The Hindu : Pseudo-secularism

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Tuesday, Jan 21, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Pseudo-secularism — II

By Gail Omvedt

A defence of secularism... has to begin with a critique of the ideas that religion and society were uniquely intertwined in India, and that Hinduism was uniquely tolerant.

WE NEED to ask some hard questions to understand why the current form of secularism has apparently failed. There have been two forms of Congress secularism — the Gandhian version, which believed Hinduism was tolerant, and the Nehruvian version which added that whatever the characteristics of the various religions may have been, it did not matter because economic development and scientific culture would provide a sufficient basis for secular tolerance. The Gandhian faith in Hinduism's tolerance is shared by almost all intellectuals today; the Nehruvian faith is still held by the Left. Both are wrong.

First, it is impossible to "found" secular values, or any values, on reason and science alone. This has been a basic proposition of almost all sociology, whether it derives from Weber, Durkheim or even Marx: reason and science themselves have a complex relationship with socio-economic production, and require a moral foundation. Nehru was simply unrealistic in this respect, however noble his faith may have been; and Indian leftists are equally unrealistic in ignoring the particular characteristics of Indian society that have had crucial influence on both economic development and scientific progress.

Second, a defence of "secularism", or any view that the state in the modern world should distance itself from traditional religious communities, has to begin with a critique of the ideas that religion and society were uniquely intertwined in India, and that Hinduism was uniquely tolerant. Such intertwining is a characteristic of all pre-modern societies, and tolerance was never a special characteristic of varna Hinduism or of Islam. (I use the term "varna Hinduism" to distinguish the particular form of "Hinduism" which based itself on traditional ideas of varnashrama dharma and the authority of the Vedas and the Brahmans). Tolerance was also not a characteristic of medieval Christianity! In Europe itself, the supposed home of "modern secularism", it took centuries and bloody wars for the state to withdraw itself from the control of the church. Today, the process of this withdrawal is not complete in Europe or in the U.S., in spite of the degree to which religious freedom was deeply embedded in its founding values. Even today, in the U.S., huge tax concessions are given to church-run religious educational institutions (especially Catholic schools), while citizens are forced to say that they pledge allegiance "to one nation, under God, with liberty and justice for all" — an imposition on those citizens who are atheists or who follow spiritual teachings that do not have the concept of God.

Islam was not tolerant in its early period; neither was Christianity, neither was varna Hinduism. In pre-modern times, all religions sought to control state power in order to enforce their conceptions of the sacred and the moral life; this normally included stigmatising other views and those holding them; making such people second class citizens in various ways, often destroying their religious sites and attacking their sources of wealth. In all societies, the process of modernisation has involved a struggle against this form of use of state power — a process we call "secularisation". The intertwining of sacred and social values, the way in which religions used state power, varied. For Islam, it meant the idea that all Muslims were equal members of a socio-religious community coupled with an urge to bring all into the fold; this meant a fairly high degree of intolerance for outsiders. For varna Hinduism, in contrast, the state could "tolerate" different ways of life for different social groups while insisting on the superiority and privileges of upper castes and the disabilities of the lowest, i.e. being intolerant to claims of equality.

The spread of Islam sought to make all people faithful Muslims. It did so in various ways, by presenting them with a faith that gave universality and equality for most, that stimulated their devotion, that provided a new culture for many; it also used state power, treating non-Muslims as second-class citizens whose status was often precarious. Occasionally, force was used to convert people. But varna Hinduism was not that tolerant either. Kings owing allegiance to forms of varnashrama dharma destroyed the sacred places of Buddhism; it was the Shaivite Shashanka, for example, who uprooted the tree which was a symbol of the Buddha's enlightenment, while ideologically the puranas of the Gupta period endorsed killing Buddhists, shudras and others. The enforcement of the varna system was more oppressive than the Shariat to significant numbers of Dalits and low castes; thus, in later years Dalit-Bahujan leaders such as Mahatma Phule in the 19th century could see this process of conversion as a liberating opportunity for Shudras and Dalits enduring caste enslavement.

It is true that there were long centuries in India, where people of different religious ideas and cultural values lived together in peace. During these centuries, attitudes of tolerance for each other's religious faith did develop and a process of symbiosis and cultural pluralism resulted. But this was primarily due to two factors. First, practical sultans and rajahs realised the need for accommodation, and along with military and aristocratic forces evolved ways of living together and common styles of life. The Rajput-Mughal symbiosis is one example of this. Second, at the mass level, there were innumerable Sufis and Sants who fought against mullah Islam and priestly Brahmanism, pioneering equalitarian and universalistic values and practices, which established ties among communities rather than dividing them along caste and sectarian lines, as part of a critique of the existing religious-political powers. In other words, "secularism" or religious pluralism, in India, has been a struggle and an achievement, not something that has sprung automatically from the basic values of the dominant religious and caste-class establishments. Establishing secularism today also requires a fight against religious establishments and caste-gender inequalities. One problem is that few proclaimed secularists have recognised this. An important exception has been the philosopher Akheel Bilgrami. In arguing that Nehru's secularism was at best a holding action since it was in fact imposed "from outside" the political process, he stresses that the process of building a politically negotiated agreement among different religious groups and communities requires fighting hierarchies such as Brahmanism. In fact, the mutual understanding needed to live together in peace cannot be achieved as long as the Brahmanic leadership of the VHP presumes to speak for all "Hindus," or the orthodox mullahs for "Muslims" or upper-caste church hierarchies for "Christians" and so on. The varying religious and cultural communities in India have to constitute themselves in new and more democratic ways. An example might be seen in the early 20th century movement of the Akalis to take control of Sikh holy places out of the hands of the traditional mahants — a fight that contrasts starkly with the fact that the temples of the bhakti movements are still controlled by priests of only one caste.

What are the chances for alternative processes to take place? Dalit-Bahujans and others in all the different religious communities have begun to assert themselves; this takes varying forms. There have been movements of "OBC Muslims" or "Dalit Christians"; there are alternative cultural and literary movements everywhere. There are important stirrings at the base of Indian society today, movements of cultural and religious democraticisation. But these need political and intellectual support. Here, if reluctance to deal with basic ideological flaws, floundering by the Congress, sidelining of caste and religious issues by the Left, and opportunism by Dalit-based parties such as the BSP all continue, the outlook for a truly democratic and pluralistic secular society, and the concurrent dangers of intensified violence in the name of religion, will remain dismal.

(Concluded)

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