Framing foreign policy and leadership is about choices, says former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon in his new book Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (Penguin Random House, Rs.599).
Your book works on the idea that all foreign policy decisions are about choices. What made you choose five instances to illustrate this?
These were instances I was associated with, but each of them was also crucial for India: the China border (dispute), transformation of India’s relationship with the U.S., the ‘no first use’ (doctrine), which had a huge impact, and, of course, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the neighbourhood. These were my choices because I knew these, and they all happened within a defined time period with which I was associated.
Isn’t this the problem with the way we look at foreign policy too: focus on a few big powers, and then Pakistan and the neighbourhood?
It’s true, but I actually started this book at a study group at Harvard. I would lay out the scenario and then we would discuss what the options were. I don’t believe there were right or wrong solutions, binary choices that are true or false, win or lose. You operate in a fog of events. Someone said that history may be written with a rear-view mirror, but events come at you through the foggy windshield.
Many have shied away from writing a book that talks about their time in government. Did you worry about this code of silence on the processes of policymaking?
If you go further back to the 1950s, people were much more open about how the government worked. Read Y.D. Gundevia’s memoir, Outside the Archives. It is much more open about the process of government, but it was also personal, in the first person with many details. I think after that we became more closed, more insecure about such writing. Some of it was this idea of a civil servant betraying the tribe if you spoke outside of the room. I think I’ve tried to steer clear of that, of saying who said what, except my own views perhaps.
Is there a balance to be made between a ‘what the butler saw’, tell-all book, and a more stiff and boring view of governance? Because the criticism on Indian foreign policy is that it has not been written about by real insiders.
I think it’s important in a democracy that you put out the considerations and argue about the substance of policy, and that argument must go on. I don’t think it’s necessary to do the tell-all type of book on who said what to whom and say, “oh, this person was so foolish”, or “so right” or “wrong”. As a policy discussion, this is much-needed.
You write at length about the decision not to attack Pakistan, or camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), despite being clear that the 26/11 Mumbai attacks had the involvement of the Inter-Services Intelligence.
It was a calculus of what was in India’s interest net-net. Of all the choices, this was the least bad. We argued it out. As Foreign Secretary, I spoke of the international reaction and how we would deal with it, and then we went public with all the dossiers.
You indicate that you were for strikes on PoK. Was it the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who decided against it?
Ultimately, it was his decision to make. Frankly, if it were to happen again, even the same leadership would have to make different choices.
And do you think now, with the September 29 ‘surgical’ strikes, those different choices are now being made? Because it would seem the Line of Control is hotter than ever before, despite the use of force.
Logically, you have to do different things because another strike means deterrence has not worked against Pakistan. Force is useful, but it has limited utility, especially when terrorists have state sponsorship. If you go public, and use your action for domestic political reasons, then you must expect the other side to play the same game. They then have to be seen to be doing something and not be cowed down by your action. So we should have expected this escalation of violence and rhetoric.
You’ve been High Commissioner to Pakistan, Foreign Secretary, National Security Adviser, and have engaged them at every level, so it is significant that you write that the conflict with Pakistan cannot be solved.
Not right now, not the way Pakistan is structured today, because it is unable to sustain a good relationship with India. Those things won’t be solved either by some sudden application of military force, or in today’s circumstance by other means, or international pressure. Unless something fundamental changes, there’s no point in hoping for an outcome. I argue that the important thing is what India’s goal is, and to adjust expectations accordingly.
Your chapter on the ‘no first use’ (NFU) nuclear doctrine seems timely, given the debate.
Well, I must thank Mr. (Manohar) Parrikar for making it the subject of discussion.
He has spoken about more than revisiting NFU. He has actually said unpredictability is the policy to employ. Do you agree?
I don’t think a strategy of unpredictability is very sensible. Tactics, yes. At the operational level it is very useful if your enemy doesn’t know what to expect. You do use surprise, deception, all that. But that’s for captains and majors. For long-term strategy, you need your enemy to be very clear what your retaliation will be, for it to be a deterrent. With the NFU doctrine, retaliation is certain. Why introduce an element of doubt there?
Secondly, if neither country has an NFU (policy), then you’re making the case for going nuclear very quickly, that is, before the other strikes. That’s not a situation you want to be in unless you can change your capabilities. I think the Defence Minister is right that the doctrine must be reviewed, and it has been done in the past.
How about unpredictability in foreign policy? We’ve seen a certain surprise element in all our relations in the past two years.
I think unpredictability is a good media strategy. I’m not sure it contributes to the success of outcomes, which is ultimately what policy is meant to do.
With China you seem to advocate only managing ties. Is it because more is not possible, or because we lack imagination on what is possible?
With China there is a fundamental problem, and that is both India and China are negotiating with the assumption that both will have a better negotiating position in the future. And it’s true: both are rising and therefore neither side is really seeing the negotiations through. We have a successful mechanism for managing difference, and good bilateral parameters like trade, students, etc. We need to look them in the eye and tell them what is important to us.
Overall, do you think the foreign policies India follows today are in broad continuity with the past, or has a lot of old baggage been shed in the past decade, with NAM, even SAARC, multilateralism, and relations with Russia dimming in importance?
I think the real liberation of Indian foreign policy came in the early 1990s, and the break- up of the Soviet Union forced India to more multivalence. After the economic crisis of 2008, the world entered a new phase. Even the West lost faith in the western order. When even the U.S. tried to set up subgroups like TPP and TTIP, you know the old order was changing. Militarily too, the world balance is shifting to Asian powers like China and India. So what you have mentioned are symptoms of the larger, more fundamental, change in the world.
India has been good about reacting to these shifts. Even in the past, Nehru was the first to see the Sino-Soviet split and react to it to build ties. As I’ve said in my book, India benefits from its personalised, centralised foreign policy framework, as it is better able to react to these changes.
To come back to the main theme of the book: choices. You make it seem as if everything is subjective: this choice versus that choice. Where does that leave principles in foreign policy?
If I’ve conveyed that, that’s a mistake. There are values and goals and ethical issues in foreign policy. It’s an important part. I’m actually questioning the whole notion that governments have of saying, “I know what to do and I’ve made the right choice.” I’ve never heard a government say “Oops, that was a mistake”, and they should look at that.
So in all these choices that you were responsible for making, are there regrets?
A thinking person will always ask, “Could I have done it differently?” We have been lucky in India that we’ve had relatively few choices that we can think we should have done completely differently. I was lucky that I was given the freedom that I was to make some of those choices.
