The Hindu : Towards positive unilateralism

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Thursday, Jul 17, 2003

Opinion

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Towards positive unilateralism

By C. Raja Mohan

Taking unilateral steps on trade, economic cooperation and people-to-people contact will help India liberate itself from the limiting confines of the current negotiating framework with Pakistan.

DESPITE THE welcome but limited improvement in the atmospherics of India-Pakistan relations, the bilateral engagement faces the danger of returning to the predictable pattern of posturing and one-upmanship. Unless the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, puts politics back in command of the diplomacy towards Pakistan, his peace initiative could well be grounded amid feckless negotiations between the two bureaucracies. India and Pakistan have negotiated off and on in the last few years. The exercise has degenerated into semantics about what is the core issue between the two nations, and a series of linkages between one set of issues and another. The current negotiating framework is designed to fail and prevent any forward movement in any area. India must find a way to break out of it.

Let us look at two issues in play. First, the simple proposal from Mr. Vajpayee for having envoys back in place and restoring road and air links has taken months to implement. The envoys are now in position and the bus service between New Delhi and Lahore has resumed. But the question of air links is caught up in an unseemly wrangle.

Pakistan says it is willing to restore point-to-point flights but has proposed a discussion on the question of overflights, which is of some priority to India. Islamabad, upset at New Delhi's cancellation of overflight rights in December 2001, and earlier during the 1971 crisis, now wants a political commitment from India that it will not resort to such a course in future. India, which initially refused to discuss the question, has now agreed to talks, but is yet to hear from Pakistan on the dates for a meeting. India can either let this drift continue, in the name of a step-by-step process, or act unilaterally to move forward. Instead of slow negotiations, India, on its part, can restore overflight rights to Pakistan and apply political pressure on Islamabad to reciprocate.

A second question relates to Mr. Vajpayee's travel plans to Islamabad. At a meeting of the officials of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Kathmandu last week, India finally agreed on a set of dates for the delayed summit. It made clear, however, that the eventual decision on Mr. Vajpayee's attendance would depend on Pakistan's readiness to show substantive movement on trade liberalisation in the run-up to the summit in January 2004.

On the face of it, India has a good argument. Why should Mr. Vajpayee waste his time at a SAARC summit that has no serious agreements to be signed? Has not Pakistan refused to give minimum trading privileges to India and stalled progress on regional trade — either preferential or free?

In linking the question of joining the SAARC summit to progress on trade, India has only postponed its diplomatic dilemma. Refusal to accept dates for the summit would have shifted the onus for the failure of the SAARC process on to New Delhi, while it lies elsewhere — in Islamabad. India could, however, find itself in the same trap at the end of the year in having to judge whether Pakistan has made "substantial progress" on trade.

There is nothing to suggest that Pakistan's behaviour on regional trade would change in any way in the next few weeks and months. India could once again find itself back to square one — where it will have to choose between going to Islamabad, despite lack of progress on trade, and refusing to. The latter course would mean taking the responsibility for scrapping the summit one more time.

The real questions about the SAARC summit are somewhat different. They are about whether Mr. Vajpayee should take the political opportunity to visit Islamabad to engage the leadership of Pakistan and its people as well as define the future steps for cooperation under the SAARC. There is some hope in South Block that by tying up India's participation to the question of trade liberalisation, and holding out the carrot of a bilateral summit, Islamabad can be forced to act on trade. But this pressure is unlikely to work. Knowing Pakistan's tactics, it is unlikely to offer satisfaction to India on trade and likely to throw the ball back into New Delhi's court.

Instead of playing this unproductive diplomatic game, Mr. Vajpayee should make up his mind that he will indeed travel to Pakistan or what would be only the fifth visit by an Indian Prime Minister in the last five-and-a-half decades. Instead of letting the discussion between Commerce Ministry bureaucrats on the number of tariff lines to be exchanged decide the prospect of his trip to Pakistan, Mr. Vajpayee should use the next few months to unveil an action-oriented agenda for bilateral relations.

If Mr. Vajpayee wants to breathe life into his faltering peace initiative, he must recognise that negotiation with Pakistan is an end in itself. Nor is the traditional framework of engagement with Islamabad a sacral one that cannot be flouted.

Diplomacy towards Pakistan must be a flexible tool to achieve one single Indian objective — the establishment of a normal neighbourly relationship free of cross-border violence and a settlement of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. The last decade of talks with Islamabad suggests that there will be no radical breakthroughs over the short term and New Delhi needs a patient strategy that seeks to isolate and contain the forces inside Pakistan that are wedded to compulsive hostility towards India. New Delhi's objectives cannot be achieved by a negotiating strategy that is complicated by a series of conditionalities.

Five critical elements must form the core of a new strategy towards Pakistan as Mr. Vajpayee heads there at the dawn of the New Year. First, reiterate India's readiness to address the Kashmir question in a purposeful manner. Although that has been the central premise of Mr. Vajpayee's peace initiative, many in the Pakistani establishment believe that India's diplomacy is aimed at avoiding a serious negotiation on the subject. Rather than get into a semantic argument with Pakistan on whether Kashmir is the core issue or not, India should reaffirm, again and again, that it is ready for a final resolution of the question. Such an assertion will not only help prepare the nation for such a settlement but also test Pakistan's own seriousness about facing up to a reasonable final settlement on Kashmir.

Second, keep up the pressure on the question of cross-border terrorism without linking it to other issues. The linkage has never been sustainable, as India has found out many times in the last few years. A revamped military strategy on the ground to deal with cross-border terrorism, and the mobilisation of the international community are likely to work more effectively than negotiations with Pakistan on the issue.

Third, instead of making progress on trade cooperation a precondition for engagement with Pakistan, take every opportunity to break the economic barriers between the two nations. If Pakistan is not ready for direct trade, take measures to actively promote it through third countries. Letting trade flow is more important than how it happens. India must also test Pakistan on its proclaimed willingness to immediately implement mega economic projects such as trans-border natural gas pipelines by removing its own objections.

Fourth, make it easier for the two civil societies to interact. By denying opportunities for contact, New Delhi has, in fact, played into the hands of those in Islamabad who want to keep the doors between the two countries closed. It is also in India's interest to engage the Pakistani political leadership across the board. Make Delhi a regular stop for Pakistani politicians of all hues. In that context, the visit by Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam is indeed a welcome opportunity to interact with an important force in Pakistan. New Delhi must also facilitate travel to India by other Pakistani leaders, including those who are exiled. The more intensive India's engagement with Pakistani political leaders, the more diplomatic options that it will have.

Finally, India has the power to act unilaterally to change the dynamics of the current stalemate with Pakistan. If New Delhi focusses on outcomes rather than diplomatic procedure, it can unveil a strategy of positive unilateralism. Taking unilateral steps on trade, economic cooperation and people-to-people contact will help India liberate itself from the limiting confines of the current negotiating framework with Pakistan.

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