A verification protocol for BWC?

ARMS CONTROL and disarmament efforts seem to have reached a dead end in the nuclear sphere. Where banning of chemical weapons is concerned, Ron G. Manley, Director of Verification for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) based at The Hague, Netherlands, recently stated in an interview that the U.S., Russia and other key member states were largely responsible for the current financial crunch, an outcome of their failure to pay their annual assessments on time and failing to reimburse the group for inspections and other activities. As a result, the international organisation charged with verifying the 1997 treaty that bans chemical weapons is in debt and even with belt-tightening and other economies, the OPCW would probably be able to conduct only 60 to 80 of the 140 inspections scheduled for this year.

However, it is in the sphere of arms control of biological weapons that a major success can be achieved provided a six-year deadlock in negotiations to create a global inspection system to detect and deter cheating i.e., a verification protocol is agreed upon so that the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC can consider it for adoption at its session slated to begin in November 2001.

Safeguard against cheating

The BWC that was negotiated from 1969-1971 was signed as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction on April 10, 1972, at London, Moscow and Washington DC., and entered into force on March 26, 1975 with 43 member countries, upon ratification by the three depository states - the U.S. the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. India ratified the Convention on July 5, 1974. A little more than a quarter century later 144 countries have ratified the pact. Though the four-page treaty was the first to ban a category of arms it included no safeguards against cheating.

The Treaty has 15 Articles and prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition by other means or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin and method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification of prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, as well as weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The destruction of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery in the possession of the parties, or their diversion to peaceful purposes, should be effected not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention.

The BWC, which has an unlimited duration, called for a review (Article XII) and the First Review Conference was held from March 3-21, 1980. A U.N. resolution in November 1982 called on the signatories to establish compliance procedures.

The Second Review Conference which met in Geneva from September 8-26, 1986, strengthened the procedures for consultation in the case of compliance concerns. The BWC Third Review Conference was held from September 9-27, 1991. During this conference, it was decided that future review conferences would be held every five years at least. This conference recognised the need for stronger measures and mandated the convening of an ad hoc group of government experts (also known as ``verification experts'' or VEREX group) to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint.

Eventually 21 measures were identified and grouped in two categories. Surveillance of scientific publications, data declarations, notifications of activities, remote sensing, and environment sampling and analysis were included as possible ``off-site'' measures while possible ``on-site'' measures included scientific exchanges, visual inspection, interviews, identification of relevant equipment, sampling and analysis and continuous monitoring with cameras or other sensors. In the last of the four meetings held between March 1992 and September 1993 in Geneva VEREX submitted its consensus final report to all BWC member states in which the experts found that because of the dual-use nature of BW-related facilities, equipment and materials, no single measure could fulfil all of the mandated criteria for a stand alone verification measure. The group, however, concluded that some measures, used singly or in combination, could strengthen the regime by helping to differentiate prohibited from permitted activities, thus reducing ambiguities about issues of compliance.

In September 1994, a special conference of BWC states parties met at Geneva to consider VEREX final report and decide on further action. It was agreed that an ad hoc group would be established ``to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument...'' It was in July 1997 that the AHG successfully transitioned to negotiation of the rolling text of a protocol and subsequent meetings have seen the elaboration of language for the various Articles and Annexes of the protocol. Between 1995 and 1996, the AHG held five meetings but it was unable to complete its mandate of providing draft proposals prior to the Fourth Review Conference that was held from November 25 to December 6, 1996. The conference was unable to achieve a consensus for setting a deadline for the AHG's work but agreed that it (AHG) should intensify its work so as to try and complete it possibly before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference, scheduled to start in November 2001.

Currently, as per the mandate given at the Fourth Review Conference the AHG of State Parties to the BWC is negotiating a protocol, in order to strengthen the Convention, which includes measures for verification. Generally, there is agreement that there should be an international operating organisation which is similar to that of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW and that there should be initial declarations of past offensive and defensive BW activities and of current biodefence programmes and facilities, vaccine production facilities, maximum containment facilities, and work with listed agents. Also, general agreement is there for challenge investigation at the request of a state party, including investigation on-site, of suspected breach of the Convention.

Points of disagreement

However, almost all of the elements of the potential protocol are subject to disputes and among disagreements of greatest concern are those relating to: the future form and operation biological- related export controls; the extent of commitments to sharing and cooperation for peaceful purposes; the purpose and effectiveness of certain kinds of visits and related activities; the level of detail of the information provided in declarations, the prospect for conducting clarification visits at undeclared sites; and procedures for initiating a challenge investigation at a facility or in the field.

However, it is becoming increasingly clear that with less than seven weeks of negotiations this year, a breakthrough enabling agreement cannot be reached without a major political push and some vigorous and efficient negotiations. This was made clear from the statements at the conclusion of the first day of the 23rd session of the AHG (April 23-May 11) which showed that different countries differed on the necessity and desirability of introducing a ``composite text'' that Tibor Toth, the Hungarian diplomat who is Chairman of the talks released on March 30. In the six years of negotiations since the AHG's creation, negotiators have arrived at 250-page draft, which has over 1,000 brackets, which indicate points of disagreement. Toth's composite text is more than 200 pages and would require that signatories of the BWC declare the existence of some of their facilities engaged in biotechnology which could be inspected. Also, the text provides for investigations into suspected clandestine biological weapons programmes and suspected use of biological weapons.

A little more than a quarter century has elapsed since the BWC came into existence. It becomes clear that after more than five years of negotiation, the AHG must ``seize the moment'' and do what it takes to have a Verification Protocol ready before the Fifth Review Conference. Otherwise, the BWC would remain just the paper-tiger that it is at present.

KALPANA CHITTARANJAN

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