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By K.K.Katyal
The U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said in an interview, carried by the New York Times, that they would "spend more time'' (in addressing the strains in the ties between New Delhi and Islamabad) so as not to be in a situation that arose a year ago. This was an obvious reference to the tensions that led to the massing of troops by the two countries on the border, seen as having a potential for a dangerous confrontation. It was considered particularly ominous because of the nuclear status of India and Pakistan. In a rare step-up of diplomatic effort, Mr. Powell visited the sub-continent three times within a few months and the U.S. President, George W. Bush, called the leaders of the two countries, A.B. Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf, several times. The stated objective was to prevent an armed clash. The U.S. obtained an assurance from General Musharraf that infiltration of militants (into Jammu and Kashmir) would be ended permanently and the terrorist infrastructure in the territory under Pakistani control would be destroyed. That it was not implemented was a different matter. The plan to "do more'' now could mean intense diplomatic contacts with the two countries on a sustained basis. "Doing more'' could also mean result-oriented efforts. It would fit in with the stand of Pakistan, which wants a third-party intervention. India, on the other hand, favours a bilateral approach in terms of the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration. New Delhi always wants Washington to use its influence and leverage with Islamabad to ensure the end of terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Last year's diplomatic engagement of the U.S. ended because of the Iraqi crisis. Had this pre-occupation not been there, the U.S. would have pursued its moves for resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan. That was the top priority of the U.S. after the two countries withdrew their troops from the border (among other factors, because of its exhortations). Washington, as a matter of fact, had been pressing for this course since then (even when its hands were full with the Iraq problem). New Delhi was clearly lukewarm to this suggestion. It reacted somewhat sharply when the suggestion was revived after the recent massacre of Kashmir Pandits. India urged the U.S. to ensure that Pakistan fulfilled its assurance with regard to infiltration and that dialogue could not be considered when terrorist activities continued. Washington agreed with New Delhi as regards the urgency to end terrorist violence (Mr. Bush in one of his telephone conversations last month, told Mr. Vajpayee that the U.S. had been "looking at the LoC''). But at the same time, it continued to be emphatic on dialogue. What could be the form of the post-Iraq initiative by the U.S.? Exhortation to Gen. Musharraf to secure an end to infiltration? Certainly. Plea to India to start talking to Pakistan? Equally certain. It may well also focus on the substantive aspect of the Kashmir problem. Washington insists it has no specific proposal in mind. In actual practice, things may be different.
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