Following the Dantewada and other Maoist attacks in India, there has been an animated debate whether the State police and the Central forces, such as the CRPF, have been adequately trained to handle insurgency of the Maoist variety. There is the inescapable impression that the training methods are outdated, suitable only for humdrum policing during normal times, and that there is a good case for their imaginative revamping. Inspiration from domestic experts is no doubt welcome. Drawing from the experience of police agencies in conflict-ridden areas elsewhere is also not a bad idea.
When the U.S. Army's Third Infantry Division made a triumphant entry into the centre of Baghdad on April 9, 2003, marking the final fall of Saddam Hussein, there was all-round expectation that the occupying army would merely stand by to help the local police maintain peace, and enable other Iraqi government agencies concentrate on day-to-day civic services. This optimism however proved misconceived. The ground reality was there was neither police nor any administration. Members of the army were equally scarce, many having fled with their arms. A direct consequence was widespread chaos and a high incidence of crime, including looting. (Ironically, under the oppressive Saddam regime, crime was low, and that was because of the all-pervasive presence of security forces and the locking up of a large number of criminals).
Task ahead
The situation was too much for the coalition forces to handle — they were totally unprepared to move into the vacuum and hardly equal to the task of reconstructing the administration and the security forces. Naturally, whatever remained of the previous police system was at the receiving end of violence from disparate groups that were unreconciled to the occupation by coalition forces.
Creating a credible, disciplined, and well-trained police force in Iraq was therefore the immediate task ahead. This of course was not easy, because skilled police instructors needed to be imported, a costly proposition. A large number were brought in only from the U.S. Raising the quality of policing is a painfully slow process, which is still on. Things have improved only marginally, that too at tremendous human costs. More importantly, a lesson had been learnt. Invasion, albeit for humanitarian reasons, carried with it an obligation to reconstruct the administration on a planned and professional basis. Neglected, the occupying forces could run into major problems involving, inter alia, their own security.
Meaningful issues in international policing arising from the experience in Iraq, especially in areas as disparate, strife-ridden and complex as Afghanistan, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, are imaginatively dealt with by David Bayley — an eminent police scholar and a great friend of India — and Robert Perito — a former U.S. Foreign Service officer, who is now with the U.S. Institute of Peace — in the book under review, their recent commendable addition to practical police studies. Their main argument is that counter-insurgency operations should go hand in hand with core policing, such as day-to-day maintenance of order in society and crime control. The three key elements are: 'being available', 'being helpful', and 'being fair and respectful'. One cannot be more forthright in spelling out what the police should be trained for, especially in regions affected by insurgency. They resonate with the conclusions of many studies in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and elsewhere. One common finding is that policing in India has been disastrously partisan and inhuman, something that had been taken advantage of by the Maoists and highlighted by activists close to them.
Remedy
The remedy, according to Bayley and Perito, is not the jettisoning of existing training curriculum, but its adaptation and incorporation in a new scheme that aims at reduction of violence and maintenance of basic police services. The ideal training capsule will have a time-span of 26 weeks, most of the training imparted in a police academy and a substantial part (seven weeks) by way of an on-the-job assingment. Subjects taught will include law, police operations and officer safety — this is most relevant in the Maoist context. Most significantly, the authors refer to the imperative need for institutional reform that will address areas related to justice administration and ministerial control of the police. This is an unexceptionable suggestion, given that all the criticism in India is directed against judicial delays and bureaucratic interference in routine police decisions. Bayley and Perito are incisive and lucid on a subject that is both complicated and contentious. They deserve to be read with seriousness by both police leaders and policy-makers.
