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THE SRI LANKAN President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, probably does not intend to immediately implement her threat to dismiss the country's Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, but the underlying concerns that have prompted her to raise the possibility of such action have to be taken note of. What merits attention is not so much the President's accusation that the Prime Minister has transgressed constitutional proprieties by failing to keep her adequately informed about the status of the negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but rather the underlying charge that Mr. Wickremesinghe is being incautious in his approach to these negotiations. Ms. Kumaratunga's misgivings in this regard were articulated earlier in the week by her Senior Adviser on Foreign Affairs, Lakshman Kadirgamar, who had characterised the negotiation as one in which the LTTE dictated the terms while the Government was willing to pay any price for peace. Such an assessment cannot be dismissed as partisan or lopsided since the Government's negotiating team did appear to have been unduly accommodative of the LTTE's approach during the fourth round of talks earlier this month, including its trenchant refusal to contemplate any diminution of its military strength. It was strange to see the Government's chief negotiator agreeing with the LTTE that Ms. Kumaratunga's suggestion that the Black Tiger suicide squads be disbanded as a gesture of sincerity should be addressed only when a permanent political settlement was on the verge of being accomplished. Neither did the Government side appear to be as concerned as it should have been when the LTTE unilaterally suspended its participation in the sub-committee for de-escalation and normalisation and fired off a rhetorical tirade against the Sri Lankan military commander in the Jaffna area. The Sri Lankan Cabinet's willingness to give the benefit of the doubt to the LTTE in military matters is not understandable in the face of this organisation's blatant assertion that its armed strength adds substantial content to its relevance. The LTTE's chief negotiator, Anton S. Balasingham, has asserted that the organisation's military strength provided it with bargaining power and rejected outright any negotiations directed at a reduction of its combat potential either the disarmament of its cadres or a decommissioning of its weapons till a final political settlement has been reached. Given the many complexities that have to be sorted out before a political settlement is arrived at, this statement is tantamount to a declaration that the LTTE will remain a predominantly military entity for a long time to come. A cursory glance at the LTTE's bloodthirsty record provides adequate proof that this would be a wholly unwelcome prospect. Since the LTTE has not entirely abandoned its maximalist demands, this assertion could also be interpreted as a threat that its militarism could be fully revived if it is disappointed with the developments on the political front. It was fortunate that Colombo's representatives at the last round of talks did not succumb to the LTTE's high pressure efforts to have the northern High Security Zone (HSZ) thrown open for the re-settlement of internally displaced persons. It is the assessment of the Sri Lankan military an assessment supported by the Presidential office that any dilution of the HSZs would lead to the penetration of these areas by LTTE cadres. Less contentious issues such as the re-settlement of internally displaced persons in areas outside the HSZs and the evolving of a common approach on human rights issues are to be taken up before the negotiators revert to the discussion of the highly sensitive political and military aspects of the situation. A report to be prepared by an Indian military expert, working in a private capacity, could form the basis for negotiations when the future of the HSZs is discussed once again. But Colombo's representatives at the talks would do well to heed the warning of their own armed forces, and of an international team monitoring military affairs, that the dismantling of the HSZs must be linked to the diminution of the LTTE's military potential.
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