Nothing illustrates more clearly Washington’s diplomatic failure over the decades to contain Pyongyang’s military and nuclear ambitions than the U.S. deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) , an American anti-ballistic missile, to South Korea. There seems little prospect of a reversal of this impasse as U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently warned North Korea of pre-emptive action besides rejecting a Chinese proposal for Washington and Seoul to cease joint military exercises in return for Pyongyang to freeze its nuclear programme. Notably, the idea of negotiating a freeze in further nuclear and missile tests has found favour among prominent nuclear and defense experts in previous dispensations as a more realistic first step over expectations of a total dismantlement of the country’s arsenal. The immediate provocation for the THAAD installation seems to be the test-launch of four ballistic missiles by the North in early March and the second exercise since U.S. President Donald Trump assumed office.
Deployment of THAAD
But the case for the THAAD also appears to stem from considerations of a long-term nature. For instance, questions are being raised in the U.S. strategic community about the efficacy of the so-called “left of launch” cyber and electronic techniques that were meant to intercept North Korean missiles at the take-off stage. These controversial measures were authorised by the Barack Obama administration in response to North Korea’s 2013 nuclear test. Corroborating those concerns, a 2017 report to the UN underscores Pyongyang’s continued mastery of sophisticated scientific know-how. Its recurrent nuclear and missile tests in 2016, the report says, have led to “technological milestones in weapons of mass destruction capability and all indications are that this pace will continue.”
The merits behind the alternative THAAD interceptor is said to be the protection it affords against short- to medium-range ballistic missile attacks, deploying what is known as “hit-to-kill” technology. South Korea and the U.S. have repeatedly emphasised that the sole focus of THAAD was the North’s expanding capabilities. But Washington’s long-standing strategic objectives in the region as a counter-weight to Beijing do not rule out other intentions. China, which maintains a no first use nuclear policy in place, is concerned that the THAAD radar system would be an excuse for Washington to snoop on its own nuclear deterrent. The ongoing installation has already strained Seoul’s diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with Beijing. Moon Jae-in, leader of Seoul’s opposition Democratic Party, a strong contender in the May elections, has described the deployment of THAAD as an act of hubris, even as he acknowledged the difficulty of a rollback. He advocates active engagement with Pyongyang as the only realistic response to North Korea’s belligerence. Beijing’s concerns in the light of the anti-missile deployment should similarly be addressed by Seoul. Such damage control is not an unreasonable expectation.
