India-U.S. ties after Sept. 11

By Kanti Bajpai

THERE ARE storm clouds gathering over India-U.S. relations. That is at least a growing impression amongst middle class Indians. A steadily enlarging view is that the U.S. has struck something like a deal with Pakistan in order to obtain its cooperation at a crucial juncture in U.S. history - as it did in the 1950s and 1980s-and that Indian concerns and anxieties are, in the end, dispensable. As a partisan of good India-U.S. relations, this is dismaying to say the least. Can anything be done to stem the rot? Yes, but the U.S. must act fairly quickly.

The U.S. Government and its diplomats in Delhi have tried to dispel the image that the U.S. is once again signing Pakistan up to a strategic relationship as a ``frontline'' state. Unfortunately, they have not succeeded. The U.S. administration has forthrightly denied that Washington has agreed to the various conditions that Islamabad has reportedly listed as a prerequisite for its cooperation in dealing with the aftermath of September 11. Nevertheless, Indian opinion once again is veering round to the cynical view that the U.S. has sold India down the Indus.

The U.S. anxiety to get Pakistan in its coalition of ``moderate'' Islamic influentials is understandable - politically, diplomatically, and militarily. And the benefits of having India in that coalition are unclear: what, after all, can India immediately do? Given India's domestic constraints, it may not be in a position to play much of a military role, and politically and diplomatically India may be a liability in cobbling together a coalition with moderate Islamic states including Pakistan.

But there is a longer-term consideration. India is the only democratic country that has dealt with terrorism of various kinds-in Kashmir, in Punjab, and in the Northeast - with some success over 50 years, and therefore it stands as something of an example. It is also the largest developing country to offer to be part of the emerging international coalition. Finally, it is in a fight with Pakistan over Kashmir and has a stake in the outcome of U.S. policies in the region. India therefore matters in a coalition dedicated to managing terrorism problem.

What should the U.S. and India do to salvage a situation that is deteriorating, at least in the eyes of the Indian public? Washington admittedly has a lot on its hands. But managing the emerging coalition is one of them, and if India is an important partner in that coalition then the U.S. must spend some time thinking about how to reassure Indians. The U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Colin Powell, has indicated that, within limits, he is sensitive to Pakistani concerns; the U.S. must make a gesture or two towards Indian anxieties. Washington should do the following in the short and longer term.

First, as many times as necessary, the U.S. should publicly emphasise that it has not and will not do a deal with Pakistan that is inimical to Indian interests - in the din of Indian democratic politics, statements like these bear repetition so that they go home. At the moment, Indians are giving the U.S. the benefit of the doubt. At a time of national calamity in the U.S., it is hardly seemly for India to press the Bush administration. However, Indians have noticed that in the first three days after the attack, there was virtually no reference to India and its offer of help. In the meantime, the Pakistanis have done a terrific job as usual of suggesting that they have a special relationship with the U.S. and that another deal is in the making. The Pakistani Ambassador, Ms. Maleeha Lodhi's interview with Wolf Blitzer on CNN was a masterful performance in this regard.

Second, the U.S. must find something cooperative it can do with India - and sooner rather than later. It does not have to be anything very dramatic and intense, but it should get a good public airing so that it registers in the Indian public's mind. Perhaps the Brajesh Mishra or Jaswant Singh visits to Washington will solve this particular problem in the near future.

Third, Washington must, at least privately, tell New Delhi that it will go beyond the immediate terrorism problem focussed on Afghanistan. While the U.S. President, Mr. Geroge W. Bush, and his advisers have certainly made that point publicly a number of times since September 11, it bears repeating. The U.S. may at this point be telling India that to the extent that it does something about Afghanistan it will have done something to help India's cause in Kashmir. This is debatable.

One could equally argue that shutting down the Afghanistan terrorism base will only cause it to migrate, possibly in part to India (i.e. Kashmir) but certainly to Pakistan from where it will be better disposed to turn its attention to Kashmir and other Indian locations. In Pakistan, it will be even more directly under Pakistani control. Islamabad's interest will be to increase the network's involvement in India. Islamabad will also be under pressure to turn these groups against India as payback for having failed to protect them in Afghanistan. If these groups intensify their operations in India or do something spectacular like September 11 against Indian targets, there will be fantastic pressure on New Delhi to retaliate massively. This could lead to a confrontation with Pakistan the likes of which we have not seen, with nuclear weapons not far away.

The U.S. should move on two fronts in respect of India's concerns. First of all, it should apply pressures on Pakistan to wind down fundamentalist influences. This means at the very least redefining the role of madrassa education in Pakistan. In addition, it means rooting out fundamentalist elements in the armed forces. Finally, and most importantly in the short to medium term, it implies shutting down the militant groups operating in Kashmir. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Hizbul Mujahideen are the three most important outfits. Washington should get Islamabad to act hard and fast against these groups and at least disarm them. To engineer the return of democracy in Pakistan is a laudable goal of U.S. policy; but it is not the central concern of Indians unless democratisation addresses the above issues.

The second front that the U.S. should move on, quietly but firmly, is to bring Kashmiri groups round to participating in Kashmir's electoral process. Some Kashmiri factions and sections are interested in contesting the polls. But the APHC has not come out publicly in support of the idea. Washington should use its influence with these groups. Pakistan will oppose Kashmiris voting and participating in the elections. Here is where the U.S. can again be helpful beyond just Afghanistan. Mr. Bush said that it would be a long hard campaign against terrorist violence and that it would require the use of punitive as well as positive incentives, that any strategy would have to combine economic, diplomatic, and political instruments in addition to the military. This would be a vital test case of subtle, strong, and extended engagement with the issue of terrorism.

In closing, it is worth noting the good things the US has so far done. It has emphasised a measured, step-by-step diplomatic approach before resorting to force. It is conducting a massive investigation of the attacks to pinpoint responsibility. It has suggested that it will in some manner, without jeopardising its intelligence sources, share its findings with the international community. It has insisted that its crusade against terrorism is not a crusade against Islam. It is putting together a diverse coalition. It seems likely that it will seek U.N. endorsement of action against the perpetrators of the attack of September 11. And it has urged Americans not to attack Muslims and other minorities in the U.S. These are wise decisions and make India's cooperation with the U.S. more plausible.

(The writer teaches at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi.)

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