

## दक्षिण पश्चिम रेल्वे

### SOUTH WESTERN RAILWAY

Headquarters' Office, Operating Department  
Rail Soudha, Gadag Road, Hubballi-580 023  
No.T.305/PCOM/Notes Date: 09.02.2023

Sub: Serious Unsafe incident happened at Hosadurga Road station of Birur-Chikjajur section of Mysore division on 08.02.2023, involving Train, no: 12649 Sampark kranti Express, leading to condition for averted head on collision with down goods train (BTPN Empty Rake).

Ref: Information gathered from Hosadurga railway station through DOM/Goods, Mr Sharvanan and Sr DOM Mysore on 08/09.02.2023.

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With reference to above, Hosadurga (HSD) is Double line station between Shivani and Ramagiri in Birur-Chikjajur Section. It is 4-line station with Road-1 as common loop, Road-2, Dn M/L, Road-3 Up M/L and Road-4 Up loop line.

A very Serious Unusual incident has occurred on 08.02.2023 at around 17.45 Hrs, where in, Up Train No: 12649 Sampark Kranti Express, while starting from Road-1, with Paper line clear ticket (PLCT) for advance starter as same was failed due to BPAC (block proving axle counter) failure, starter was working alright, thus, taken off at 17.45 Hrs. The loco-pilot of train no: 12649 Sampark Kranti Express had stopped the train before Point No: 65 A, while observing that the point was set to down main line (Wrong line), while as per PLCT, the train was supposed to pass through up main line.

It was strange that the route of despatch was set and starter was taken off, PLCT was given, but point no: 65A automatically set in wrong direction ( Down direction). **However, due to the alertness of the Loco pilot, the train was stopped before entering the wrong line (Down line) and averted a major disaster, which would have led into a head on collision of Train no 12649 Sampark Kranti Express with a Down goods train (BTPN Empty Loco no- 12664/70398 Pune Shed) approaching towards Hosadurga station at down direction.** The down goods train had left Ramagiri station at 17.41 hrs and expected Hosadurga at 17.51 hrs, running time of section is of 10 minutes only. The chain of incident had started with BPAC failure and normal indication was not coming for Point No: 65. The Station Master of Hosadurga had decided to receive the train on Common Loop (Road 1) with reverse indication of Point No: 65, for which provision is already available and system also permits. The Electronic signal maintainer (ESM) was available at the cabin of SM. The chronology of event is as under :

17.08 Hrs- 12725 Up Intercity left Hosdurga towards UBL.

17.18 Hrs- SM/HSD observed Up BPAC failed between HSD-RGI

17.18 Hrs- SM/HSD informed ESM, about the failure, over phone.

17.20 Hrs- Line Clear was sought by SM/Shivani for Train No: 12649 (Sampark Kranti Exp) from SM/HSD.

17.25 Hrs- Train no: 12649 left Shivani.

17.25 Hrs- SM/HSD observed Point No: 65 was flickering and Normal indication was not appearing. (Point No: 65 should be Normal to pass through the train on Road-3). In the meantime, SM/HSD has granted Line Clear for Down BTPN from Ramagiri.

17.33 Hrs- ESM arrived at HSD.

Point No: 65 "R" was available, hence to avoid detention of train, it was decided to deal the train on Road-1 (Common Loop).

17.39 Hrs- SM/HSD cleared the Up Home Signal for Train No: 12649 Exp to Road-1 and route was set and Home also picked up. 12649 exp arrived on Road-1 at HSD.

Since, there was BPAC failure towards RGI, SM/HSD prepared PLCT and issued to train No: 12649 Exp and cleared Starter, as Point No: 64 and 65 "Reverse" indication was available, and route of dispatch also appeared.

17.41 Hrs- BTPN departure at RGI.

17.45 Hrs- Train No: 12649 left HSD

17.49 Hrs- After passing Point No: 64, the Loco Pilot of 12649 Express observed that Point No: 65 A end was not in favour of his movement, and was instead set towards the Down line, and immediately stopped the train at point no 65 A.


18.04 Hrs- Further, with the permission of SM/HSD, the train (12649 express) was backed to Road-1 and then SM/HSD clamped the points and started the train, by issuing PLCT and taking off the Starter.

After departure of the Train No: 12649, the clamps were removed and then Down BTPN was dealt.

18.17 Hrs- BTPN passed through HSD (Running time between RGI to HSD is approximately 10' for goods train).

After collecting the details of the incident and with above chronological events, the situations of the incident emerged quite fearsome, however, on critically examining the whole incidents, following pictures emerged:

1. The incident indicates that **there are serious flaws in the system**, where the route of despatch gets altered after a train starts on signals with correct appearance of route in the SMs panel. This **contravenes the essence and basic principles of Inter-locking**.
2. It is understood that the Signal Maintainer, who was available at the Station was trying to rectify the failures. The said ESM would




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have opted to wait for the dispatch of the train, since it was already issued with PLCT, and then attempted to rectify the failure, by adopting the extant rules and procedures.

3. As per the extant rules and procedures, the ESM shall serve a Disconnection Memo to the Station Master, who acknowledges it and then give permission to attend any failures. In this case, **why such procedure was not followed by the ESM?** Had it been followed, the SM would have been alert and followed the practice to be adopted for non-interlocked working, like clamping of points, piloting of trains etc.
4. When, we talk high of ourselves that system is fail-safe, then **how anybody can meddle with the interlocking gears without opening the Relay Room ?** It is astonishing to see that such occurrences are happening with investing lot of money on signalling gear with world class safety attach to them.
5. Though, there are clear guidelines from Railway Board regarding the design and establishing the Relay Rooms and the procedure for opening the Relay Rooms in order to attend failures in Stations, **how come an ESM get an access to meddle with the interlocking without opening the Relay Room?**
6. It is understood that at this station and elsewhere in many other stations, **the signalling cables are first brought to a Junction box in the yard and then brought to the Relay Room, which makes it vulnerable for meddling and interfering with interlocking.** It seems to be against the sanctity of Relay Room. If some temporary junction boxes had been created at some stations, due to some or other reasons for preventing any unavoidable delay in commissioning of station then in that case, **once Relay room is constructed then all such arrangements be dismantled and cable be reverted back to the Relay room at the first available occasion.** However, this station had commissioned with doubling years back.
7. **The present incident must be viewed very seriously and immediate corrective actions are required** to be taken to rectify


  
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the system faults and also sensitizing the staff for not venturing into short cuts leading to major mishap.

8. Repeated and persistent counselling of maintenance staff is the need of the hour along with detailed inspection as mandated in signal manual. Though the SSE/JE/Signal Maintainers are not classified under Safety Category by RB, while they are actively involved in works which directly affects the safety in train operations.
9. If the signal maintenance system is not monitored and corrected immediately, then it would lead to happening of such re-occurrence and serious accidents.
10. It is high time that some serious work is done on this front to ensure that the precious lives and Safety of travelling public and railway men are not put in risk.

It is therefore, advised that necessary actions may be initiated against the culprits and corrective steps are to be taken immediately to rectify the flaws prevailing in the signalling system of Railway Stations in SWR territory. The outcome of detailed investigation and measures taken for rectification of the system may be shared with undersigned also to educate the station masters, TIs and traffic officers for training, information and necessary actions on their part.

I hope you may take my note in positive manner for improving the systems in Railways and making SWR as accident-free zone.



**(Hari Shankar Verma)**  
**Principal Chief Operations Manager**  
**South Western Railway**

#### **PCSTE/SWR**

Copy: Secy to GM for kind information of GM.

AGM for kind information.

DRM/ MYS for information and necessary actions as mentioned in above note.

DRM/ SBC & UBL for information and necessary actions.

CTPM may issue suitable instructions to all Sr. DOMs for sensitising the Station Masters about wrong doing of ESMs and other signal maintenance staff.