Corruption fuels a war

In Chechnya, Russia has to deal with the rebelsand its own corrupt military commanders whohave a vested interest in keeping the conflictgoing, says Vladimir Radyuhin.

RUSSIA'S SECOND war for control over breakaway Chechnya will enter its third year next month. It has already been going on longer than the first Chechen war, which lasted 22 months and ended in a de facto recognition of Chechnya's independence in August 1996, yet victory is nowhere in sight this time either.

Despite repeated claims by the Russian military to having broken organised rebel resistance, a full-scale guerilla war is under way in the separatist region. Russian troops, numbering between 50,000 and 80,000 according to different estimates, continue to suffer daily losses as Chechens mine roads and ambush military convoys. Official losses averaged 73 men a month last winter and have climbed to over 100 men a month in summer with rebels taking advantage of forest cover to step up attacks on federal troops. The toll is fast approaching the 3,800 official count of troops killed during the first war. The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers says the real losses are almost double the official figure.

The Moscow-appointed chief administrator, Mr. Akhmad Kadyrov, former religious head under the separatist Chechen President, Mr. Aslan Maskhadov, has not justified the Kremlin's hopes of winning over the population and rebel commanders to the Russian side. In fact, he has no chance of succeeding in a situation when civilians in Chechnya are daily subjected to hostile and even brutal handling by the Russian military.

The Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin, who rode to power in 2000 on a powerful wave of support for the war seen as revenge for Russia's humiliating defeat in the first Chechen war, is now under strong pressure to end the fighting. According to a recent opinion poll, just 33 per cent of Russians are in favour of continuing the war, whereas 56 per cent want peace talks with the rebels. The war, which costs Russia an estimated $1 billion a year, is hampering the country's economic revival and clouding its relations with the West. If the war drags on much longer, it may endanger Mr. Putin's chances of a second term in 2004.

Worst of all, the longer the war goes on, the more destructive its effect on the army's morale. Rampant corruption has emerged as a strong driving force of the conflict. Russian military commanders have turned the war into a profitable undertaking, engaging in oil smuggling, selling weapons to rebels, and extorting ransom money from relatives of detailed Chechens. Russian war correspondents report periodical shootouts between rival Russian military units for control of oil wells and illegal mini- refineries. Television regularly shows unearthed caches of brand-new Russian weapons apparently bought by rebels from Russian troops.

Chechen rebels doing business with Russian commanders enjoy immunity. The story of one of the most notorious warlords, Arbi Barayev, is a typical example. Known as ``The Terminator'' for his personal count of 170 murders, including that of three Britons and a New Zealander in 1998, Barayev was on the list of Chechnya's most wanted criminals. Yet, for nearly two years after the second Chechen war began in September 1999, Barayev lived openly in the republic, often appearing in public and even hosting lavish wedding receptions. It was not until Mr. Putin personally berated his generals for their inaction that they moved. In June, Barayev was killed, even though he could have been easily arrested. But then he would have told investigators how he was able to travel freely in the region on a military- issued pass, who helped him run his lucrative kidnapping business and who sold him Russian weapons.

Many more warlords like Barayev are still at large. They suit the purpose of corrupt Russian commanders as useful business partners and at the same time as justification for massive Russian military presence in Chechnya. The war has gained a momentum of its own which Mr. Putin is finding hard to break. He is fighting on two fronts, having to deal not only with Chechen rebels, but also with military commanders who have a vested interest in keeping the conflict going.

In an effort to break this vicious circle of corruption and violence, Moscow has replaced several top military commanders in Chechnya and handed over control of the operation to the Federal Security Service, which is admittedly least tainted by corruption. Mr. Putin's trusted appointees to the key posts of Defence and Interior Ministers have also launched a drive to root out corruption among the top brass in Moscow, who are believed to be linked to the ``commercial war'' in Chechnya.

The Kremlin has adopted a three-pronged strategy in Chechnya: the military has been told to hunt down warlords instead of conducting sweeping house-to-house raids and arrests that only antagonise the local population; Moscow has moved to rebuild a judicial system to cope with excesses against civilians; and it has allocated considerable funds to create jobs and revive the devastated economy. The success of this strategy will hinge on Moscow's ability to curb corruption among the military commanders and civilian administrators in Chechnya and will require a lot of patience and perseverance.

The Russian leadership seems reconciled to the inevitable conclusion that it will take years to `win' Chechnya. Kremlin officials no longer make optimistic predictions of a swift victory. Instead, they like to recall that it took the Soviet army 10 years to crush gangs of bandits and anti-Soviet ``forest brothers'' after the end of World War Two.

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