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``HOW LONG can the spider's web last?'' asked a cheeky one-line letter in a prominent Pakistani English daily referring to the Bonn Agreement reached among the various Afghan factions.

It would have been dismissed as the reaction of a born cynic if it did not pertain to Afghanistan's affairs. The unending strife of 23 years, thanks first to the proxy war between the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union and later the civil war, has turned every optimist on the country into a pessimist.

This is what makes the Bonn Agreement an extraordinary achievement notwithstanding its limitations. However hard the U.S.-led coalition might try to sell the agreement as one by those truly representing the Afghans, the fact remains that the leaders were handpicked by America.

If the Taliban militia, which controlled over 90 per cent of Afghanistan before its collapse, could not claim to represent Afghans despite being at the helm for six years, there is no way the Northern Alliance and other groups brought together at Bonn could claim the status.

Nevertheless, the various Afghan groups did surprise the world community. No one expected the accord to be reached so soon and so smoothly. Of course, the tremendous pressure from the international community and the billions of dollars of donor commitment for the ``reconstruction'' of Afghanistan would have helped expedite the process.

For Pakistan, the accord is a great solace given its stakes in Afghanistan and all that it lost with the collapse of the Taliban. As an editorial in the English daily, Dawn, pointed out: ``For Pakistan it is a matter of immense satisfaction that its western neighbour should have opted for peace, stability and progress after more than two decades of trauma and anarchy. No country was more seriously affected by the events in Afghanistan than Pakistan; conversely, no country stands to gain more from what one hopes will be a period of lasting peace and an enduring era of national reconciliation and reconstruction of Afghanistan''.

The accord coincided with the Taliban's decision to surrender its last stronghold, Kandahar, which is good news for the new regime headed by Mr. Hamid Karzai as it gets ready to grapple with the minefield of the problems in Afghanistan.

The fall of Kandahar is the result of the relentless bombardment by the U.S.-led coalition and has nothing to do with the Bonn Agreement. The same factor saw the ascendance of the Northern Alliance to power.

Does the transfer of power in Kandahar mean the total eclipse of the Taliban? It is difficult to hazard a guess. Little is known about the casualties suffered by the Taliban during the campaign, but there is little doubt that there have been more civilian deaths.

So where have all the Taliban cadres gone? Have they just melted into the crowds? Answers to these questions are important for the future of Afghanistan. If the Taliban mindset is active, it is bound to impact on the work of the new setup.

The main concern of Mr. Karzai, head of the new setup, seems to be about the disgruntled Taliban cadres haunting the new administration. Strangely, the U.S. and the rest of the world which hailed the Bonn Agreement as historic were, in the same breath, undermining Mr. Karzai's authority on the question of the treatment of Taliban leadership. The dilemma faced by Mr. Karzai on account of the Kandahar surrender and the fate of Mullah Omar indicate the challenges ahead.

The U.S.-led coalition has left no one in doubt that it will be guided by its own interests in deciding the course of events even after the Karzai Government takes charge.

Those who matter in the Bush Administration have said the military campaign will continue as long as deemed necessary. Of the three objectives the U.S. had set for itself before the campaign, two remain - the capture of Osama bin Laden and the dismantling of Al-Qaeda.

It is indeed a peculiar situation for the Karzai Government. As long as the U.S. continues to dictate the agenda, it will be a ``puppet regime''.

On the other hand, the minute the U.S.-led forces leave the country, several threats lurking within and without will surface. In a way it is a no-win situation. The challenges from within are evident from the grumbling voices over the composition of the Council of Ministers with those left out denouncing it as ``imbalanced''.

The Uzbek warlord, General Rashid Dostum, and the Pashtun royalist, Pir Sayed Ahmed Gilani, have criticised the accord.

Though the interim setup is to be headed by one of them (Mr. Karzai), there is a feeling that Pashtuns have got a raw deal at Bonn. The fact that the Tajiks have managed to garner the important portfolios of Foreign, Affairs, Defence and the Interior is the main grievance of the Pashtuns.

Several others in the Northern Alliance, including the Acting President, Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Commander Ismail Khan, are unhappy over the way things have gone in Bonn. There are also reports of some disgruntled Northern Alliance members trying to reach out to the Taliban.

It would indeed be a Herculean task for the Karzai Government to establish its authority and make a meaningful contribution within six months as there are too many warlords demanding their slice of the cake.

The Bonn accord provides for some kind of international peace force. But for the time being it would be limited to Kabul. Besides, there are serious differences within the Northern Alliance on the desirability of such a force.

Mr. Karzai will need all the luck in the world to balance the contradictions and bring a semblance of governance to the war-ravaged country.

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