Scholarship on international relations is often built on the ideas of war, conflict, and genocide and that tradition is continued in this volume by employing the idea of implosion, also a notion from the same family. The political developments in the Middle East in the context of regional and global rivalry, it is argued here, present a scenario for an implosion or series of smaller but interconnected implosions in the region. It could unfold in multifarious ways if one adds the Israeli-Palestine conflict and the nuclear stand-off between Israel and Iran in the face of a waning Arab Spring.
The author articulates this argument in six separate chapters. Some scholars, however, would like to argue that implosion in the Middle East has already begun. What is the big deal about implosion? While one would appreciate the author’s sincerity to persuade readers, the fact is that western political elites, or even the ones in the Middle East do not seem to find it as scary as the book’s title. Will the global rivalry lead to a Third World war? Neither this book nor the general commentary about the crisis indicates such a scenario. And, the western political elites seem to be rather indifferent to such a prospect, though the scale of human tragedy is of the scale of a world war or even worse.
What is crucial is not whether implosion takes place or not, but whether the global political leadership has time to introspect about what happened to post-war consensus about global peace or of a working international political order. The nature and extent of global conflict in Middle East and elsewhere in the post-Cold War era suggests as if the competition ridden political order during the Cold War, that appeared an aberration by ideal standard, was far better than the current global one. It is worthwhile thus to ask whether there is indeed a responsible global political leadership at all in our time. One senses a big vacuum, and it is this vacuum which makes the concern and desperation about the ongoing conflict deeply worrisome.
The author seeks to theorise these developments in the larger context of global politics. We learn that the Arab Spring is more of a mirage likely to lead to disillusionment despite the fact that most of the ensuing movements contain some of its sparks even today. We also learn that there was not a single Arab Spring, but several of them, such as a Tunisian Spring, an Egyptian Spring, a Libyan Spring, etc. He is persuasive when he argues that the conventional politics of the Middle East has changed; and also the nature of regimes, intra-societal balances, and relationship among states.
He highlights five specific factors that could contribute to the combustion in the region: 1) the growing role of political Islam and the anti-Islam backlash; 2) the enduring Israel-Palestinian conflict, and its increasingly zero-sum nature; 3) Iran’s quest for nuclear capability; 4) heightened rivalry among regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey; 5) Great powers interest and involvement in the region clearly demonstrated by the American invasion and involvement in Iraq.
The chapter on Iran and the bomb stands out for the unique insight it brings to the analysis of Middle East politics. Iran’s ambition, it argues, to develop a nuclear weapon is not meant for Israel at all; instead, it is a response to the growing nuclearised region in which Pakistan, India, China and Israel have already become nuclear weapon states. The author explains why it is not hard to seek a nuclear-free region as a long-standing means of addressing Iran’s nuclear ambition.
The chapter titled, “Regional and Global Rivalry”, details the political developments of the crisis-ridden region, country after country. It discusses Syria, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain and even Turkey, and how the politics of national interest in each of these cases plays out in the context of global rivalry. Each section offers deep insight.
What is impressive is how the author makes interconnection about the underlying threat that these conflicts pose. While he alludes to the role of the United Nations, the fact remains that the UN has become an anchor to various forms of global rivalry or even a facilitator instead of a mediator or arbiter. That is why reflection on post-war consensus is very important. Writings of public intellectuals, opinion-makers and even serious scholars such as the author thus need to raise the issue of post-war consensus, which seems to be conveniently forgotten by the leaders in Washington, London, Paris, Berlin and elsewhere in the world today. Thus, the agenda for an effective global institution or a U.N. with some teeth should be brought to the table as soon as possible.
The western political leadership should be made to be aware that “crude national interest” cannot be the only driving force behind foreign policy, and conflicts should not be allowed to continue — just because it does not directly threaten the western territories; and that lives of millions of human beings all over not just in the West are crucial and there is an obligation to defend them, or else there is little reason to claim that we are more civilised than medieval regimes.
The book thus makes a major contribution in unravelling some of these puzzles. It sensitises us to the nature and character of a body like the United Nations, which needs to be changed; that it cannot be a mere debating body or a platform for pursuing national interests of powerful nations; and that lives of millions of innocent people cannot be left to the aggressive pursuit of national interests of nations in the West and the Middle East. The rest of the world needs to present urgent evidence that it does not stand only for itself, but also for the Middle Eastern people. Scholars of international relations, particularly of Middle East, will find this book a major source in advancing their understanding.
