The Hindu : Hardly any `shock and awe'

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Sunday, Mar 23, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

Hardly any `shock and awe'

By Rajesh Rajagopalan

The first night of the U.S. air campaign to "shock and awe" the Iraqi leadership into surrender looked impressive on television. But, if the history of strategic bombing over the last century is any guide, its psychological impact will disappoint the Pentagon. Bombing campaigns designed to affect the general morale and the will to fight rarely succeed; indeed, many times they bolster the very determination that they are supposed to break.

The idea of strategic bombing to create a psychological impact goes back to the inter-World War years, when strategists such as the Italian Giulio Douhet and the American Billy Mitchell suggested that wars could be brought to a quick end by striking at the civilian population deep behind the enemy lines. Such terror bombing would create civil unrest, destroy the economic and infrastructure underpinning of the targeted society and create popular pressure that would force the government to sue for peace.

Though the ongoing American campaign targets the Iraqi leadership rather than the people, its objective is the same: to win by destroying the enemy's will to fight by demonstrative bombing. Those who survive the bombing will, so the theory goes, be "shocked and awed" into suing for peace. What is being sought is the "Hiroshima and Nagasaki effect" of forcing the enemy to capitulate.

The idea of strategic bombing took root in the corridors of the Air Headquarters of the various big powers before World War II, not least because it promised greater importance in strategy to the youngest of the military service arms, the Air Force. It also impacted on war plans and acquisitions, as the Air Force in many countries attempted to build a strength capable of putting into practice the hopes of these theorists. The theories were also tried out, albeit on a small scale, by Nazi Germany in the Spanish Civil War and by the Japanese in China. The attack on and the destruction of Guernica in April 1937 made a deep impact on the European mind, and was immortalised in Pablo Picasso's famous painting. It also appeared to show the efficacy of the theory, at least in terms of creating the promised destruction.

But, as with many military doctrines, the results of strategic bombing in full-scale wars were less impressive. The U.S. and Britain in particular launched massive air raids, some of which included over 1,000 bombers, on the German and the Japanese cities. The stated aim of the raids was to destroy the military industries in the two countries. But "Bomber Harris'', as Sir Arthur Harris, head of the British Bomber Command, was known, made no secret of his real objective — to "de-house" the Germans.

But the actual effect of the raids on civilian morale and industrial production in Germany were contrary to the expectations. Germans, as the British had done earlier in the war, learnt to live with the bombing. Indeed, German industrial production actually went up during some of the months of heaviest bombing. A study of the effects of the American strategic bombing campaign, conducted after the war, belied much of the claims of the pre-war theorists.

The concept of strategic bombing did not fare much better in subsequent years either. Because only the superpowers had the economic capacity to develop the vast forces required for such a campaign, the theory had little relevance for other countries. And in the post-colonial period, when winning hearts and minds was more important, even superpowers had to be careful about strategic bombing. Indeed, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, which was substantial but not really strategic, did little other than providing propaganda material to the communist forces.

The primary U.S. objective in the current campaign is to force the surrender of the Saddam Hussein regime so that the American and the British forces do not have to fight their way to Baghdad. It is unlikely that they will succeed unless the bombing eliminates the Iraqi leadership. It certainly will not shock and awe the Iraqi forces into surrender. Baghdad has been through other bombing campaigns in the past, and it will learn to live with this. Even the Yugoslavian high command, during the Kosovo war, was able to withstand weeks of sustained bombing.

Of course, the bombing will have other direct, beneficial effects for the American campaign. For one, it will reduce Baghdad's capacity to command and control its forces. This is a definite advantage even if it is being over-emphasised by American commentators.

The bombing can also pare down some of the forces defending Baghdad, and weaken some of the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units that are expected to defend the city. But these are not the primary objectives of the "shock and awe" campaign. Ultimately, its fate will depend upon whether or not the U.S. successfully targets the Iraqi leadership. A fortuitous piece of intelligence, or a lucky bomb, could change the fortunes of this new strategic bombing doctrine. Short of that, despite the spectacular television images, it is unlikely that the bombing will do anything to avert a battle for Baghdad.

(The writer is Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.)

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