The Hindu : The invisible line between conventional and nuclear war

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Thursday, Jan 02, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

The invisible line between conventional and nuclear war

By Amit Baruah

The Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, has provided considerable food for thought to Indian strategic planners in the New Year when he said that a war with India would not be a conventional one.

Whatever the "boast factor" in his statement made in Karachi on Monday, Indian military strategists need to remove some of their cobwebs when looking at Pakistan.

The story of how Pakistan acquired its nuclear capability is instructive insofar as "nuclear doctrine" is concerned. From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's promise in the 1970s that Pakistanis would eat grass but acquire nuclear capability — Rawalpindi has done everything from stealing and smuggling to get the job done.

And, when India conducted a nuclear test in May 1998, the Pakistani military got the opportunity it needed to demonstrate its nuclear capability to a sceptical domestic audience and the international community.

Had India not tested, large sections of the Pakistani public opinion would not have been satisfied about whether or not the country actually had the wherewithal to match India on the nuclear front.

The Pakistani nuclear capability is not for "show"; it is not just for deterrence. In a scenario where Pakistan feels threatened, these weapons can be used. And it will not be India, but Pakistan, which will decide when India crosses that ``threshold''.

Indian perceptions of Pakistan's nuclear intention must err on the side of "use" — not that of "non-use". The steadfast refusal of the Pakistanis to give a commitment of "no first-use" says enough about Islamabad's "intentions".

The General may have exaggerated when he said that a war with India (earlier this year) would not have remained "conventional" even if a single soldier had crossed the Line of Control (LoC) or the International Border. But, if India had embarked on a full-scale conventional war, then Pakistan would not have but been aware of its enormous conventional weaknesses. Such an awareness can only reinforce Pakistani reliance on its nuclear capability.

All those who talk endlessly about the need for surgical strikes against Pakistan, including hitting at terrorist camps, must understand that Islamabad's response will not be a "limited one".

Had India done a Kargil and Pakistan was at the receiving end, one shudders to think what would have been the response of the hot-headed Generals in Rawalpindi.

The fact that India did not cross the LoC or the international border in 1999 won India full dividends abroad. Pakistan was recognised the world over as the aggressor, but it took some time for this to happen. Islamabad will not have that much "time" to respond to any Indian provocation.

Given the manufactured paranoia about India in Pakistan, any little action from New Delhi will be construed as a big threat by the "faujis" sitting in Rawalpindi.

Those responsible for building up India as the bugbear in Pakistan are the very persons responsible for upholding Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For a country and military, which lost its eastern wing to a perceived Indian action back in 1971, the paranoia and fear about India runs deep.

This is something that many Indian strategic planners do not take into account.

Many perceptive Pakistani analysts point out that unleashing the "jehadis" against India was not so much about Kashmir, but about getting even with India for its role in the creation of Bangladesh.

Terrorism cannot be combated by military mobilisation or even a war.

If Indian defence strategists believe that "war" remains the only option, then they are mistaken.

The role of intelligence (as was demonstrated by the release of the Musharraf-Mohammad Aziz conversation during the Kargil war) and covert actions (for which Indian intelligence agencies have no appetite and little capability) is the middle path between doing nothing and going to war.

To get back to Gen. Musharraf's statement, there is little need for an official Indian response.

If the international community is listening, it is they who need to respond given their deep concern about a possible nuclear exchange between South Asia's "irresponsible" neighbours.

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