The Hindu : Sri Lanka and India's security

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Friday, Apr 25, 2003

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Sri Lanka and India's security

By V. Suryanarayan

Colombo has been conceding, one by one, the demands put forward by the Tigers without any quid pro quo... India can ignore these developments only at its peril.

THE PROPOSAL made by Major General (retd.) Tryggve Teleffsen, head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), few days ago, that Colombo recognise the Sea Tigers as a "de facto naval unit" and demarcate the surrounding seas between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Colombo "for exercise and training areas" has far-reaching implications for regional security. Unfortunately, the pros and cons of the proposal have not been analysed by the Sri Lanka watchers in India.

The Norwegian-brokered negotiations, from which the Tigers, in an act of brinkmanship, have suspended their participation for the time being, are not taking place between just an established Government and an insurgent group; they are taking place between the Sri Lankan Government and a de facto state. Colombo's writ does not run over large parts of the north and east of Sri Lanka; the Tigers exercise effective control over these territories.

They have their own armed forces, police, administrative machinery and judicial system. By demanding delimitation in the sea and getting recognised as a de facto navy, the Tigers want to extend their supremacy over the vital sea-lanes linking Sri Lanka with the outside world. The independent Tamil Eelam that they want to carve out will not only include the strategically significant Trincomalee harbour, but also two-thirds of Sri Lanka's coastline.

One of the conditions laid down by the LTTE chief, Velupillai Prabakaran, for participating in the peace process was de-proscription of the outfit and its recognition as the sole representative of Sri Lankan Tamils. Anton Balasingham, LTTE ideologue, expressed the hope that once Colombo lifted the ban, other countries — India, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia — would follow suit. This turned out to be wishful thinking; the Tigers still remain a banned organisation in these countries.

Smarting under international isolation, the Tigers have been proclaiming that theirs is not a terrorist outfit, but a national liberation organisation, fighting for the liberation of the oppressed Tamils.

These appeals have not evoked any favourable response from the international community so far. This is a major setback for the Tigers. They were bitter that they were "marginalised and excluded" from the Washington Conference. In his recent letter to the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, Mr. Balasingham characterised the LTTE's exclusion as a "breach of faith"; adding that it "has severely eroded the confidence of our people in the peace process". Making a virtue out of necessity, Mr. Balasingham proclaimed that the Tigers would not attend the coming donors' conference in Tokyo in June.

When the peace process started in Thailand, the Tigers thought that it would proceed in stages. And that each step would be a confidence-building exercise and would lead to the next. The Sri Lankan team also shared this perception. Mr. Prabakaran's expectation that the interim administration in the northeast would be entrusted to the Tigers, which would enable them to have complete supremacy over the Tamil territories, did not materialise. The two sides did not anticipate the outburst of Muslim discontent and subsequent Tiger-Muslim clashes. Nor did they foresee the series violent incidents in the seas, which endangered the ceasefire and the peace process.

The LTTE's insistence that the high security presence in Jaffna be removed so that the internally displaced could go back to their homes was interpreted by large sections of Sinhalas to mean that Mr. Prabakaran was more interested in consolidating his gains than arriving at a final settlement. Fourteen months have elapsed since the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement; the two sides are yet to discuss core political-constitutional issues.

The three Eelam wars have conclusively proved that the two sides have sufficient military prowess to avoid a defeat, but, at the same time, neither has overwhelming superiority to register a decisive victory. In other words, there is a military stalemate. Mr. Wickremesinghe echoed the truth when he declared soon after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement, "we have no option but to talk, there is no alternative". Mr. Wickremesinghe's political future hinges on the success of the peace negotiations. As a result, Colombo has been conceding, one by one, the demands put forward by the Tigers without any quid pro quo on the part of the LTTE. There is also a general feeling that the negotiations are being carried out in secrecy and even the President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, is not being kept informed. Sri Lanka watchers in India feel that the present confrontationist politics between Ms. Kumaratunga and Mr. Wickremesinghe would lead to ethnic polarisation in the island. Unless the two leaders rise to the occasion and evolve a common agenda, days ahead will be turbulent. And if the trend continues, Mr. Prabakaran would have the last laugh.

Unlike other insurgent organisations, the LTTE has developed a conventional military force. It has a strong infantry with an elite fighting wing, Charles Anthony Regiment, headed by Balraj; its naval wing, Sea Tigers, is headed by Soosai; it has an air force in the making (Air Tigers headed by Shankar) and a suicide squad and an intelligence wing functioning under Pottu Amman. The Sri Lankan armed forces are no match for the highly disciplined, motivated and fanatical Tigers — a fact that has been proved in many decisive battles. The capture of the army/navy base in Pooneryn complex in 1993; the capture of Mullaitivu in 1996; the massive assault on Paranthan and Killinocchi in 1998; overrunning of the Elephant Pass in 2000 and the attack on the Katunayake Air Force Base in 2001. In most of these battles, not only did the Sri Lankan armed forces suffer heavy casualties but the Tigers were able to seize unprecedented quantity of arms and ammunition.

The series of incidents involving the Sea Tigers and the Sri Lankan Navy in the recent months has added a new dimension to the conflict. The confrontation is the direct consequence of the emergence of Sea Tigers as a credible fighting force in the Indian Ocean. It is also an expression of simmering differences between Mr. Soosai and Mr. Balasingham; the former feels that Colombo is soliciting the assistance of the U.S. to encircle the Tigers. According to him, the best option for the Sea Tigers is to assert their supremacy and force Colombo to grant them the status of a de facto navy. Unfortunately, the SLMM gives the impression that it is prepared to go to any length to humour the Tigers and persuade them to continue in the peace process.

The emergence of Sea Tigers as a credible fighting force in India's immediate neighbourhood has serious security implications. India can ignore these developments only at its peril. New Delhi must make it clear to Colombo, the SLMM and the international community that the conferment of the status of a de facto navy on Sea Tigers would be an unfriendly act.

New Delhi should also take up the Sethusamudram project on a top priority basis, so that the Navy and the Coast Guards can freely move around the Palk Bay and the Gulf of Mannar and keep constant vigil on India's maritime borders.

(The writer is a former Director, Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras, Chennai.)

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