of their personnel based in Pakistan.
Three diplomatic cables in particular, sent from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, highlighted the tug-of-war among senior U.S. officials such as former Pakistan Ambassadors Anne Patterson and Ryan Crocker and the former National Security Advisor, James Jones, on the one hand and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, Inter-Services Intelligence Chief Ahmad Pasha and President Asif Zardari, on the other.
One cable, dated October 7, 2009, accounts Ms. Patterson submitting to a two-hour meeting with General Kayani and Mr. Pasha wherein they repeatedly complained about “conditions” attached to the Kerry-Lugar civilian financing bill. Mr. Kayani was noted to have said “there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army”.
In this meeting, the Pakistani officials remonstrated with Ms. Patterson about everything, from insecurities on whether the Pressler sanctions would be invoked to suspend the Kerry-Lugar aid, to the American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command. The latter issue, in particular, “rankled COAS Kayani (and) DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders”, according to the cable.
All the U.S. Ambassador could do was emphasise the bill's long-term commitment to Pakistan — $7.5 billion over five years — and make three further points: that the provisions of the bill could be waived; that the bill only required certifications and “assessments;” and that the bill did not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund.
In another cable, Mr. Jones was recorded as hearing numerous pleas from Mr. Zardari for even more U.S. support in Pakistan's fight against extremist groups on its soil and also hints that the U.S. should convey to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the difficulties that Mr. Zardari faced domestically.
The cable, dated June 30 2009, described Mr. Zardari making repeated pleas for drones to be “put in Pakistan's hands” so that Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including collateral damage) would not provoke anti-americanism. “Zardari said the technology behind them was not cutting-edge and said he has raised the issue with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” the cable said. India has expressed concern in the past that Pakistani access to “killer” Predator drones could inflame tensions on the border.
In the same discussion with Mr. Jones, Mr. Zardari's comments indicated a sense of relative weakness experienced by his civilian government. Mr. Zardari not only emphasised that “goodwill from America was central to his and Pakistan's future” but when told by Mr. Jones that it was vital for Pakistan to ensure that another Mumbai-style attack did not occur, he said that Prime Minister Singh was unaware of what it took to change the mindset of Pakistan's “establishment”, given Pakistan's “short history of fragile democratic regimes toppled by the military”.
In a third cable classified by Mr. Crocker on March 7 2006, U.S. officials recommended to the State Department that the imposition of United Nations Security Council sanctions a domestic terrorism finance designation on Jamaat-ud-Dawa, “an alter-ego of current terrorism finance designee Lashkar-e-Taiba,” be delayed by two weeks based solely on “force-protection considerations.”
Specifically the U.S. embassy explained that U.S. military personnel would be flying helicopter sorties in North West Frontier Province and Pakistan-administered Kashmir until the end of March that year and ground staff would be deployed too.
“In order not to increase the risk to our military personnel as they conclude their successful mission to Pakistan, post recommends that no action on the JuD designation be taken until all... operations have concluded and (U.S.)... personnel are in the Islamabad area,” the cable said.
